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This objective of this thesis is to explore welfare politics and welfare policy 
in Britain and South Korea (hereafter Korea) focusing on ex-miners with coal 
workers’ pneumoconiosis (hereafter CWP) and laws and institutions 
concerned (the IIA in 1946 and the CWPS in 1974 in Britain, and the IACI in 
1964 and the APPPPW in 1984 in Korea). The reason to choose this group is 
that they stand at complex conjunction of circumstances - the elderly, the 
poor, the disabled and the persons injured at work. In addition, the reason to 
examine laws and institutions concerned is that they contain more general 
issues of welfare politics.  
The theories adopted in this thesis are historical institutionalism and 
power resources theory which together give an important insight about 
institutions, politics and welfare state. Based on these theories, this thesis 
defines welfare politics, its determinants and why it may be deficient. The 
major elements of welfare politics can be characterized as class politics as 
exemplified in the role of trade unions, social democracy as a basic ideology 
and social corporatism as a type of political participation and policy-making. 
Generally there are three major variables in welfare politics; the organization 
of trade unions and control of their members; left-wing political parties and 
solidarity between trade unions and the parties; and the institutionalization of 
social dialogue and social policy.  
From the above determinants, the concept of ‘the deficiency of 
politics’ can be defined. Firstly, it is a weakness or extinction of class politics 
through the exclusion of the labour movement. Secondly, it can be explained 
by the weakness of progressive political parties in state politics or the lack of 
solidarity between labour unions and political parties resulting in a difficulty 
of access to social policy formation by trade unions. Finally, the concept of 
the ‘deficiency of politics’ is related to a poor legacy of institutions and the 






To summarize the research results, there are differences in the areas of 
welfare politics and welfare system between Britain and Korea. Welfare 
politics in Britain on this issue includes elements of class politics, labour 
politics and exchange politics based on balanced power relations among 
classes and the corporatist political system. Welfare politics in Korea, 
however, is characterized by pressure group politics in specific areas and 
legitimacy politics for national goals based on state corporatism. In addition, 
welfare politics has established different welfare institutions. Korea has 
established a residual welfare system while Britain has an institutional system. 
Furthermore, the institutions regulate their welfare politics in different ways: 
the interests of ex-miners with CWP are secured through established schemes 
by trade unions in Britain while in Korea the schemes are operated unfairly 
by interest groups in the interests of a sub-group of the sufferers. As a result, 
in Korea, welfare politics based on these politics and institutions leads 
beneficiaries to distrust the Government, relevant institutions, and even their 
own organization. Similarly, the distrust which exists in Korean ex-miners 
with CWP can be understood and explained in terms of social policy which 
has been formed and is being affected by welfare politics.    
There are five findings in this thesis. Firstly, the distrustful attitudes of 
Korean ex-miners with CWP originate from welfare institutions and welfare 
politics which are closely related. Secondly, the principle of new 
institutionalism, the correlation between institution and politics, is evident in 
compensation politics in both Britain and Korea. Thirdly, in an explanation of 
the Korean welfare state, a power resources model rooted in political 
economy and corporatism is more persuasive than a cultural approach based 
upon Confucianism. Fourthly, there are many differences in this policy area 
between Britain and Korea despite similarities in their welfare state regimes. 
Fifthly, politics rather than institutions are the dominant explanatory 





CHAPTER 1. CWP AND QUESTIONS 
 
 
1. Comparative Social Policy between Britain and Korea   
 
 
This thesis aims to explore the industrial injuries schemes for British and 
South Korean ex-miners with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (hereafter 
CWP) in order to understand social policy and welfare politics. In order 
to do this, CWP or pneumoconiosis patients will be chosen as a case 
study. In general, case studies provide a more complete understanding of 
a situation’s complexity than other research methods and are helpful to 
arrive at the essence of socio-political phenomena. It is expected that 
examining the social policy and welfare politics concerning CWP will 
lead to an in-depth understanding of the British and South Korean welfare 
states and social policies.   
The case of CWP will be examined through comparison of South 
Korea (hereafter Korea) and Britain. Why is a comparative social policy 
study useful in understanding the problems surrounding CWP? A clue to 
the answer to this question is given by May:  
 
Comparative social policy centres on the complex task of examining the 
welfare order in different countries, identifying commonalties and 
differences, explaining these and considering possible future 
developments. More pragmatically it is concerned with improving 
provision in one country through drawing on the experience of others 
and assessing the implications of different systems for individuals and 
the wider society (May, 2004 : 19). 
 
Comparative social policy analysis has generally been regarded as a 
methodology which can give lessons for social policy and allow an in-





comparative social policy study between Britain and Korea will illustrate 
the broader situation of the British and Korean welfare systems and will 
be useful in finding an alternative based on the strong and weak points of 
each country.  
Why have Britain and Korea been selected as the objects for 
comparison in this study of ex-miners with CWP? In general, studies 
which adopt a comparative social policy are divided into two groups: one 
group emphasizes the similarities, concentrating on their common 
determinants, while the other group takes notes of the differences, 
identifying the distinctiveness of the welfare states being studied (Kwon, 
1999: 7). Looking at the similarities or differences between comparative 
objects is a requisite for comparative social policy research. Britain and 
Korea are good cases for a comparative social policy study due to the fact 
that while they have some similarities, they are very different in terms of 
their social policies and welfare politics.  
With regard to their similarities, the two countries are both 
categorized as liberal welfare regimes. Britain has been following the 
Anglo-Saxon Model, a form of liberal welfare regime, since the advent of 
Thatcher’s government (Jones, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 
1994: 2006). Meanwhile, the economics and politics of Korea have 
developed rapidly1  and its welfare state has been advanced accordingly 
                                                 
1 Korea has reformed itself into a rapidly industrializing nation through its Five Year 
Economic Development Plans beginning in 1962 (Kown, 1993). As a result, Korea has 
become the world’s eleventh-largest economic power and became a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996. The 
economic growth in Korea has been seen as a surprise around the world. The miracle of 
its economic growth can be seen in some economic indexes. For example, in 1961, per 
capita GNP was only $82 and exports amounted to only $41 million, but in 2006, GNP 
had increased to $19,392 and exports to $325,464,000,000 (OPRK, 2000; Kown, 1993, 
30; Korean Statistical Information Service, http://www.kosis.kr). Even more surprising 
is the political development in Korea. The transformation from a military to a civilian 
government in 1987 meant the beginning of democracy, and there have since been five 
democratic elections for the presidency. During the elections, Korea has experienced 
two peaceful changeovers of political power where an opposition party has become the 





(see chapter 3.4). In particular, Korean social welfare has been 
strengthened under the motto “the Harmonious Development of 
Democracy and Market” of Kim Dae Jung’s Government (1997-2002). 
Since the welfare reforms were implemented, debates about the 
characteristics of the Korean welfare state have been raised. In these 
debates, some scholars claim that Korea has a liberal welfare regime like 
Britain’s2.  Thus, there is a convergence on welfarism between ‘the 
social investment state’, based on Britain’s ‘The Third Way’ (Giddens, 
1998), and ‘The Productive Welfare’, based on ‘the Harmonious 
Development of Democracy and Market’ in Korea (OPRK, 2000).   
The mining industries in Britain and Korea were very different in 
their initial stages, but since the Second World War they have become 
more similar since Korea has very quickly undergone industrialization 
and modernization by using coal fuel. In other words, both countries’ 
mining industries have followed the same course of development, 
although there are differences in scale and period. Furthermore, there are 
many similarities in the enactment and implementation of the relevant 
schemes. For example, the Industrial Injuries Act, the social insurance 
scheme, was introduced in Britain in 1946, the same year Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurance was enacted in Korea. Also, there was 
a gap of just 10 years’ between Coal workers Pneumoconiosis Scheme 
1974 and Act on the Prevention of Pneumoconiosis and Protection etc. of 
Pneumoconiosis Workers 1984 which are special measures for ex-miners 
with CWP.  
The justification for a comparative social policy study lies in the 
                                                                                                                        
all interests to competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty” (1991: 14), Korea has 
achieved procedural democracy consolidation in just 20 years. 
2 It has been also asserted that the Korean welfare regime is a conservative welfare 
regime like the style of Continental Europe (Nam, 2002), a mixture of the two regimes 
between the conservative and the liberal (Kim, Y.M., 2002; Kim, M.S., 2002), or the 
East Asian Welfare Model (Jones 1993; Holliday, 2000; Goodman and Peng 1996). By 
and large, however, opinion seems to have converged that, since the 1997 financial crisis 





differences as much as the similarities between the two countries. First of 
all, it is indicated that there have been fundamental differences in 
ideology, welfare politics and welfare institutions despite the convergence 
of welfare philosophies and policies currently taking place. For instance, 
although Britain tends to follow the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon model, 
the British welfare system can still be characterized as relatively 
institutional compared with the Korean one. This is closely related to 
legacies of social welfare. There has been a comprehensive welfare 
system in Britain since it was implemented under the Labour Government 
in 1945, despite a series of efforts towards welfare retrenchment under the 
Governments of Thatcher and Blair which have tended towards a neo-
liberal welfare system, so-called ‘welfare to work’. Pierson (1994) 
explains  that welfare retrenchment has proceeded very slowly despite 
active and direct attacks on social programmes by these Governments due 
to the strong resistance of welfare states’ own constituencies.      
Korea, on the other hand, through demonstration and 
industrialization has introduced welfare institutions in a piecemeal 
fashion and, as a result, reached the point at which it could be called a 
welfare state in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Korea 
remains in a limited residual situation. For example, social insurance 
programmes have not benefited a significant percentage of the population 
and the public old-age pension programme only covered about 40 percent 
of the working population as recently as the late 1990s. In addition, only 
about 27 percent of the working population have benefitted from 
employment insurance since 1995 (Woo, 2004: 1). The fundamental 
problem is that policy aims have not changed from those of a developing 
state: “The objective of pursuing economic growth at all costs, which first 
emerged during the period of authoritarian industrialization, remains 






Table 1-1 Trade Union Density in Korea and Britain 
Year Korea Britain 






1965 362 301,922  629 10,325,000 49 
1970 419 473,259  538 11,179,000 52 
1975 488 750,235  501 12,193,000 53 
1980 2,618 948,134 21 438 12,947,000 44 
1985 2,534 1,004,398 16.9 409 10,774,000 39 
Sources: Pelling (1987: 318-324) and Booth (1995); Korean Labor Institute (Labor 
Statistics), each year 
 
In addition, the two countries have been in very different situations in 
relation to welfare politics. The power resources theory has proved that 
the development of a welfare state depends on the roles of trade unions 
and left-wing political parties (Gough, 1979; Korpi, 1978; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Rothstein, 1990). The position and role of trade unions 
in the two countries were very different until the 1970s, and remain 
different. The power of trade unions in the two countries can be 
calculated by the density and type of these organizations. In the 1970s, 
the trade union density in Britain was about 50% and was about 15% in 
Korea (refer to Table 1-1). In 1974, there were 11,755,000 union members 
in 491 unions in Britain, and 656,000 union members in 3,352 trade 
unions in Korea. The reason why the union density of Korea is low, 
despite having more unions than Britain, is that the trade unions have 
been organized based on an industrial unit in Britain but on an enterprise 
unit in Korea3. From this point of view, it can easily be inferred that the 
Korean labour movement, based on an enterprise bargaining system and 
                                                 
3 Enterprise unions which confine their members to workers in their companies are a 
dominant type of organization in Japan and Korea. This type has identified as “an 
arrangement suitable for building an employer-led cooperative industrial relations 
system” (Bae and Cho, 2004: 148). On the other hand, the type of industrial unions is 
based on ‘one union for one industry’ and accordingly is advantageous to organize 
workers beyond enterprises. In this context, industrial unions rather than enterprise 





enterprise unions, has suffered problems of organization fragmentation 
and a lack of influence on social policy and politics.        
Regarding the influence of trade unions on political parties, trade 
unions have had close organizational and financial links with the Labour 
Party in Britain since the Labour Party was formed in 1900, mainly under 
the leadership of the trade unions. Many members of trade unions were 
affiliated to the Labour Party and trade unions provided most of the funds 
for the management of the Labour Party. In addition, trade unions could 
intervene in the policy-making bodies4 of the Labour Party. Trade unions 
have a great influence at Labour’s annual conference by virtue of their 
block vote and they also enjoy rights at Labour’s National Executive 
Committee. Furthermore, of the 393 Labour Members of Parliament 
elected in 1945, 120 were sponsored by trade unions, with 29 of these 
being appointed to ministerial posts, six of these in the Cabinet itself. 
Bevin’s successor at the Ministry of Labour was George Isaacs, a former 
trade union leader (Pelling, 1963: 221-2; Dorey, 1995: 17-18).  
Conversely, there was no progressive political party in Korea until 
1997. This is because no progressive group could exist in the political 
situation of anti-communist and authoritarian regimes after the Korean 
War (1950-1953) and there were no social groups, such as trade unions, 
to support a progressive political party. Instead, trade unions played the 
role of an advanced guard for the authoritarian government in factories. In 
other words, they armed themselves with the ideologies of anti-
communism and ‘high growth of Korean economy first’ and managed 
workers for the sake of the Government and employers. After 
democratization in 1987, a progressive party named ‘Kuminseongry 21’ 
                                                 
4 There are three major institutions in the Labour Party, the Party Conference, the 
National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Labour Party. “Conference 
delegates may claim to represent the memberships of their organizations, the NEC to 
represent the Conference delegates and, via them, the members of the party, and Labour 





(‘People’s Victory 21’ in English) was created in 1997 without the 
support of trade unions. The party changed its name to the ‘Democratic 
Labour Party’ in 2000 attracting support from some progressive trade 
unions, but it currently has just five legislators out of 299 and has an 
approval rating of 5%.  
As has been shown in this section, the similarities and differences 
between Britain and Korea in the areas of social policy and welfare 
politics provide a strong motivation for using a comparative social policy 
study in this thesis. This thesis will try to examine both aspects but more 
attention will be paid to the differences because they will guide us to an 
understanding of the development and characteristics of the welfare states 
in Britain and Korea and, what is more, will give an insight into the 
reforms of the Korean welfare state.       
 
 




Pneumoconiosis is an occupational disease defined as: “the accumulation 
of dust in the lungs and the tissue reactions to its presence.” 5 It covers 
various respiratory disorders caused by many kinds of dust, such as coal 
                                                 
5 The definition of pneumoconiosis was adopted at the Fourth International Conference 
on Pneumoconiosis held by the International Labour Organization in 1971. On the other 
hand, the expression pneumoconiosis, from the Greek pneuma (air, wind) and konis 
(dust), was coined in Germany by Zenker in 1867 to denote changes in the lungs caused 
by the retention of inhaled dust(Safety Line Institute, 2007: 2). The symptoms are: “This 
impaired physical capacity, reduced the ability of miners to perform their arduous labour, 
as well as many other physical activities, such as walking. In the most serious cases, 
death resulted from lung failure, or cardiac failure as the impaired capacity put pressure 





dust, asbestos dust, silica dust etc. 6 The object of study of this thesis is 
CWP which is a kind of pneumoconiosis7 caused by inhaling coal mine 
dust.  
It is interesting that discovery and acceptance of CWP as a 
prescribed work-related disease in relevant laws has taken a long time, 
although its existence has been recognized since at least the early 
nineteenth century. It was not until recent times that CWP was inscribed 
into law as an occupational disease, this occurred in 1943 in Britain and 
as late as 1963 in Korea (see Chapter 3-3). The discovery and recognition 
were not objectively realized with the acquisition of medical knowledge 
and rational discussion. Rather, they tended to be a product of political 
struggles and compromises among the relevant actors, namely the 
Government, employers, workers, and experts. 
In addition CWP tends to be identified as a historical disease 
which has already been eradicated because most mines in Britain and 
Korea were closed 2-30 years ago. But CWP is still at the centre of 
occupational diseases.  For example, there were 1,085 new patients with 
CWP and about 200 deaths from CWP in Britain in 2004 (HSE, 2007; 
ONS, 2005) and 5,239 new patients and over 300 deaths in Korea in the 
same year (Korea Workers’ Compensation & Welfare Service, 2005). 
CWP is still a noteworthy industrial disease with a high incidence and 
mortality although it is not the most controversial industrial disease. 
In order to understand the characteristics of CWP, it is necessary 
to understand why it occurs so broadly in mining industry. The medical 
explanation of the cause is the deposition of coal dust and formation of 
                                                 
6 According to the kinds of dust, there are many kinds of pneumoconiosis including 
CWP from coal dust: For instance, there are silicosis from silica dust, asbestosis from 
asbestos dust, byssinosis from cotton dust, siderosis from iron dust etc. 
7 There are different names for CWP, miners’ lung, black lung, ‘black spit’, ‘miners’ 
asthma’, silicosis, pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis etc. according to 
countries, times and parts (Kerr, 1980: 50-51; McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 2). This 






fibrous nodules in the lungs. Although this medical perspective offers 
clinical knowledge, it fails to understand the political and social context 
surrounding this disease. It is widely accepted that “occupational diseases 
are different from other diseases, not biologically but socially. They are 
the result of working conditions and therefore affect the labouring 
classes” (Sigerist, 1943: iv). The working conditions in mines are 
responsible because CWP is closely related to dust from extremely bad 
working conditions. Generally, working in coal mining has been 
recognized as one of the most dangerous trades or occupations (Arnot, 
1953: 23; Mclvor and Johnston, 2007: 41). From the early 1900s there 
were an average of between 1,000 and 1,500 deaths each year in pits. This 
means that on average four miners were killed every day in British 
coalfields (Arnot, 1953: 23; Anderson, 1982: 58). This trend continued 
until the 1950s. In 1955, 408 mineworkers were killed at work in Britain 
and roughly one in every three workers had an accident of some kind 
involving at least three days off work and the number of fatal accidents 
averaged more than one a day (Allen, 1981: 92). In the same context, 
mineworkers had been directly exposed to dust for a long time: 
 
At work coal miners are covered with dust. It’s in their hair, their 
clothes, and their skin. It gets between their teeth and they swallow it. 
They suck so much of it into their lungs that until they die they never 
stop spitting up coal dust. Some cough so hard they wonder if they have 
any lungs left (Kerr, 1980: 50).  
 
As a result the rate of fatalities from CWP was very high; between 1951 
and 1971 more than 17,000 miners and examiners died from 
pneumoconiosis in Britain (Kerr, 1980: 94), and in 1955 nearly 5,000 new 
compensation awards were granted for this disease (Kerr, 1980: 53). 
Who takes the responsibility for the bad workplaces and the 
occupational disease? “The prevention of occupational diseases is the 





medical, and social – must be applied to promote and protect the health of 
those who through their labour create the nation’s goods” (Sigerist, 1943: 
x). From this point of view, the Government, trade unions and employers 
should share the blame for CWP. In general, the Government’s economic 
policy and the employers’ business strategies had placed an emphasis on 
increasing productivity rather than workers’ health and safety. Therefore, 
CWP needs to be contextualised “within the profit-oriented and 
productionist managerial culture of coal mining in the private and public 
ownership eras” (Mclvor and Johnston, 2007: 309). In addition, the then 
industrial relations tended to be neglectful of occupational safety and 
diseases. In particular, trade unionists do not seem to be free of this 
responsibility because, compared with their wide range of interests 
concerning wages and workers’ welfare, it is not until recently that they 
have become earnestly interested in occupational health (Dwyer, 1991; 
Beaumont, 1983).  
As has been shown above, the excessive incidences of CWP could 
allow it to be considered a ‘man-made social disease’.  Therefore, the 
origins of CWP must be examined from a social and political perspective 
as well as a medical perspective. In this respect, it is right that this thesis 
should focus on welfare politics around the struggles for recognition and 
compensation for CWP.  
On the other hand, it is impossible to consider CWP separately 
from people who worked in the mines. Although in the past these workers 
were called ‘industrial soldiers’, at present they exist as the ‘injured 
people’. It is worthy of note that these people are facing many difficulties. 
Firstly, most of them are older people. Ex-miners with CWP are almost 
all aged over 65 because most mines in the two countries were closed 
between the 1960s and the 1980s. They can also be classified as being 
disabled because they are afflicted with a respiratory disease and old age 





to be living in poverty. This is inferred from the fact that mineworkers 
have historically come from underprivileged social and economic 
backgrounds and made a poor living due to low wages, and thus it is 
expected that they will still be poor people. Due to these complex 
characteristics, the sufferers require a mixture of social policies for the 
elderly, the disabled, the poor, the occupationally injured etc.  
The CWP-related institutions and politics are quite well 
established and developed because of the long history of the disease, the 
large number of sufferers of CWP, and the fact that CWP has been 
discussed in the political arena and in social policy. Furthermore, as will 
be shown in Chapter 3-2, the most crucial reason is the role of the miners’ 
organizations; the trade unions in the mining industry were the biggest 
trade unions, and so CWP has become a one of the biggest issues in the 
area of occupational diseases. Thus, the existence and role of strong trade 
unions will provide a good clue to understand welfare politics and the 
development of the institutions concerned.  
To conclude, ex-miners with CWP offer complex contradictions 
and provide a good clue to understanding welfare politics and class 
politics as well as welfare institutions in this context of relatively strong 
trade unions and well-established institutions.  
 
 
3. Study Object and Research Question 
 
 
Object of Study 
 
As has been discussed above, the object of study of this thesis is a 





specifically, this thesis will look at the welfare politics surrounding the 
formation, development and changes of compensation institutions 
concerning CWP in Britain and Korea. The cases examined in this thesis 
are the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act in 1946 (hereafter IIA), 
the Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis Scheme in 1974 (hereafter CWPS), 
the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance in 1964 (hereafter IACI) 
and the Act on the Prevention of Pneumoconiosis and Protection, Etc., of 
Pneumoconiosis Workers in 1984 (hereafter APPPPW). The first two are 
British schemes while the others are Korean (refer to Table 1-2).  
 
Table 1- 2 Compensation Institutions of CWP in Britain and Korea 
 Britain Korea 
Origin of 
Institution 
the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act in 
1946 
the Industrial Accident 




the National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act + 
the Coal Workers’ 
Pneumoconiosis Scheme in 
1974 
the Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance in 
1964 + the Act on the 
Prevention of Pneumoconiosis 
and Protection, Etc., of 
Pneumoconiosis Workers in 
1984 
 
The IIA8 in Britain and the IACI in Korea are regarded as institutions of 
path-shaping rather than path-dependence because they were newly 
established following the principle of national insurance. The British 
Labour Government introduced the IIA as a part of the establishment of a 
social security system in 1946. Under the IIA, pneumoconiosis became an 
                                                 
8  The IIA was incorporated into National Insurance (hereafter NI) in 1992 and 





object of state provisions of benefits. In Korea, the IACI, equivalent to 
the IIA in Britain, was introduced in 1965 by the authoritarian 
Government. The national insurance is based on a principle of ‘no-fault 
liability’ and provides benefits for CWP mainly from payments from 
employers.    
While the benefits of the IIA are provided by the Government, the 
CWPS is provided by employers in mining industry. The CWPS was 
introduced through compromise between labour and management in order 
to make up for compensation which would be awarded to miners through 
litigation. On the other hand, the APPPPW which contains special 
benefits for ex-miners with pneumoconiosis is a special law for 
compensation of CWP. It supplements the IACI with medical treatment 
as well as some consolation benefits. In terms of benefits, the law is 
similar to the IIS plus CWPS in Britain (refer to Chapters 3 and 4).     
To summarise, this thesis examines welfare politics around and 
the contents of these schemes, that is, the formation, operation and 
process of changes focusing on the political relations of the relevant 
actors and the contents of these schemes themselves for pneumoconiosis 
sufferers in Britain and Korea. In addition, a comparative study of these 
institutions and the welfare politics around these institutions will lead to a 
more complete understanding of the characteristics of welfare politics in 





Research questions most often come from real-world observations, 
dilemmas and problems (Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 28). In Korea, 
most of the ex-miners with CWP had worked in the mining industry for a 





experienced extremely poor working conditions, high labour intensity, 
low wages and an impoverished life. These conditions make CWP one of 
most representative industrial diseases. In fact, CWP made up 76.7% of 
all occupational disease patients of Korean workers in 1988 (Won, 1996: 
17). Ex-mineworkers with CWP suffer a lot of difficulties including 
economic poverty; various kinds of diseases, including complications 
related to CWP; and disabilities caused by their hard work, old age and 
psychological uneasiness. In addition, they have come to distrust the 
Government, the relevant schemes and even their own representative 
body, the Association of Pneumoconiosis Patients (hereafter APP). British 
ex-miners with CWP, however, do not face economic difficulties at 
present and do not tend to distrust the Government or their representative 
body, the National Union of Mineworkers (hereafter NUM). From these 
two different real world situations, the questions for research in this thesis 
will be constructed to examine why welfare institutions for ex-miners 
with CWP in Korea are residual, why Korean ex-miners distrust the 
CWP-related policies and institutions of the Government while British 
ex-miners with CWP are relatively trusting of the relevant institutions, 
and why the British Government and welfare system has been so 
comprehensive for pneumoconiosis patients.  
The argument of this thesis is that differences in welfare politics 
are the answer to these questions, because the distrust of ex-miners with 
CWP and the vulnerability of Korean welfare institutions are supposedly 
caused by the deficiency of welfare politics. Thus, the main objective of 
this paper is mainly to examine the welfare politics around CWP in 
Britain and Korea (see Chapter 4 and 5). 
From this point of view, the main research questions are: “Where 
do the institutional and political differences around CWP between Britain 
and Korea originate?” The specific research questions are drawn from the 





and developed in Britain and Korea?”; “How does compensation politics 
for ex-miners with CWP make institutions for compensation between 
Britain and Korea differ?”; “What are the dominant factors to determine 
different welfare institutions and welfare politics?” 
 
 
Structure of this Thesis 
 
The subjects and questions of this thesis will be examined and discussed 
in each chapter. Chapter 1 has outlined the research question, focusing on 
CWP and its implications in a comparative social policy study.  
The theoretical perspectives and methodology will be handled in 
Chapter 2. Firstly, there will be an examination of existing comparative 
studies between Korea and Britain, the welfare state regimes in Korea and 
Britain and the role of trade unions in the politics of CWP. Secondly, the 
historical-institutional approach and the power resources theory will be 
investigated and, based on these theories, the determinants of welfare 
politics will be presented. Finally, this chapter will also handle subjects 
related to methodology, focusing on data collection, data analysis and 
ethical considerations.  
The schemes and welfare politics around CWP in Britain and 
Korea are discussed in Chapter 3 to Chapter 5. These will present general 
information and the backgrounds of welfare politics in Britain and Korea 
(Chapter 3) and then examine the welfare politics of the actors concerned 
(Chapter 4 and 5).  
In detail, Chapter 3 will contain examinations of the mining 
industry and working conditions in Britain and Korea, trade unions and 
their compensation politics, the processes of recognition of CWP and the 
social policy for CWP. Chapters 4 and 5 will examine compensation 





three parts. The first part of each of these chapters will analyse the 
process behind the development of industrial injuries compensation for 
CWP. The second part of each of these chapters will examine the 
compensation politics contained in IIA in Britain and IACI in Korea. The 
third part of each of these chapters will describe the introduction of and 
turbulence caused by the special laws concerning pneumoconiosis, 
APPPPW in Korea and CWP-related schemes in Britain focusing 
specifically on the CWPS.  
Finally, Chapter 6 will contain a summary focusing on the 
similarities and differences between the two countries and present a 





CHAPTER 2. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1. Previous Studies  
 
 
CWP and Trade Unions in Britain and Korea 
 
With regard to the previous studies of CWP in Britain and Korea, the 
following subjects will be examined: first, occupational health and safety 
focusing on CWP; second, the role of trade unions around CWP; third, 
the introduction of schemes related to CWP, CWPS in Britain and 
APPPPW in Korea.    
 
Study in Britain  
 
There are many studies about British coal mining 9 . However, the 
literature rarely deals with industrial injuries as a topic, or, if so, only in a 
very limited scope. Despite comprehensive studies of coal mining and 
miners’ organizations, typical examples that never touch on occupational 
disease are books written by Arnot (1953; 1961) and Cole (1923) which 
are regarded as classics in this area. Taylor’s ambitious two books (2003; 
2005) which examine the politics of the NUM from 1945 to 1995 are also 
in line with this trend. Without mention of miners’ health and safety, his 
books illuminate the activities of NUM in the areas of energy, state 
capitalism, industrial restructuring, miners’ solidarity etc. This trend has 
                                                 
9 The representative works are from Church (1986), Supple (1987) and Ashworth 
(1986) which stand out as high-calibre examples of work taking in the wide 
chronological sweep of the industry from early industrialization to decline (McIvor and 





been followed in most works which handle industrial relations in the coal 
industry (refer to McCormik, 1979; Scott, 1963; Richards, 1996).    
 However, there is some literature which covers occupational 
health and diseases, especially CWP, as can be seen in Allen (1981), 
Francis and Smith (1980), Bryan (1975) and McIvor and Johnston (2007).  
Of this literature, McIvor and Jonhston’s book (2007), Miners’ Lung: A 
History of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining, is second to none in the 
area of CWP-related studies. The book handles miners’ respiratory 
diseases such as bronchitis and emphysema, and CWP is a main subject 
in this book. Thematically, the book focuses on advancing medical 
knowledge, the industrial politics of respiratory disease and the personal 
experiences of the miners of CWP.10  
 There have been controversial debates over the involvement of 
miners’ trade unions with occupational health and safety. The negative 
position argues that the role of trade unions on health and safety is 
marginal. In other words, “trade unions in the UK marginalised health 
and safety for the sake of increased wages, and that they failed as a 
countervailing force” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 24).11 However, there 
have also been positive assessments of the role of trade unions regarding 
occupational health and safety (Eva and Oswald, 1981; Tweedale, 1999; 
Melling and Bufton, 2005; McIvor and Jonston, 2007). For example, 
Bloor (2000) and Melling and Bufton (2005) have suggested that the 
negative role of trade unions in occupational health should be re-
examined and Eva and Oswald (1981) asserts that trade unions have tried 
to advance health and safety for workers and shows that trade union 
                                                 
10 With regard to contents for CWP, there are four sections in this book: Firstly, miners’ 
work as a context and background to CWP; secondly, medical information about CWP; 
thirdly, activities and roles of relevant actors in the industrial politics around CWP; and 
fourthly, investigation of the problems of CWP through testimonies of miners and ex-
miners with CWP. Undoubtedly this book, as the authors claim, contributes to industrial 
relations and labour history, medical history, disability studies and oral history. 






activity on health and safety takes place at two levels: in the workplace 
and through parliament. In this context, McIvor and Johnston (2007) 
maintain that trade unions emerge as proactive and progressive in their 
occupational health strategies: “We have argued here that the miners’ 
unions were active ... in protecting the interests of their members” (313, 
314).  
 Compared with the many studies on industrial injury and the role 
of the trade unions, it seems very strange that, with regard to CWPS 1974 
and its policy-making process, there are just a few papers. In fact, most 
books never handle this subject. Although McIvor and Johnston (2007), 
who contribute to the history and implications of CWP, deal with CWPS 
1974, the number of pages discussing this scheme are just 4 (226-229), 
while Bryan (1975) and Allen (1981) spare just 2 pages each (128-129; 
291-292). Therefore, the processes of policy-making for CWPS 1974 can 
only be discovered from primary documents from the Government, trade 
unions, or employers.  
 The reasons why there are just a few studies about the policy-
making on this topic can be inferred from the following facts: CWP as an 
occupational disease rather than wage and welfare for miners has not 
been observed by trade unions; and the documents relating to the 
introduction of CWPS 1974 have only recently been released, around 
2006.       
 
Study in Korea 
 
Comparing with the relatively large amount of discussion in Britain, there 
are very few studies about mining in Korea (refer to Nam, 1991; Yoo and 
Won, 1991; Yoo et al. 2001; Hong, 2002; SJC, 2001). What is worse, 





to the working conditions of mineworkers, factual situations in mining 
towns and the mining industry etc.  
 Studies about CWP were at first limited to researchers in 
industrial medicine, and have only recently been conducted by social 
scientists. Of these studies, the Forgotten Mine Workers and their 
Realities by Won (1996) is probably the first comprehensive study on ex-
miners with CWP, as can be seen in the sub-title: ‘the Report on the 
factual situation of ex-miners with CWP and the sponsored programmes’. 
This study links to further research on the actual conditions faced by ex-
miners with CWP which was led by Won, 2001 Report on Patients with 
CWP in Taeback Region (ASWT, 2001).  
While this report discovers the difficult lives of ex-miners with 
CWP in terms of economic aspects and social welfare, the study by Yoo 
et al. (2001), A Study on Developing Rehabilitation Programmes for 
Pneumoconiosis Workers: Medical Treatment and Poverty Alleviation, is 
an effort to suggest an alternative for sufferers. As can be seen in the sub-
title of the book, this study tries to search for measures for ex-miners with 
CWP in terms of social welfare as well as industrial injuries schemes. In 
addition, Jung’s paper (2001), The History of Pneumoconiosis, very 
briefly summarizes the history of pneumoconiosis in Korea in the context 
of Korean occupational health and safety.  
 There is no exaggeration to say that there is very little research 
about the role of trade unions concerning CWP. It can be assessed that 
this academic situation reflects the political reality that the Miners’ union, 
the Federation of Korean Coal Workers' Trade Union (FKCWTU), was 
created by the authoritarian Government and has not represented the 
interests of miners. Therefore, apart from the FKCWTU, many are 
reluctant to maintain the positive role of the miners’ organization in terms 





 Similarly, there are only several papers examining the 
introduction of APPPPW. Besides Kim who examines the policy-making 
process in relative depth (1986: 225-234), most papers just touch on the 
welfare politics around the introduction of APPPPW 1984 (see Kim, 
1988; Jung, 2001; Cho, 1991). This reflects the Government-led 
enactment and the fact that academia is quite indifferent to the issue.  
 
 
Studies on Comparative Social Policy between Britain and Korea  
 
There are few comparative studies on the relationship between Britain 
and Korea in the area of social policy. This means that neither Korean 
scholars and researchers or British ones have been interested in a 
comparative study into both countries.    
In Britain, it is not unnatural that there is not much motivation to 
explore Korea’s social policy. The first reason for this may be due to its 
lack of proximity and the fact there is little historical relationship between 
the two countries. The second reason may be the image and position of 
Korea in the world. The image of the East accorded by the West has been 
as uncivilized or mysterious according to Said’s Orientalism (1978). In 
this context, Korea has been regarded as an underdeveloped country with 
little attraction especially compared to China and Japan. These reasons 
lead to little study about Korea.   
However, the interest in Korea has increased in Britain since 
around the 1990s. British politicians and scholars have looked at East 
Asian states focusing on their characteristics of rapid economic growth 
and low expenses of social welfare. Above all, British political parties 
have been interested in the East Asian states in terms of lessons which 
could be learnt. In general terms, the Labour Party concentrates on the 





cohesion and raising popular welfare standards while the Conservative 
Party is, by contrast, more interested in a society of based on market 
competition with a spirit of individual self-reliance social welfare based 
on familialism (White and Goodman, 1998: 4). However, the East Asian 
economic crisis in the late 1990s reduced their interest in these countries.   
While the interest of British politicians in East Asia comes from 
an instrumental perspective, the motivation of western scholars, including 
British ones, stems from intellectual curiosity, or academism. There has 
been a relatively large number of articles about the East Asian Welfare 
Model and relevant papers have been published recently (Gough, 2004; 
White and Goodman, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1999). These works have 
examined areas such as the inherent features of East Asian Welfare 
Model, differences between the West and the East, positions of welfare 
state regime etc. and the motivation for study seems to be in academic 
findings: “While East Asian welfare experience is interesting in and of 
itself, it is of limited substantive relevance to the West and cannot be 
regarded as a model for emulation, despite its superficial attractiveness” 
(White and Goodman, 1998: 20). This attitude seems to be different from 
that of East Asia which tries to learn lessons from the West.  
As has been shown in the above description, the West has had 
limited interest in Korea. Primarily, its focus is not so much on Korea 
itself as in East Asia, and even this interest has been limited and very 
temporary. Furthermore, even when they are interested in individual 
states, the main objects are usually China or Japan; Korea is located at the 
edge in terms of object of studies. In addition, there are few comparative 
studies between East Asian states and the West and there are also not 
many plans for comparative studies between Korea and Britain which 
proceed beyond the initial stage and the scholars of the West have not 





From a Korean perspective, Britain has not been recognized as a 
role model for social policy. Korean welfare institutions tend to be 
introduced referring to two cases: the German model, which was 
introduced through Japan, and the American Model. In the initial phase of 
introduction of welfare institutions, Japanese welfare schemes were main 
objects of reference but the model gradually changed from Japan to 
America through the 1980s. This is because the Korean governments 
based on the ideology of anti-communism are traditionally pro-American 
in their characteristics and most of the political elite in Korea have 
studied in America.  
Nevertheless, the Korean Government and social scientists have 
conducted some research into the British welfare system for a long time, 
because Britain is identified as one of the founders of the welfare state. 
For this reason, university departments in Korea related to social welfare 
have adopted subjects such as ‘the development of the welfare state in 
Britain’ or ‘British social policy’ in their curricula, and writings in 
relation to British welfare system have been translated in Korean.12 This 
shows that there have been continued studies into British social policy in 
Korea. The Korean Government has also traced the British social policy 
and welfare system. For example, the Department of Welfare and Health 
translated Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942), known as the 
Beveridge Report, into Korean in 1965, the Korean Government and 
institutes run by the Government have analysed the British welfare 
system and introduced aspects from it.13 
In particular, Korea has been much concerned with the Anglo-
Saxon model since globalization and neo-liberalism. As a result, many 
books in this area have been translated into Korean. In addition, the most 
                                                 
12 For example: Gough, 1979, Schweinitz, 1975, Kathleen Jones, 2000.  
13 As government-funded think tanks, The Korea Labor Institute and the Korea Institute 
for Health and Social Affairs, which are responsible for social insurance, have reported 





recent changes and trends in Britain have been followed as can be seen in 
the translation of ‘The Third Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy’ and 
‘The Third Way and its Critics’ (Giddens, 1988; 2000). In this context, 
the Government and academia in Korea have studied the stream and 
content of social policy in Britain. They have assessed ‘the Third Way’ 
and its programmes for social welfare, identified as ‘welfare to work’ or 
‘social investment state’, and tried to categorize Korea’s social reforms as 
being part of the the Third Way (Kim et al., 2006; Cho, 2004; Kim, 2007; 
OPRK, 2000).   
While the above studies have simply introduced or examined 
British institutions, some recent studies have conducted comparative 
social policy studies between Britain and Korea (Oh, 2003; Park, 2004; 
Kim and Ross, 2008)14, but more analytical studies have not yet appeared.   
 
 
Welfare State Regime of Britain and Korea 
 
In Britain, there are two distinct periods with regard to the formation of 
the welfare state 15  : before and after Thatcher’s Government. The 
consensus is that the pre-Thatcher period is characterized as institutional, 
from Wilensky and Lebeaux’s definition, while the post-Thatcher period 
                                                 
14 Oh (2003) examines the poverty policy of the past in the two states. The policy in 
Korea was, he discovers, based on Confucianism and was established for the protection 
of royal authority while the policy in Britain was based on liberalism and deprived 
people of civil rights in return for their support. Park (2004) explores social policy in 
globalization in Korea, Britain and Sweden. He compares the development of social 
welfare in Korea with the retrenchment in Britain under the period of globalization. 
Matthews and Jung (2006) examine the health systems in Korea and Britain. According 
to their findings, there is a convergence in the financing and health care delivery systems 
between Britain and Korea. Kim and Ross (2008) explore the barriers to service user 
involvement inherent in a Korean context and searches for lessons from the British 
experience in the areas of the right to assessment within a care management structure, 
the setting of quality care standards and inspection processes and a complaints procedure. 
15 Esping-Andersen defines the welfare regime as “the combined, interdependent way in 






is identified as a liberal welfare regime according to the Esping-Andersen 
classification.16 On the other hand, Korea’s social welfare system tends 
to be classified as the East Asian Welfare Model which is characterized as 
residual in terms of Wilensky and Lebeaux, or liberal welfare regime 
using the Esping-Andersen’s classification.   
 
Change of Welfare State Regime in Britain: from Institutional to Liberal  
 
The classification of the British welfare state still seems to be a 
controversial issue. Even Esping-Andersen who classifies Britain as a 
liberal welfare regime confesses that Britain, along with the Netherlands, 
fits poorly into all three welfare state regimes defined because of a kind 
of ‘mutation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 86-87). However, there is an 
agreement that Britain belonged to ‘an institutional welfare state’ before 
the advent of Thatcher’s Government in 1979. Esping-Andersen points 
out:  
 
Had we made our comparisons in the immediate post-war decades, we 
would almost certainly have put Britain and Scandinavia in the same 
cluster: both were built on universal, flat-rate benefit programmes, 
national health care, and a vocal political commitment to full 
employment (1999: 87). 
 
                                                 
16 By and large, these are the two classifications which are most prevalent. According to 
the classification drawn from Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965: 138-140), there are two 
ideal types of welfare state as follows: ‘the residual’, based on the principles of 
economic individualism and free enterprise, and ‘the institutional’, based on the notions 
of security, equality and humanitarianism. Also, the model of Esping-Andersen has been 
accepted in academic areas. He maintains that based on the two principal analytical axis, 
degree of decommodification and modes of stratification, there are three regimes, or 
three worlds: ‘social democratic’ (basically the Nordic countries), ‘conservative’ 
(Continental Europe), and ‘liberal’ (the Anglo-Saxon nations). On the other hand, there 
are many problems to overcome or expand these categories and some scholars suggest 






This perspective has been widely verified by scholars. For example, 
Mishra (1981: 100-105) identifies Britain as a typical state which has 
transformed from the residual to the institutional in a capitalist society. 
He strongly asserts that the British social welfare has shifted towards 
statutory welfare, or universal welfare, in the areas of income security, 
medical care, education and housing based on comparison of welfare 
systems between 1860 and 1974. In particular, he views the National 
Health Service as a special institution due to the fact that it is operated for 
everyone and by taxation.17  
However, the perspective of the British welfare state regime was 
radically changed by Thatcher’s Government in what has been described 
as: “a clear-cut case of typologies being undone by historical change” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 77). In other words, it is now widely 
acknowledged that Britain is now a typical example of the Anglo-Saxon 
model, categorized along with America as a typical liberal welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990).18  
The current Labour Government seems to have continued with 
some liberal policies. Taylor-Gooby and Larsen examined the Labour 
                                                 
17 In this context, Briggs (1961), Sleeman (1973) and Titmuss (2000) define Britain as 
an institutional welfare state based on the three principles of a guarantee of minimum 
standards including a minimum income, social protection in the event of insecurity and 
the provision of services at the best level possible or in terms of provision of universal 
services of NHS, education, national insurance and family allowance before 1970s. 
Allsop (1995) sees Britain as ‘the institutional-redistributive model’ until 1980s focusing 
on the NHS. Pierson is follows the same line that “by the mid-1970s Britain had 
developed a midsize welfare state with a mix of fairly modest income transfer programs 
and relatively extensive and interventionist policies in health care and housing” (1996: 
159-161). Lowe also defines Britain in the period, 1945-1976, as the ‘classic’ welfare 
state which “sought in a particularly active and ‘comprehensive way to promote 
individual welfare” (1994: 41). 
18 It is of course true that there are different opinions on classifying the British welfare 
model. Castles and Mitchell (1992) suggest that Australia and Britain which are 
classified as liberal welfare regimes by Esping-Anderson should be located in a different 
position to America. Lister (2004) and Walker (2005) puts the ‘social investment state’ 
of Britain in a hybrid form of welfare regime in terms of mix of liberal/neo-liberal and 
social democratic factors. These different opinions of Britain seem to be due to the 
hybrid characteristics of Britain from the legacies of institutional welfare state in the 





Government’s welfare state based on social investment state and reached 
the conclusion that Britain is a “genuinely liberal welfare state” in the fact 
“that welfare supports rather than obstructs the operation of a market 
system” and “the needs of citizens are effectively met” (2004: 63). 
There has, without doubt, been a break away from the image of 
the institutional welfare state in Britain since the 1970s, and the new 
image of a liberal welfare regime now seems fixed. This change of image 
can be explained by two facts: firstly, there have been changes for the 
worse, on welfare retrenchment; secondly, other states have developed 
relatively faster than Britain since the 1970s, or, in other words, the 
development of social welfare in Britain has lagged behind that of other 
countries. With regard to retrenchment, in Britain, sickness and maternity 
benefits were transferred to employers, council housing was sold off, the 
earnings-related pension was ‘privatized’ through opting-out, and both 
private pensions and health insurance have been nurtured via tax 
subsidies. However, deterioration in social welfare has not occurred 
quickly because welfare retrenchment has not been welcomed (Pierson, 
1994; 1996). Thus, more responsibility for the change in the British 
image should be put on relative advancement in social welfare of other 
states. Britain has failed to follow policies to lead towards its full-
employment commitment, such as a guarantee of adequate income 
replacement, while Nordic countries have moved their welfare systems 
towards de-commodification with a public second-tier system. Instead, 
Britain has followed market-friendly policies, such as privatization, 






East Asian Welfare Model and Korea: Cultural or State-Centred 
Approach? 
 
It was not until the late 1990s that the concept of a welfare state regime 
was discussed in Korea. The momentum for discussion comes from the 
relatively comprehensive development of a welfare system under Kim 
Dae Jung’s Government (1997-2002). The Korean welfare regime has 
been discussed from two perspectives: the first is the liberal welfare 
regime from the three welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990), 
and the other is the East Asian Welfare Model or Confucian welfare state. 
By and large, the former frame is used by Korean scholars while the latter 
is adopted by Western scholars. However, both these perspectives have 
the precondition that Korea is subjected to be the residual welfare system 
in the categorization of Wilensky and Lebeaux.  
From Esping-Andersen’s point of view about the welfare state 
regimes, Cho (2001) points out that Korea became a liberal welfare state 
as a result of the introduction of ‘the productive welfare’ by Kim’s 
Government. He searches for a basis of justification for high public 
assistance, for example, the American style of workfare, reduction of 
state intervention. Nam (2002) insists that Korea has a conservative 
welfare state rather than a liberal welfare state because of the effects of 
stratification which have deepened since welfare reform. On the other 
hand, some scholars maintain that the regime in Korea is a hybrid type 
with both liberal and conservative characteristics (Kim, Y.M., 2002; Kim, 
2001; Walker, 2005). From this point of view, the appearance of welfare 
institutions resembles a conservative welfare regime while the level of 
benefits is similar to a liberal welfare regime. 
The categorization of East Asian states tends to start with 





identified as the Newly Industrialized Countries19, Korea, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan etc., which have achieved rapid economic growth. In 
the eyes of Western scholars, East Asia is a mutation or exception which 
does not live in any of Esping-Andersen’s ‘three worlds’. In this context, 
the categories of Esping-Andersen are criticized as having been 
constructed only for “a Western welfare capitalist typology” and it is 
asserted that states in East Asia have been recognized as the ‘fourth 
world’ (Jones, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1994; Kwon, 1998; Holliday, 
2000). Despite there being much doubt about whether the fourth world 
really exists, or whether there is homogeneity or similarities between ‘the 
tigers’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990; White and Goodman, 1998), the East 
Asian Welfare Model as an additional regime has to some extent been a 
topic of academic interest (Holliday, 2000, 2005; Jones, 1990, 1993; 
Kwon, 1998; Aspalter, 2006). This discussion has identified differences 
between the East Asian Welfare Model and the three regime types of 
Esping-Andersen as follows:  
  
Conservative corporatism without (Western-style) worker participation; 
subsidiarity without the Church; solidarity without equality; laissez-
faire without libertarianism: an alternative expression for all this might 
be ‘household economy’ welfare states-run in the style of a would-be 
traditional, Confucian, extended family (Jones, 1990; 1993: 214). 
 
Therefore, it seems generally to be accepted that the East Asian states are 
no longer situated in one of the three worlds, namely the liberal-
conservative-social democratic typology of welfare state regimes. What 
then, are the decisive factors which make a difference? By and large, two 
have been suggested: a cultural determinant, Confucianism, and 
developmental state. Confucianism represents a cultural approach to East 
                                                 
19 Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries are categorized as ‘tigers’, which are 
separated into a big tiger, Japan, and little tigers, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 





Asian states while the developmental state is related to a state-centered 
approach. 
 Confucianism is familiar with notions such as hierarchy (respect 
for seniors), statism (the group before the individual, conflict avoidance, 
loyalty), dutifulness (filial piety, paternal benevolence), striving for 
learning, entrepreneurship, meritocracy etc. Due to these characteristics 
of Confucianism, the state can be exempted from its welfare 
responsibilities because the family has replaced the state in the provision 
of social welfare. In this context, the Confucian welfare state is often 
characterized as ‘the principles of familial responsibility and obligation’ 
(Jones, 1990, 1993; Goodman and Peng, 1996). In this context, scholars 
assert that a new category, ‘the Confucian welfare state’, should be added 
to the list of welfare state regimes (Jones, 1993; Hong, 1999; Rieger and 
Leibfried, 2003). 
 The state-centred approach, on the other hand, focuses on the 
features of the East Asian states which have been identified as being a 
‘developmental state’. The introduction and growth of social welfare by 
the developmental state is “driven primarily by the requirements and 
outcomes of economic development policy” (Deyo, 1992: 289-90). In this 
context, ‘the developmental state’ which goes into areas of social welfare 
has been expressed using various terms: ‘developmental welfare systems’ 
(White and Goodman, 1998), ‘regulator’ Kwon (1998), ‘reluctance to 
welfarism’ (Midgley, 1986) or ‘productivist welfare regime’ (Holliday, 
2000).  
 Despite these various names, they all seem to contain the 
common features of the East Asian Welfare Model. Firstly, social policy 
in East Asian states has been subordinated to economic growth, as can be 
seen in the slogan, ‘economic growth first, social welfare later’. That is, 
“the two central aspects of the productivist world of welfare capitalism 





including social policy, to economic/industrial objectives,” (Holliday, 
2000: 709).   
 Secondly, the role played by the Korean welfare state in terms of 
the financing of the welfare system is as a regulator which makes 
“statutory rules to bring about social welfare programmes without making 
a financial commitment.” That is, “National Health Insurance, the 
National Pension Programme and the IACI are contributor programmes 
that are funded by employees and/or employers” (Kwon, 1999: 136). 
Clear preference in Korea has been given to the family and the market in 
welfare provision, while limiting the welfare function of the state largely 
to a regulative role in social welfare policy (Aspalter, 2006: 298). 
 Thirdly, the Korean welfare state with a strategic priority for 
rapid economic growth and its role of regulator, without doubt results in 
a low level of provision, or “a fragmented welfare system in which the 
pooling of risk is narrower than in an integrated system” (Kwon, 1998). 
This can be seen in the reluctance of the Korean welfare state “in 
extending benefits and coverage of social security and welfare 
programmes. Social rights were, first and foremost, confined to the 
realm of economic participation and public commitment to investment 
in social development – especially education, healthcare and housing,” 
(Aspalter, 2006: 290).  
 As has been discussed above, there are two perspectives to 
identify the East Asian Welfare Model: cultural and state-centred 
approaches. This thesis follows the line of the latter, that the residual 
welfare system of East Asian state has been introduced by an 
authoritarian regime with arbitrary power rather than by people who are 
affected by Confucianism. The reasons why this thesis does not agree 
with the cultural approach are as follows. Firstly, the cultural approach 
may suggest incorrectly fatalism or cultural determination. This is 





the most important factors on culture, and the cultural approach asserts 
that because the culture of Confucianism has been instilled into people for 
a long time, the regime may not be changed easily. However, since 
modernization and, more recently, globalization, East Asian societies 
have changed dramatically and in particular, the introduction of a modern 
political system and the organization of labour class mean that culture can 
no longer be regarded as the decisive factor in explaining these societies.   
Secondly, this can lead to a mistake that people in East Asia have 
voluntarily accepted and supported the model based on the belief or 
custom of Confucianism. However, citizens do not seem to have agreed 
with the low provision of social welfare based on the value of 
Confucianism, although the developmental/authoritarian state might 
design welfare policy based on Confucianism for its justification. This 
can be proved by the historical fact that people have shown dissatisfaction 
and occasionally resistance. Similarly, people have inevitably had to take 
care of their families due to the state’s insufficient welfare system.  
 
 
2. Theory and Perspective 
 
 




                                                 
20 Historical institutionalism or the historical-institutional approach is a kind of new 
institutionalism. Largely, there are at least three different new institutionalisms: 
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism. Despite the similarity between schools of new institutionalism which 
share the common value ‘the rediscovery of institutions’, they seem to have developed 
quite independently of each other and there are no clear agreements on the conception of 






The objective of this thesis is to explore the welfare politics, social policy 
and both relationship concerning CWP in both Britain and Korea. This 
thesis will be based on historical institutionalism as a main perspective 
for this because it is especially appropriate to the case study of this thesis. 
In other words, CWP policy in the two countries is a matter of the 
development of institutions over time and welfare politics around 
institutions, adding weight to the five reasons why historical 
institutionalism will be adopted by this thesis:    
The first reason is that it has been assessed that historical 
institutionalism has greatly contributed to an explanation for the 
relationship between politics and institutions. On this point, this thesis 
will adopt this theory to explore the relationship between welfare politics 
and institutions around CWP. The second reason why historical 
institutionalism will be adopted is that historical institutionalists have 
focused on studies of the welfare state (Hudson and Lowe, 2004: 149). 
The main subjects of historical institutionalism are institutions and their 
development in relation to the social welfare system. Accordingly, there 
are many accumulated studies on social policy, as can be seen from the 
eight papers in Structuring Politics (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 
1992). In this aspect, historical institutionalism will give an understanding 
of the social welfare system in the context of the relationship between 
institutions and politics.  
The third reason is that historical institutionalists have been 
interested in the analysis of institutional development and policy-making, 
paying special attention to autonomy, historical processes and structure 
(March and Olsen, 1984: 738; Koelble, 1995: 242). Thus, historical 
institutionalism will provide a framework for directly confronting the 
central question of choice and constraint in understanding political life 





understand the background of CWP-related institutions and politics in this 
thesis.  
The fourth reason why historical institutionalism will be adopted 
as an analytical perspective is its usefulness in comparative social policy 
research. The new institutionalism was originally created by authors in 
comparative politics and comparative political economics and has 
contributed to the study of persistent cross-national differences (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992: 28). These previous comparative studies using 
historical institutionalism will give a good reference basis for this thesis 
which is based on comparative social policy study between Britain and 
Korea.  
The fifth and final reason is its methodological usefulness. As 
discussed above, the main interest of historical institutionalism lies in 
institutions being recognized as a factor in understanding socio-political 
context and interaction of actors. This attitude is available to “a 
theoretical project aimed at the middle range that confronts issues of both 
historical contingency and ‘path dependency’” (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992: 1-2). Likewise, the analysis of institutions mediates structure and 
behaviour and, through an analysis of the middle-level, enables problems 
which exist in the state-centred and the social-centred theories to be 
overcome. This aspect of historical institutionalism is useful because this 
thesis illuminates compensation politics around CWP in Britain and 
Korea at a very detailed level. 
These merits of historical institutionalism can be understood 
through the proof of the fundamental fact that institutions and politics are 
a dependant variable, as well as an independent variable, for each other. 
This means that institutions have relative autonomy over politics and the 
reverse is also true. This relationship can be in three steps.  
 Firstly, “political institutions do not operate in a vacuum” 





reflection of activities among actors rather than a priori or preexisting 
thing. According to historical institutionalism, “institutions genetically 
are the fossilized traces of social and political action, and thus are a key to 
unraveling the driving forces behind policies and the historical 
compromises or cooperative practices that have established the policy” 
(Jorgensen, 2002: 18). Therefore, an institution cannot be recognized as a 
thing that is fixed and monolithic but as a collection of socio-political 
relations that have reflected intentions, struggles and results of struggles 
between the actors concerned. In this context, the statements, “institution 
are shaped by history” (Putnam, 1994) and “institutions structure the 
interactions of individuals” (Hall, 1986: 19) can be justified.  
 Secondly, the institutions which have been created through 
politics and relationships among political actors inversely impose controls 
on their creators with a certain fixed stability and continuation as soon as 
an institution becomes a written contract or regulation, law etc. In other 
words, they intervene in the distribution of power and influence, the 
definition of interests, and the establishment of values in society 
(Jorgensen, 2002: 18; Hall, 1986; Pontusson, 1995: 118-119; Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992: 9). In addition, institutions may alter their own 
environment. States (here meaning central decision-making institutions) 
may, for instance, be able to alter the distribution of power among groups 
in civil society (Krasner, 1988: 85). In this context, “institutions shape 
politics” (Putnam, 1994; Koelble, 1995: 238), “policies produce politics” 
(Pierson, 1994: 39), and “preferences are shaped by institutions” (Koelble, 
1995: 232) can be justified.   
 As discussed above, the image of institutions in historical 
institutionalism can affect activities, goals, and even visions of actors. In 
the political space, institutions steer individual choices in particular 
directions, thus helping to shape political outcomes and especially 





financial resources for fashioning policy interventions (Pierson, 1994: 32; 
1996: 152). In other words, like a prime political actor, institutions have 
their own coherence and autonomy and, in this context, institutions can be 
treated as decision makers and more than simple mirrors of social forces 
(March and Olsen, 1984: 738-739). 
 Thirdly, politics which is affected by institutions again tries to 
transform institutions. The existing institutions which seem to be correct 
in T time may not be available in T+1 time, or some groups may not find 
the institutions convenient even in T time. In any case, it is natural that 
political actors will try to change these exiting institutions. This means 
that institutions do not always have actors under their control and 
coverage and so institutions cannot discipline the activity of actors 
completely because institutions are a reflection of power relations and 
strategies of actors that change continuously according to political 
activities.  
 Likewise, the relationship between institutions and politics can be 
recognized as interactions, reciprocal changes or dialectic between 
politics and institutions. The following statement shows the relationship:  
 
If interest groups shape policies, policies also shape interest groups. 
The organizational structure and political goals of groups may change 
in response to the nature of the programs that they confront and hope to 
sustain or modify (Pierson, 1994: 39).   
 
In other words, politics materialized as an institution through struggles 
and compromises and the institutions can accordingly be recognized as a 
result of policies and political relations. However, politics also tries to 
transform the existing institution with the passage of time. As a result, 
existing institutions tend to change into new institutions in T+1.  
The above discussion of institutions and politics can also be 





recognized as “a specific ensemble of institutions” (Jessop, 1990: 267) or 
“as the most significant of all social institutions” (Cammack, 1992: 402) 
while class has been accepted as a main actor in the politics of a capitalist 
society (Gough, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Stephens, 1979; Shalev, 
1983). In this context, many historical institutionalists have conducted 
studies of state from the point of view of “no longer as a neutral broker 
among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of 
structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 938). From this perspective, institutionalists generally pay 
attention to the whole range of the state that shapes how political actors 
define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other 
groups (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). This means that the perspective of 
the relationship between institutions and politics applies to the analysis of 
state and politics: “The state is not only affected by politics but also 
affects it” (March and Olsen, 1984: 738). 
 On the other hand, with regard to the discussion of political 
actors and their power relations which are inscribed inside state as an 
institutional materialization of social relations, new institutionalism seems 
to be open to various perspectives as can be seen in the following 
statement:  
 
Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate 
various theories of politics: class structure in Marxism, group dynamics 
in pluralism. Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure 
these battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992: 3). 
 
As mentioned above, no actor, including class, individuals and interest 
groups etc., enjoys privileges in new institutionalism. In other words, 
classes and their organizations may not be regarded as the main political 
actors in new institutionalism. However, this thesis will focus on the 





institutions which embody the welfare state and its welfare system. In 
doing this, political economy and power resources theories will 
complement historical institutionalism.  
 
 
Political Economy and Power Resources Theories  
 
The welfare state has managed social risks and secured social rights 
through social policy. 21  There have been many theories about the 
formation and development of the welfare state which act in keen 
competition.22 Political economy and power resources theories hold a 
key part in the explanation of the formation and development of the 
welfare state and draw special attention to the issues of class and the role 
of trade unions.  
 As a theoretical approach, political economy is drawn from 
Marxism which sees politics and power in terms of class, exploitation and 
collective conflict (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 11). Here, a class is a group 
of people sharing a common relationship to the means of production 
while exploitation is where the dominant class extracts surplus labour 
from the subordinate class. Thus, the relationship between the exploiter 
and the subordinate is antagonistic (Gough, 1979: 17-20). Likewise, the 
                                                 
21 The risks in modern society exist beyond the control of any individual and are 
generalized under market economies in capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Giddens, 
1998; Beck, 1992). In addition, they are characterized as uncertain in knowledge and 
impossible to calculate: “Recent commentators such as Beck and Giddens have argued 
that post-modernity can be characterized by global risks, indeterminate and contingent 
knowledge about the probability of such risks, and uncertainty over future outcomes and 
impacts”  (Kemshall, 2002: 5). The key issue, in front of social risks, has been how 
public institutions, especially state, can and should cope with these risks. In this context, 
Esping-Andersen points out that “social risks are the building blocks of welfare regimes” 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 40). 
22 There are clear analytical perspectives on the main factors contributing to or retarding 
welfare state expansion. There are three main influential theories, which each give a 
different priority to power resources of labour movements, on the role of institutions or 





fundamental basis of politics is the capitalist mode of production in which 
exploitation necessarily occurs between classes and the class politics of 
the working class tries to get rid of or mitigate the system because “state 
intervention in the selling or buying of labour-power, that is, intervention 
in the labour market, should be the primary state policy or institution 
affecting the organizational capabilities of workers in capitalist societies” 
(Rothstein, 1990: 322-323). In this context, a conflict is formed by the 
control of supply of labour, namely, labour market policies and 
institutions operating on the labour market.  
 Political economy theory maintains that trade unions and labour 
movements in the capitalist mode of production hold a very important 
position because they are organized in favour of the labour class and can 
fundamentally conduct politics to get rid of exploitation and contradiction 
of capitalism. Therefore, working-class organizational strength depends 
on the degree of unionization of workers, the ideology and strategy of 
unions, and the organizational force of the working class, and this 
determines the characteristics of class politics. In other words, in terms of 
political economy, the relationship between classes determines the mode 
of state and society, specifically the type of exploitation and value 
distribution. All of these issues are evident in CWP policy.  
 Power resources theory argues that the power of the working 
class is the most important independent variable in explaining 
development of and the differences between welfare states.23 In other 
words, the greater the organizational strength of the working class the 
stronger the welfare state (Rothstein, 1990: 318-319). It is generally 
acknowledged that the role of pressure from subordinate classes and other 
                                                 
23 It is generally accepted that, during the past decade the power resources perspective 
has been the leading approach in comparative politics to explain patterns of welfare state 
expansion (Pierson, 1994: 28) and that it is persuasive because “still, the ‘class-
correlates’ do not erode similarly across all advanced nations, and this is where 
differences in welfare state and industrial relations construction matter” (Esping-





organised pressure groups associated with them is of importance in 
explaining the introduction of welfare measures (Gough, 1979: 58). The 
labour movement in general and trade unions in particular must be 
counted among the most important interest groups seeking to influence 
policy because of the contradictory class location of the working class as 
an object of exploitation.24  
Korpi’s power resource theory argues that labour tries to confine 
power of capital through its political power and the welfare state results 
from this effort of labour. Here, distributional outcomes depend on wage-
earner unity and power mobilization (Korpi, 1983). In this context, social 
programmes result from the significant impact of the bargaining positions 
of workers and employers in the marketplace. In addition, many social 
programmes limit the economic vulnerability of wage earners and 
increase worker solidarity (Pierson, 1994. 28).25  
Regarding characteristics of welfare state and politics, the 
“welfare state simultaneously embodies tendencies to enhance social 
welfare, to develop the powers of individuals, to exert social control over 
the blind play of market forces; and tendencies to repress and control 
people, to adapt them to the requirements of the capitalist economy 
(Gough, 1979: 12).” However, it is noted that the welfare state is 
characterized not as overturning the mode of production from capitalism 
                                                 
24 Mishra (1999: 59) maintains that organized labour wields considerable power by 
virtue of its strategic location in the system of production as well as its capacity to 
support political parties (financially, electorally and in other ways) which would further 
labour’s interests. Regarding the sources of workers’ bargaining power, Wright (2000) 
suggests two sources of “associational” and structural power.” Associational power 
consists of “the various forms of power that result from the formation of collective 
organization of workers” (most importantly, trade unions and political parties). Structural 
power, by contrast, consists of power that accrues to workers “simply from their location 
… in the economic system” (Silver, 2003: 13).  Likewise, because of its position in the 
production relations of exploited groups, a labour movement based on collective 
organization of workers tries to overthrow the mode of production or persuade capital 
into concession like social wages. 
25  Whereas Korpi has interest in blue-collar workers, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
emphasizes the importance of class solidarity beyond collective activities of labour class. 





to socialism, but to reform or revise and so relieve exploitation with 
social wages. The term ‘welfare state’ is defined as “the use of state 
power to modify the reproduction of labour power and to maintain the 
non-working population in capitalist societies” (Gough, 1979: 44-45).26   
 To summarize the implications of theories introduced and their 
relations, the state is an institution and the welfare state is accordingly a 
given institution, while politics is based on class relations and welfare 
politics. Furthermore, the welfare state as an institution should be 
identified in terms of class relations (Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 1990). 
This means that, firstly, the characteristics of the welfare state should be 
understood in terms of class and class politics, and the position and role 
of trade unions; secondly, power sources and relations should be grasped 
clearly in terms of class relations; and finally, welfare politics to remedy a 
contradiction of capitalism tends to be characterized as a class 
compromise which is presented in a political machine like a political type 
of corporatism.   
  
 
Defining Deficiency of Welfare Politics 
 
Based on the above discussion on theories, this section will discuss 
welfare politics and its determinants in order to identify the concept of 
‘bureaucratic-authoritarian politics’ which is a deficiency of welfare 
politics which shows the differences between welfare politics and 
institutions concerning CWP in Britain and Korea.  
Welfare politics are political activities to remove or mitigate 
social risks with social wages which lead to a mitigation of class 
exploitation or ‘raise of de-commodification’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) 
                                                 
26 In this tradition “the welfare state takes on two forms: to some it is a (problematic) 
instrument of social legitimation; to others it is a (possibly contradictory) democratic 





and finally materializes into a welfare state and its institutions. These 
politics can best be understood through three intrinsic characteristics as 
described by Mishra:  
 
Historically organized labour has lent its support to social democratic 
and other left parties who have been more supportive of the welfare 
state. Moreover, in many countries organized labour has played a key 
role in societal decision-making in the post war years through 
corporatist institutions. Typically this took the form of tripartite and 
consensual forms of decision-making involving peak associations of the 
state, employers and workers. These arrangements – reflecting the 
strategic position of organized labour in the economy as one of the 
‘social partners’ – were commonplace in many European countries 
during the golden age of welfare capitalism (1999: 59-60). 
 
As seen above, firstly, welfare politics and the welfare state are 
characterized by class politics, as exemplified in the role of trade unions 
as found by Pierson: “The welfare state is the product of a struggle 
between the political powers of social democracy and the economic 
power of capital. A generous and expansive welfare state is an expression 
of the strength of working-class forces in both parties and trade unions,” 
(2006: 33). Secondly, it is generally accepted that social democracy is a 
basic ideology of welfare politics. Esping-Andersen (1985: 3) maintains 
that it “is, and has always been, the most successful expression of 
working-class politics in capitalist democracies”. Thirdly, it is also widely 
acknowledged that welfare politics and the welfare state may be presented 
as a type of corporatism, more exactly ‘social corporatism’. Schmitter and 
Lehmbruch, pioneers of neo-corporatism studies, define corporatism27 in 
                                                 
27 “Different authors have defined ‘corporatism’ differently” (Lehmbruch, 1982: 2). 
Nonetheless, the definition by Schmitter (1974) has generally been accepted: 
“Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest intermediation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” 





terms of “a distinctive, and modern system of interest representation” 
(1974: 85) and “an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation” (1977: 
94)28, and these aspects all are recognized as corporatist features although 
there are differences in the definition and type of corporatism29.  
 It is natural that welfare politics is presented as class politics 
based on social democracy and corporatism, but it is not the politics of 
revolution or of socialism attempting to overthrow capitalism, but the 
politics of compromise in institutionalized areas of capitalism. In other 
words, class politics or class conflict in welfare politics does exist in 
democratic institutions in capitalism and tends to discover itself “through 
the political arena in advanced capitalist countries.” In other words, “once 
universal suffrage and the other major liberal rights are established, this 
provides a crucial channel through which to obtain welfare 
improvements,” (Gough, 1979: 60).  
Unlike welfare politics in developed countries which have basic 
factors such as class politics, social democracy, social corporatism and 
welfare system from these results, welfare politics in developing countries 
lack these factors which are replaced by characteristics like bureaucracy, 
authoritarianism and controls on labour movement. These politics can be 
better understood with a description of state corporatism which is a 
political type of participation and policy-making.  
                                                 
28 Besides these definitions, there are others such as ‘a distinctive combination of 
political representation and state intervention’ (Jessop, 1990: 120), new mode of 
production (Winkler, 1976), specific political structure (Panitch, 1979).  
29
 They call neo-corporatism ‘societal corporatism’ (Schmitter, 1974) or ‘liberal 
corporatism’ (Lehmbruch, 1974) respectively. In addition, Schmitter defines neo-
corporatism as a form of interest representation with a clear-cut distinction of pluralism, 
statism and syndicalism. Therefore he focuses on incorporation of interest groups into 
the state’s decision-making and administrative processes. On the other hand, Lehmbruch 
regards corporatism as a type of policy-making or an institutionalized pattern of policy-
formation. Namely, he views neo-corporatism as being closely related to economic 
policy or public policy and classifies it as three types of strong, medium and weak 





Compared with social corporatism, 30  ‘state corporatism’ 31  is 
composed of relevant interest groups, including labour subordinated to a 
central bureaucratic power or state. Therefore, welfare politics in state 
corporatism tends not to remain as class politics for classes in general, but 
more as pressure group politics for specific interest groups. In the case of 
dominant ideas, they also tend to be subject to the goals, ideas and 
intentions of the Government, such as economic growth, authoritarian 
governance, chauvinism etc. From the differences between the two 
systems, more general determinants of welfare politics can be drawn. In 
politics in state corporatism there is a lack of welfare politics, unlike 
welfare politics in social corporatism, and so bureaucratic-authoritarian 
politics can be characterized as an ‘excluding political system’ 
(O’Donnell, 1973). In this thesis, this situation is identified as a 
‘deficiency of politics’ and factors of welfare politics will first be 
examined to determine its characteristics. The factors for welfare politics 
can be inferred in factors to determine social corporatism and welfare 
politics.    
Based on previous studies on these determinants,32  generally 
there are three factors in welfare politics; organization of trade unions and 
                                                 
30 State corporatism may seem to be social corporatism in terms of participation of trade 
unions, but is in fact definitely different in aspects of power relations among actors, 
function, ideology in base, possible social condition etc. Schmitter discriminates state 
corporatism from societal corporatism as follows: “Societal corporatism appears to be 
the concomitant, if not ineluctable, component of the postliberal, advanced capitalist, 
organized democratic welfare state; state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, 
if not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, 
neomercantilist state” (1974: 105).  
31
 This division, societal and state corporatism, follows Schmitter’s opinion (1974: 102-
103). Besides his classification, there are others such as liberal and authoritarian 
corporatism by Lembruch (1979: 92). Meanwhile, there are sub-divisions in state 
corporatism such as ‘excluding political system and ‘incorporating political system’ by 
O’Donell (1973), and ‘inclusionary corporatism’ and ‘exclusionary corporatism’ by 
Stepan (1978). 
32 There is no denying that determinants of politics in corporatism are as follows: the 
strong solidarity between organized labour and political poverty on left wing; centralized 
organizations of workers and employers; strong coordinated system over national 





control on their members; left-wing political parties and solidarity 
between trade unions and the parties; institutionalization for social 
dialogue and social policy. 
The first and the second factors represent the fact that welfare 
politics is basically class politics and is based on the strength of trade 
unions because the unions are still assessed as one of main actors, 
although they become weak in the face of intense attacks from neo-liberal, 
conservative parties. Regarding these factors, this paper will focus on 
density, ideology, the level of intervention of trade unions in political 
parties and social concertation at a national level.  
 From the point of view of historical institutionalism, institutions 
have been formed by previous politics, but also structures present politics. 
In other words, the institutional factor should be handled in accordance 
with the cohesion of political relations and interventions in politics. Thus, 
this thesis will examine the roles and implication of institutions which 
have been formed from the past politics in terms of their influence and 
effect on the strategies.   
 From the above determinants of welfare politics, the concept of 
‘the deficiency of politics’ can be defined. Firstly, it is a weakness of 
class politics, meaning the exclusion of the labour movement leading to 
                                                                                                                        
relevant to welfare politics because corporatism is closely related to the welfare state. In 
fact, regarding the determinants of development and formation of the welfare state, there 
are many suggestions of the determinants which are similar to those of corporatism. For 
example, Saville sees the development of the welfare state as a result of the interaction 
of three main factors: the struggle of the working class against their exploitation; the 
requirements of industrial capitalism for a more efficient environment in which to 
operate-in particular the need for a highly productive labour force; and the recognition 
by the propertied classes of the price that has to be paid for political security (Saville, 
1981). Esping-Andersen (1990) also suggests three factors: the nature of class 
mobilization (especially of the working class); class-political coalition structures; and 
the historical legacy of regime institutionalization. Furthermore, the list of Pierson 
(2006) is longer and more comprehensive than that of any other author: (1) the extension 
of the franchise (2) the rise of social democratic parties (3) a strong (and centralized) 
trade union movement (4) weak parties of the right (5) sustained social democratic 
governmental incumbency (6) sustained economic growth (7) strong class identity and 





the weakness or extinction of welfare politics. In other words, welfare 
politics depends on the degree of class conflict, especially, the strength 
and form of the working-class struggle by trade unions or mass working-
class parties. Thus, the concept of the ‘deficiency of politics’ is related to 
the existence of a relevant actor, or trade union, and that actor’s ability to 
take part in class politics.  
Secondly, the ‘deficiency of politics’ is related to weak political 
influence of trade unions. This can be explained by the weakness of 
progressive political parties in state politics or the lack of solidarity 
between labour unions and political parties resulting in difficulty of 
access to social policy formation by trade unions.  
Finally, the concept of the ‘deficiency of politics’ is related to 
poor legacies of institutions. This can be explained in two dimensions: 
one is related to the political system while the other is connected with the 
welfare system. As far as a representative system is concerned, deficiency 
of politics is a concept related to weakness or absence of a class 
compromise system.  In detail, deficiency of politics can be found in the 
weakness of institutions such as corporatism, tripartism 33  or policy 
concertation, which can be characterized as authoritarianism, state 
corporatism and sometimes market despotism, in comparison with the 
policy compromise which takes place in social corporatism. Meanwhile, 
poverty is also affected by a poor social security system. 
  
 
                                                 
33 According to the definition of Panitch (1977), corporatism constitutes “a political 
structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organized socio-economic 
producer groups through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction 
at the leadership level, and of mobilization and social control at the mass level” (Panitch, 
1977: 60). Meanwhile, when restricted in this way to the integration within the state of 
the two basic producer groups in capitalist society-capital and labour-it is often referred 
to as ‘tripartism’. The essence of this strategy is that in return for consultation and a 
‘representational monopoly’ within their sphere, each co-party exerts control over the 





Industrial Disease and Welfare Politics around CWP 
 
With regard to industrial diseases, the position of this thesis is also in line 
with the political economy and power resources theories. This means that 
this thesis will explore institutions related to industrial diseases in terms 
of class politics. From this point of view, the relevant institutions are 
recognized as ‘industrial injuries schemes’ or ‘industrial accident 
compensation insurance’ and class politics as the ‘politics of 
compensation’ or ‘compensation politics’. 
 As has been discussed, in the view of political economy, capital 
attempts to offset rising wages by raising the level of direct exploitation, 
for example by extending the hours of work or the intensity of work 
(Gough, 1979: 24). Marx described what happens during the process of 
production as follows:  
 
It must be acknowledged that our labourer comes out of the process of 
production other than he entered. In the market he stood as owner of the 
commodity ‘labour-power’ face to face with other owners of 
commodities, dealer against dealer. The contract by which he sold to the 
capitalist his labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white that he 
disposed of himself freely. The bargain concluded, it is discovered that 
he was no ‘free agent,’ that the time for which he is free to sell his 
labour-power is the time for which he is forced to sell it, that in fact the 
vampire will not lose its hold on him ‘so long as there is a muscle, a 
nerve, a drop of blood to be exploited (Marx, 1867: 285).   
 
From this perspective, workers’ health can be understood in the area of 
the labour process because intensification of exploitation through 
extension of working hours and strengthening of labour intensity leads to 
worsening workers’ health. In this context, work, specifically ‘the quality 
of the work environment and the work process’, may always damage 
workers’ health (Harvey, 1988: 9). Likewise, Marxist political economy 
in explaining occupational health maintains that “workers suffer 





and profit-maximising policies of their employers” (McIvor and Johnston, 
2007: 16) under the continuing process of capital accumulation under 
capitalism. Thus, the protection of workers’ health can be acquired by 
workers themselves, or by the trade unions and their collective activities. 
As a result, social wages for workers have increased in all Western 
capitalist societies more rapidly than monetary wages and part of that 
increase reflects an expansion in the health benefits available to the 
working population (Navarro, 1986: 40-41). However, the activities of 
trade unions for health will inevitably struggle with the intentions and 
strategies of capital. From this point of view, occupational health can be 
understood in relation to class politics as well as a mode of production in 
capitalism. Navarro (1978) explains these characteristics through two 
related themes in an examination of the NHS: the first is the theory that 
the primary controlling forces within the health service are to be found in 
the very infrastructure of capitalism; the other is concerned with 
articulating the function of class relations in shaping the wider social and 
political context in which health care is located (Navarro, 1978: 9).  
 As discussed above, workers’ health and occupational diseases 
should be understood not in the context of individuals but in the social or 
class dimension.34 However, although the problem is associated with 
capitalist modes of production, it does not automatically become social 
                                                 
34 Some commentators have noted that industrial accidents and disasters are socially 
constructed, and some have argued convincingly that in many cases catastrophes, such 
as Piper Alpha and Bhopal, should be seen more as the consequences of a chain of 
corporate irresponsibility than ‘accidents’ in the blameless sense of the word. Indeed, 
speaking about the UK situation, Nichols argues that the term ‘industrial injury’ is more 
appropriate than ‘industrial accident’ (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 21). Dwyer has also 
looked at this in some depth in Life and Death at Work: Industrial Accidents as a Case 
of Socially Produced Error (1991), and suggests that sociological theory regarding work 
accidents can be reduced to four simple hypotheses: 1. Social relations of work produce 
industrial accidents. 2. The greater weight of a level of social relations in the 
management of workers’ relationships to the dangers of their jobs, the greater the 
proportion of accidents produced at that level 3. The greater the degree of auto-control 
by workers at a level, the lower the proportion of accidents produced at that level. 4. The 
greater the degree of managerial safety management at a level, the lower the proportion 





and political. Historically, trade unions focused their priorities on wages, 
followed closely by working hours and conditions of work while they 
have neglected workers’ health and industrial diseases. Therefore, there is 
nothing fixed about the order of the remaining items; it varies as 
circumstances vary (Allen, 1966: 149; Harvery, 1998: 9). This attitude of 
neglect was found by the Robens Committee which reviewed workers’ 
health and safety in the early 1970s.  
 In this context, workers’ health is the responsibility of the labour 
movement35 and, in fact, most of the strikes in the Western developed 
capitalist world in the last two decades have had to do with working 
conditions and how those working conditions affect the well-being and 
health of the labouring populations (Navarro, 1986: 145). In other words, 
“the more control over the workplace workers have, the safer their 
working environment will be, and the fact that modern trade unionized 
workplaces are statistically safer than non-trade unionized workplaces 
bears this out” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 21).  
  As has been shown, the historical-institutional approach and the 
strategic-relational approach can also be applied to give an explanation of 
workers’ health and occupational diseases. From this perspective, 
“medicine is not neutral, nor is it an instrument”. In other words, 
“medicine is a synthesis of social relations, defined within a matrix of 
power dominant-dominated relations that reproduce those relations within 
all dimensions of medicine, including its knowledge, practice, and 
institutions,” (Navarro, 1986: 11). This seemingly neutral definition could 
be re-interpreted in the context of the political and social context of 
capitalism. Smith (1983) shows that the medical definitions of 
pneumoconiosis have been subjected to ideological and political struggles 
                                                 
35 The expansion of state medical expenditures and state health regulations, components 
of the welfare state, in the post-the Second World War period is an outcome of the 
strength of the working class that has forced the bourgeoisie to provide those services 





and the burden of respiratory disease is intimately related to the political 
economy of the workplace, the site of disease production.  
 To conclude the above discussion, occupational diseases must be 
understood in the context of the capitalist relation between production and 
class politics. In this aspect, diseases should be recognized as the basic 
agenda of class politics. In addition, the definition and discovery of 









Data are divided into two types in this thesis: documents and interviews. 
Documentary data and interview data are each collected in two 
categories: primary sources and secondary sources.36 Therefore, there 
will be four kinds of material used in this thesis: primary documents, 
secondary documents, primary interviews, secondary interviews. The 
documentary data and secondary interviews have mainly been collected 
from libraries, museums and institutes while the primary interviews were 
obtained from my own interviews.   
 Data collection has been carried out in two steps. In the first step, 
data in documentary data and secondary interviews were collected 
                                                 
36  The terms, ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’, are widely used to distinguish between 
document sources. The former is related to “records kept and written by actual 
participants in, or witness of, an event” while the latter is related documents by writers 
who report what actual participants said and wrote (Burns, 2000: 485). In this thesis, the 
categories will be applied to interviews in a similar context but slightly modified. That is, 
secondary interviews mean interview materials conducted initially ‘for other study’ 





considering the research question. Based on examination of these data, 
my own interviews were planned as the second step. In other words, my 
own interviews were conducted in order to supplement gaps in knowledge 
in the materials collected in the first step.   
 In the case of Britain, there are already lots of the accumulated 
materials available, as can be seen in McIvor and Johnston’s claim that 
“Coal mining is probably the most documented of all British industries in 
the twentieth century” (2007: 9). In addition, Hansard which registers 
parliamentary debates and archives which contain debates of policy-
making process in the Government are very helpful for understanding 
politics of compensation. There are also many secondary interviews in 
Britain which are kept in universities, museums and relevant 
organizations. On the other hand, as the events studied in detail took place 
in the 1940s and 1970s and key participants are no longer alive, there was 
little need to carry out new interviews and these were limited to a small 
number of miners’ representatives. 
 On the other hand, there is a smaller amount of material on coal 
mining and CWP in Korea compared with Britain (refer to 2.1). This 
reflects the shorter history of mining industry, the Government’s control 
and mineworkers’ ignorance of CWP. In particular, there are hardly any 
documents or statements on the enactment of APPPPW 1984 in Korea. 
Therefore it is essential to carry out interviews to gather data on this. The 
interviews in Korea are therefore very important for this thesis because 
the political processes cannot be fully discovered due to a lack of 
documents which contain the processes of policy-making. 
 
Documentary Data and Secondary Interviews 
 
Documents were collected using ‘purposive sampling.’ This is sampling 





The purposive sampling in the thesis covers three areas: the situation of 
miners and ex-miners with CWP; social policy and industrial injuries 
schemes for ex-miners with CWP; and welfare politics for the 
introduction of schemes concerning CWP.  
 A wide range of documents can be used by social researchers 
including life histories, such as biographies, autobiographies, diaries, 
letters, essays, personal notes, institutional memoranda and reports; and 
government pronouncements and proceedings (Jupp, 1996: 300-303). 
These documents are usually situated in libraries under universities and 
museums; the institutions concerned, such as government agencies and 
parliament; organizations related to industrial relations, such as trade 
unions; federations of businesses concerned; organs connected with civic 
groups or persons; and media, such as newspapers and journals. 
 In Britain, sources of material for this thesis are: Edinburgh 
University Library, South Wales Miners' Library at Swansea University, 
National Library of Scotland, the National Archives, the Reference 
library at the Scottish Mining Museum, the Inter-library Loans service, 
Government departments and agencies, and the Scotland Area and South 
Wales Areas branches of the National Union of Mineworkers. In Korea, 
the sources are the Seoul National University Library, the National 
Assembly Library, departments of the Government, trade unions and 
associations relevant to coal.    
 The types of materials are: articles and books including census 
data and other statistical compilations, primary materials from 
government and trade unions, newspapers, magazines, journals, non-
written qualitative data such as audio-visual materials or artefacts. There 
were the three characteristic materials in Britain: (1) Hansard 
(Parliamentary Debates), (2) Interview materials from the Miners’ 





Government documents concerning the policy-making processes, 
pronouncements, proceedings and white papers.  
 In addition to the general types of documents mentioned above, 
there is also a major piece in Korea relevant for this thesis. It is a survey 
from the Korea Labor Institute conducted by the author. The research 
surveyed 507 SPPs who live in Taebaek City and 510 HPPs37 who are in 
hospital (a total of 1,078 persons with CWP)38.  The survey contained 
questions to gather general information about the surveyed, for example: 
what it was like to work as a coal miner; their everyday life at present; 
their awareness of the compensation for pneumoconiosis under the 
current law; and their needs for medical treatment and everyday life. 
Statistics from this survey have been an important reference for 
understanding of situation of Korean ex-miners with CWP and was a 
major motivation behind this thesis.  
 In addition, there are three sources of secondary interviews: two 
sets of interviews related to the British case were carried out by Miners’ 
Library at the Swansea University and the Library of Scottish Mining 
Museum while the other, related to the Korean case, comes from the 
Korea Labor Institute.  
 The first set of interviews comes from the ‘South Wales Coalfield 
Collection’ in the Miners’ Library.39 I contacted the Miners’ Library after 
fourteen interviews expected to be useful were selected. CDs containing 
                                                 
37 Pneumoconiosis patients in this thesis are divided into two groups: SPP and 
HPP. The groups all have pneumoconiosis but the latter is patients hospitalised 
with complications related to pneumoconiosis while the former does not have 
the complications so is not in hospital. The Chapter 5.3 will give more 
explanation 
38 The author worked for the Institute as a research fellow at that time and the survey 
was conducted as part of that role in 2001.   
39 There is ‘South Wales Coalfield Collection’ which was “established in 1969 as an 
attempt to preserve the documentary records of the mining community of South Wales” 
(http://lisweb.swan.ac.uk/swcc/). There is an ‘Audio Collection’ in the ‘South Wales 
Coalfield Collection’ in which interviews with persons concerned are collected by three 





these interviews were received from the Miners’ Library in July 2007 and 
were listened to by the author. The interviews include interviewees who 
were present at the enactment of CWPS 1974, Daly, Ezra, Varley, Eadie, 
McGahey, and famous union leaders and politicians, such as Scargill and 
Benn. Eight of these interviews were selected as useful for this research 
(refer to Appendix A).   
 The second set of interviews was conducted by the Scottish 
Mining Museum40. The Museum has conducted ‘oral history projects’ and 
the results have been kept in the Reference Library at the Scottish Mining 
Museum. Access to the materials is very easy as the author has worked at 
this library as a volunteer. Requests for relevant interview materials were 
sent to the relevant staff and twenty-one interview transcripts were 
obtained. The interviewees are mainly ex-mineworkers and the interviews 
were conducted in 2005. These transcripts were read and nine interviews 
were selected as sources for this thesis.   
 The third set of interviews comes from the Korea Labor Institute. 
The interviews were conducted under the author’s supervision in May 
2001 for research into the situations of ex-miners with CWP. The 
interviewees were 61 SPP living in Tabaek City. 30 interviewees were 
interviewed by the author and ten of these interviews have been selected 
for this thesis. The interviews are very useful to understand the situation 
of ex-miners with CWP and the benefits available for them under the 
Korean welfare system. However, there is lack of information on the 
political aspects surrounding the compensation system because the 
objective of the survey and interviews was to explore the actual life of ex-
miners with CWP.  
 
                                                 
40 The Reference at the Scottish Mining Museum  hold archives, books, journals, trade 









Interviews are very important to this thesis because political processes 
may not be discovered fully by documents if the documents do not 
contain detailed information on the covert processes of policy-making. To 
supplement the limitation of documents, often the only way open to the 
researcher is to interview participants in policy-making (Punch, 1998: 
180). In this respect, the interviews were ‘a conversation with a purpose’ 
in terms of supplementary data collection as well as attaining the purpose 
of study.  
 The types of interview selected for the thesis were the focused or 
semi-structured interview. This means that the interview was located in 
the centre between tightly structured and standardized interviews and 
unstructured and open-ended interviews. In other words, interview 
questions were to some extent pre-planned and standardized and to some 
extent evolve as the interview unfolds. The wording of those questions to 
some extent depended upon the direction the interview took (Punch, 
1998: 175-176).  
 For sampling, or interview respondents, interviews were 
conducted with former direct and indirect policy-makers and activists 
who were in a position to attest to the events which actually occurred. 
Sampling was selected on the basis of the information gathered from 
literature reviews and the reputational-case selection based on 
recommendations by experts. What is more, interviews were conducted 
with the pneumoconiosis elderly, physicians, social workers and other 
relevant persons.  
In this case, interviews were not conducted focusing on IIA and 
CWPS. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, almost all the participants 
have now passed away because over thirty years have passed since the 





were already materials available to examine these events, for example 
Hansard and internal Government papers including policy-making 
processes had been released.  
 Therefore, the interviews were conducted focusing on trade 
unionists who understand the general facts of welfare politics in terms of 
trade unions and the Labour Party (refer to Appendix  A). The 
interviewees are members of the NUM and the interviews were conducted 
between May and December, 2006.  
In the case of Korea, there are two cases for analysis in this thesis: 
IACI 1964 and APPPPW 1984. While IACI 1964 is not an object suitable 
for analysis by interview because the event happened a long time ago, 
interviews on APPPPW 1984 were possible and were conducted. This is 
because the relevant persons are still alive and there are few documents 
concerning the policy-making processes.  
 There are also many actors related to CWP: ex-miners with CWP 
and their organizations, civic groups, officials, trade unionists, physicians, 
politicians etc. the interviews were carried out in Korea between 8 April 
and 6 May, 2006. During this period, twenty persons were interviewed 





Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to 
the mass of collected data in order to arrive at the objective of the study 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 112). This thesis will adopt the Miles and 
Huberman Framework for qualitative data analysis because their work on 
data analysis is one of the most notable works in recent years and has 





qualitative data to that traditionally expected in the analysis of 
quantitative data” (Robson, 1993: 372).  
 Miles and Huberman identify Miles and Huberman Framework 
as ‘transcendental realism’ and there are three main components to Miles 
and Huberman Framework: data reduction, data display, and drawing and 
verifying conclusions. There are also three main operations in their 
model: coding, memoing and developing propositions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 10-12, 50-89; Punch, 1998: 203-204). Figure 1 
Components of Data Analysis: Flow Model and Interactive Model  
Data reduction is “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes 
or transcriptions” so that “the reams of collected data are brought into 
manageable chunks” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 10; Marshall and 
Rossman, 1989: 114). Data reduction is an effort to reduce the data 
without significant loss of information. As part of the analysis, data 
reduction intervenes in all the processes of analysis. There were editing, 
segmenting and summarizing of data in the early stages of coding and 
memoing; associated activities such as finding themes, clusters and 
patterns in the middle stages; and conceptualizing and explaining in the 
final stages. Data displays organize, compress and assemble information 
to permit conclusions to be drawn. Therefore, good displays are a major 
way to validate qualitative analysis. Displays are used at all stages. 
Likewise, with data reduction, the creation and use of displays is an 
important activity of analysis. On the other hand, the reasons for reducing 
and displaying data are to assist in drawing conclusions. In other words, 
the third stream of analysis activity is conclusion drawing and verification. 
Provisional or tentative conclusions, such as propositions may be drawn 
in the initial stages but the conclusions will be sharpened during data 
reduction and displays, and finally verified in the final stages (Miles and 
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Sources: Miles and Hubenman, 1994: 11, 12. 
 
The relationship is not so much sequential as consisting of concurrent 
streams or activities which interact throughout the analysis, as can be seen 
in Figure 1. That is, “these three components are interwoven and 
concurrent throughout the data analysis” (Punch, 1998: 204; Miles and 
Data Collection Data Display 
Data Reduction 
Conclusions: 





Huberman, 1994: 11) as “three concurrent flows of activity” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 10). During the data analysis with reduction, display 
and drawing conclusion it is important to bear in mind that these activities 
should be conducted in conjunction with research questions, hypothesis 
and important themes throughout the data analysis. Furthermore, “as the 
research progresses, some hypotheses are discarded, others are refined, 
and still others are formulated” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 
1997: 292)   
 On the other hand, there are three main operations in Miles and 
Huberman Framework of coding, memoing and developing propositions; 
the first two are the basic operations on which data reduction and display 
mainly rely (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 50-89; Punch, 1998: 204-208). 
Coding is the process of putting tags, names or labels against pieces of 
data while codes are tags, names or labels for classifying the descriptive 
or inferential data collected during research into meaningful categories 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1997: 335; Miles and Hubenman, 
1994: 56-57). Likewise, the coding of data (data reduction for example), 
leads to new ideas on what should go into a matrix (data display). Memos 
“are summaries of ideas about codes and their relationships and vary in 
content, direction and length” (Sarantakos, 1998: 319). They tie together 
different pieces of data into a recognizable cluster, to show that those data 
are instances of a general concept. They are one of the most useful and 
powerful sense-making tools available (Miles and Hubenman, 1994: 72).  
Entering the data requires further data reduction. As the matrix 
fills, preliminary conclusions can be drawn, but these will lead to the 
decision, for example, to add another column to the matrix to test the 
conclusion (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 2). In terms of that fact, coding 
and memoing try to find and organize the main themes of interviewees in 
terms of the research question and drawing conclusions. These operations 





represent the points of view of the interviewees through descriptions of 
experience, beliefs, and perceptions (Luborsky, 1994; Park, Butcher and 
Maas, 2004: 349-350).    
 According to the guidance of the Miles and Huberman 
Framework, the data collected have been analysed. First, categories were 
designed to relate to the objects and subjects of this thesis and coding of 
collected data was systematically conducted in these categories. For 
example, there are three categories in this thesis: British case, Korean 
Case, theory and methods. The two cases are further separated into 
several sub-categories: working conditions of mineworkers in the past, 
the situation of ex-miners with CWP in the present, compensation 
systems for ex-miners with CWP, and compensation politics for industrial 
injuries schemes. These sub-categories can again be divided into more 
detailed categories. Therefore, the categories become classified into 
detailed sections. According to these categories, accumulated data have 
been re-arranged and coding starts in the categories respectively. Activity 
for coding naturally accompanies memoing. The activity for memos is in 
relation to the advancement and conceptualization of arguments in this 
thesis and goes toward drawing conclusions. In this step, memos were 
reorganized and discussed bearing in mind the research questions and the 
concept of the ‘deficiency of politics’, which is the main concept in this 
thesis.  
 The more times the process of coding and memoing are 
conducted, the clearer the arguments and concepts become. These 
processes take data analysis from data collection through data reduction 
and displays to conclusion drawing and verification. There is no doubt 
that these activities form an interactive, cyclical process. In fact, in the 
beginning, by drawing a research question, this thesis already has some 
conception of a provisional conclusion as well as selected subjects and 





in operations of coding and memoing. During these activities, 
conceptualization and findings have been revised in the circle of 
concurrent or sequential data reduction, data display, drawing and 





Social research involves ethical issues because data collection is likely to 
be directly related to the personal lives of interviewees (Sarantakos, 1998: 
218; Punch, 1988: 280). In particular, issues mainly tend to occur in the 
area of fieldwork which is “characterized by long-term and intimate 
participation in the daily life of the people being studied” (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1997: 298) or asking people about public or 
private information.  
 As written above, there are two types of data in this thesis, 
documents (primary and secondary), interviews (primary and secondary). 
The primary and secondary interviews of these data seem to be closely 
related to ethical issues. This is because while documentary data have 
been collected from already published materials or declassified 
government documents, the use of the interviews requires permission 
from the participants or the researchers who conducted the secondary 
interviews. In particular, the reason why the ethical considerations may 
matter in this thesis is because it is attempting to discover the internal 
processes of policy-making and compromises made by actors who may be 
reluctant to open this up.  
 In regard to the ethical issue, the areas particularly considered 
are: potential deception, informed consent, respect for privacy and 
confidentiality and protection from risk and harm. This is because these 





The problem of potential deception means that researchers will 
sometimes conduct studies using a false identity in order to gain access to 
the field. The concept of informed consent can be summarized as the right 
of interviewees to be informed that they are being interviewed for 
research purposes and for them to understand the nature of the research 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1997: 298; Yang, 2005: 64).  
 The issue of potential deception occurs when respondents may 
perceive a researcher as a source of material resources, political 
connections or social prestige (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1997: 
299). There are few problems in the interviews in Britain because all the 
interviewees knew the researcher’s position as a PhD student from the 
contact with them. However, there may be a problem in Korea where the 
author previously worked for an institute under the Government. In other 
words, the author could be identified as a researcher working for the 
Government and this opens the research to potential deception. To solve 
this ethical issue, no career history was given for the author, and if 
someone was being who may already know this information, they were 
told the author’s current position very clearly.   
 In the case of informed consent, as a basic ethical issue, prior to 
interview research, the Miles and Huberman Framework guidelines and 
checklist were followed. In practice, interviewees were given information 
about the purpose, intention, content of questions, method of interview 
etc. when arranging the meeting, and this information was confirmed 
again just before the start of interview. In particular, these interviews 
were recorded with the consent of interviewees and permission was 
gained to use the interviews for this thesis. All the participants agreed 
with the plan and it is thought that their positive attitudes come from their 
official positions and keen interest of the comparative social policy.  
Interviewees’ approval was also required for the use of the 





use these interviews was confirmed by a person in charge of the library 
who said there was no problem as the materials are already in the public 
domain with the consent of interviewees.  
 Furthermore, the study has tried to respect the ethical principles 
of ‘Privacy and Confidentiality’. In reality, personal privacy in the 
research is related to confidentiality and I think that, quoting Punch, “the 
major safeguard to place against the invasion of privacy is the assurance 
of confidentiality” (Punch, 1994: 92). In this study, the respondents in the 
primary interviews tend to represent the official stance of their respective 
organizations and the issue of anonymity is less important to them than 
interviewees in the secondary interviews. Therefore, for the primary 
interviews this thesis gives private information in limited categories of 
name, position, career etc. However, the interviewees in the secondary 
interviews, except the interviews from the Miners’ Library, are mainly 
members of the general public. Therefore, this thesis guarantees their 
anonymity and respects the right to privacy of the interviewees. In 
addition, this thesis ensures confidentiality by not breaching informed 
consent. 
 In addition, interviewees should not suffer harm or 
embarrassment as a consequence of research (Punch, 1994: 92). Harm 
and risk as an ethical issue is related to a concern that interviewees might 
be hurt due to this thesis. This issue occurs if there may be a possibility of 
potential harm to participants during the process of data collection or as a 
result of the publication of data (Bulmer, 2001). This thesis avoids this 
problem with the observance of informed consent. In other words, in an 
attempt to maximize the protection of the particpants by maintaining 
informed consent and guaranteeing confidentiality, the potential for harm 
and risk as an ethical problem will be minimized. In addition, if it is 





respondents, this will be solved by showing them how it is intended to use 


















It is no exaggeration to express that in the industrialisation era, ‘the true 
source of Britain’s wealth was coal’ (Anderson, 1982: 7) and its industrial 
development was based on its coal supplies (TUCGC, 1936: 5; Allen, 
1981: 1; Burton, 1976: 39) in Britain while coal was also a very important 
energy resource for industrialisation and the coal industry had been 
fostered intensively as a strategic industry, especially since the 1960s in 
Korea (Yoo and Won, 1991: 31) 
 There are three phases of development for the coal industry in 
Britain: before nationalisation, which started in 1946; from 
nationalisation to rationalisation, which had been tried since the late 
1950s; and after rationalisation and individualisation of pits.  
 Until 1946 when it was nationalised, the coal industry was in 
private hands, operated by a great many companies, with some operating 
only one small pit, and others being large and owning a group of several 
pits (NCB, 1983: 4). This ownership structure was criticised because it 
brought many problems such as low competitiveness in the coal industry 
and bad working conditions (TUCGC, 1936: 6; FRG, 1945: 5).  
                                                 





 There had been efforts made to move towards greater national 
centralisation or nationalisation by the Government and trade unions and 
for this there was the Sankey Commission (1919) and the Coal Mines Act 
(1930). The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act of 1946 was finally 
introduced by the Attlee Labour Government. The National Coal Board 
(hereafter NCB)42 was established by the Coal Industry Act as a wholly 
state-owned corporation and, accordingly, assets owned by some 800 
different private companies, including 980 collieries, passed into public 
ownership (Lloyd, 1985: 2; NCB, 1983: 4). This meant that NCB became 
the largest single coal company in the Western world (Morgan, 1989: 6). 
It was expected that nationalisation, that is, a state-owned company or 
public corporation, would lead to enhanced productivity and an 
improvement in working conditions. In the first ten years after 
nationalisation, the industry’s main concern was to meet the rapidly rising 
demand, both inland and for export to Europe. Total production gradually 
rose to 214 million tonnes in 1952 and remained almost at that level until 
1958. During this period, the number of miners employed was around 700 
thousand. This was thanks to an increase in coal consumption from 190 
million tonnes in 1947 to 230 million tonnes by 1955 (Robinson and 
Marshall, 1985: 18). However, an ominous shadow of crisis was passing 
over the coal industry in the late fifties because coal consumption 
decreased as it started to be replaced gradually by other alternative forms 
of energy, such as oil and gas (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 150; DTI, 
1971).  
 Before so-called ‘oil shocks’, and with the price of oil rising 
about eightfold between 1973 and 1979, the importance of coal was 
recognised; accordingly, in the 1970s there was a temporary recovery in 
the coal industry. Through a tripartite compromise, the Government 
adopted The Plan for Coal (1974), which brought about capital 
                                                 





expenditure for the expansion of deep-mined coal and the introduction of 
new mining technology (Bromley, 1992: 105; Lloyd, 1985: 4; NCB, 
1983: 11). However, it seemed that the coal industry could still not 
overcome its inherent problem. Oversupply problems had been deepened 
and stock of coal was accumulated little by little as coal consumption was 
gradually contracted (Lloyd, 1985: 2). In addition, coal came to be seen 
as an increasingly expensive and unattractive source of energy (Morgan, 
1989: 11). Nevertheless, until the 1980s, the NCB attempted to maintain 
unprofitable mines, financing them from profitable ones, in order to 
secure coal supplies and to mitigate the social effects of unemployment 
(Morgan, 1989: 14). However, in front of the general economic 
slowdown and advent of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government, 
the rationalisation of the coal industries was unavoidable. During the 
process of pit closures, there was furious resistance of mineworkers and 
this peaked in a year-long strike from 1984 to 1985. The historical defeat 
of NUM led to rapid rationalisation of the mining industry. ‘Within 12 
months of the end of that strike, 39 collieries had closed and more than 
60,000 employees had left the industry’ (Morgan, 1989: 6), and “deep-
coal mining had virtually disappeared in Britain by the 1990s” (McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 27-28). In addition, the coal industry was privatised 
in 1995. 
In the case of the coal industry in Korea, there were three distinct 
phases in the development of the mining industry: before 1945, Korea 
achieved independence from Japan; from decolonisation to rationalisation 
of the mining industry in the late 1980s; and after rationalisation of the 
industry (refer to FKCWTU, 1974; KOCOAL, 2006; Yoo and Won, 
1991: 15-43; Nam, 1991; SJC, 2001: 13-60). 
 In the first phase (1910-1945) in which Japan ruled over the 
Korean Peninsula. Japan tried to develop the coal industry from the 1920s, 





coal was conducted by Japanese big companies. Therefore, the capital 
monopolised the development and management of the coal industry in 
Korea. The new phase in coal mining began with decolonisation in 1945. 
After the American Military Government Office, which ruled over the 
southern part of Korea rather than Japan for three years (1945-1948), a 
new government in the southern part of Korea (South Korea) was 
established in 1948. The Government introduced ‘Korea Coal 
Corporation Law’, which prescribed funding for the Korea Coal 
Corporation, a government-owned company that was established on 1st 
November 1950. The Korea Coal Corporation Law had played a vital role 
as a backbone industry and had been greatly devoted to the stable supply 
of energy since the Korean War (1950-1953) (SJC, 2001: 24; KOCOAL, 
2008). As well as the state-run coal company, there were many private 
companies in Korea. The majority of coal mines had been in private 
hands and the majority of private mines were small-scale businesses. By 
and large, small mines, which produced below 100 thousand tonnes per 
year, equated to 80-90% of all mines, but their coal production was just 
below 30% of total production. This shows that there were lots of small-
scale mines (Ann, 1988; Nam, 1991). Since the early 1960s, private 
mining companies had produced over 50 % of total production and this 
amount reached nearly 80% in the late 1980s (Seo, 1993: 43-44).  
 There is no doubt that the momentum of rapid development of 
the coal industry was the advent of the Park Regime, which took political 
power by military coup in 1961. The Government tried to develop the 
mining industry to meet energy demands in the process of import-led 
industrialisation (Ann, 1988: 14). In order to give impetus to the increase 
of coal production, the Government introduced the so-called ‘TCL’: 
‘Temporary Law for Coal Development’ (31 December 1961), 
‘Temporary Law for Coal Industry Protection’ (4 August 1969) and 





laws comprised protection of the coal industry, provision of the special 
position of the coal industry, and regulation for supply and demand of 
coal.  
 As a result, 3.6 million tonnes of coal was produced in 1955 and 
about 5 million tonnes in 1960. The production of coal annually increased 
by 35% during the first part of the 1960s and total production reached 
10.5 million tonnes in 1965. As a result, the production of coal increased 
up to 192% in the 1960s (Yoo and Won, 1991; SJC, 2001; Nam, 1991: 
43; Seo, 1993: 20).  
However, the primary energy in Korea had changed from 
firewood and rice straw before the 1950s, through coal (anthracitic) in the 
1950s and 1960s, to oil since the 1960s. After the first and second oil 
shocks in the 1970s, there was a change of energy policy. The 
Government tried to produce coal at its maximum. The lean-to-one-side 
policy towards maximisation of coal production, however, resulted in an 
imbalance between supply and demand in that coal consumption lagged 
behind its production. In addition, the policy was faced with a drop in oil 
prices, revaluation of the Won currency, and deterioration of mining 
conditions due to gradually deepening drifts. Furthermore, cheap and 
good quality foreign coal also caused a crisis of the Korean coal industry. 
On the other hand, the clean energy policy for the Seoul Olympic Games 
in 1988 dropped the demand for coal in the metropolitan area.43 These 
factors resulted in an increasing level of the total stock of coal. For 
example, there was about 1.1 million as stock in 1988, which reached 
44% of total coal production. Therefore, there were many coal mines that 
went into bankruptcy and delayed in payment. Likewise, there was an 
                                                 
43 Over 90% of anthracite produced was used as household briquette, but since 
the late 1980s, the consumption had been quickly decreased because of the 
change in household energy (petroleum, LNG, electricity), resulting from an 
increase in national income and government regulation on pollution (Nam, 1991, 





overall downturn in the coal industry in the 1980s (Yoo and Won, 1991; 
Won, 1996). As a result of coal industry rationalization of the 
Government, from 1989 to 1994, 303 of the 355 mines in Korea have 
been closed or abandoned, and 31,535 miners left their workplace (Kang, 
2000:34). By 2004, there were just nine coal mines in operation, 
employing no more than 6,500 miners. 
As described above, the industry was a main engine for 
industrialisation and had employed a higher number of workers than any 
other industry. In addition, the life cycle of this industry is also similar, 
although the industrialisation in Britain does not synchronise with the one 
in Korea. After rapid growth, the industry was discarded under the pretext 
of industrial rationalisation in the 1960s in Britain and the 1980s in Korea.    
However there was a big difference in ownership structure. Since 
the Second World War, Britain nationalised main industries including the 
coal industry, whereas privatised mines in Korea played a key role in coal 
production. The difference creates a great gap between the two countries 
in terms of working conditions, type of trade unions, scale of mines, and 
so on.  
 
 
Miners, Working Conditions and Industrial Injury in Britain 
 
Whether it takes place in Britain, Korea or elsewhere, coal mining has 
always been a dangerous occupation and hard work, and it is widely 
accepted that there is a huge combination of dangers, health hazards and 
discomfort in the working conditions (Morgan, 1989: 1; Allen, 1981: 93-
94):  
 
The working atmosphere in an underground coal mine is usually hot, 
close and damp. ... Coal extraction inevitably produces much dust, dirt 





consequently, prone to collapse, flooding and gas ignitions (Morgan, 
1989: 1). 
Men descend as far as 3,000 feet below the surface … They travel as far 
as 5 miles from the pit bottom to the face by man-riding facilities and on 
foot ... They work in coal seams as narrow as 18 to 24 inches … They 
have to protect continually, vigilantly, against floods of water, gas 
explosions, falls of rock (Allen, 1981: 93-94). 
 
As can be seen above, workplaces in mining have the worst working 
conditions and, especially, they have been recognised as a base for 
occupational diseases such as pneumoconiosis, emphysema, bronchitis 
and other respiratory diseases, due to the greatest exposure to dust.  
 
Table 3-1 Accidents in British Coal Mining (a) 















1913 1,753 5,675 177,189 1.55 5.0 157.1 
1930 1,013 3,812 166,281 1.07 4.0 176.2 
1936 790 3,117 135,968 1.02 4.0 174.8 
1940 923 3,237 146,388 1.20 4.2 190.3 
1945 550 2,353 181,059 0.76 3.2 249.4 
1950 493 2,020 237,833 0.68 2.8 328.3 
1955 425 1,889 217,305 0.58 2.6 296.5 
1960 317 1,573 192,576 0.51 2.5 311.9 
1965 216 1,159 206,235 0.45 2.4 428.9 
1967 151 982 165,790 0.36 2.4 399.2 
Source: MOP, 1967: 62. 
 
In particular, before the twentieth century coal mining was synonymous 
with an extremely hazardous industry, with high injury and mortality 
rates (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 309). It was not until 1799 that fully-
fledged slavery was abolished, but by the first half of the nineteenth 





working underground 44  according to the Reports of the Royal 
Commission on the Employment of Children in Mines (1842):  
 
Young females, dressed like boys in trousers, crawling on all fours, with 
belts round their waists and chains between their legs (the Reports of 
the Royal Commission on the Employment of Children in Mines, 1842; 
recited in Walker, 1979: 49-50). 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, almost half of all deaths of 15 – 20-
year-olds in mining communities were due to injuries sustained in pit 
work. Despite a fall in injury and death rates since the 1850s, it was still 
the case in 1914 that a miner was killed in Britain every six hours, and 
severely injured every two hours (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 41; 
Benson, 1980: 43; Church, 1986: 582-87). However, the accident rate in 
Britain was not high compared to other countries at that time. The table 
below shows that the fatality rate in Britain was higher than that of 
Belgium, but lower than that of Germany and the USA.  
 




UK USA Germany France Belgium 
1896-1900 1.32 2.85 2.381 1.23 1.11 
1901-05 1.29 3.24 2.02 1.09 1.012 
1906-10 1.39 3.68 2.23 2.293 0.99 
1911-12 1.17 3.41 2.26 1.29 1.07 
Notes: 1.Relates to 1897-1900, 2.Relates to 1902-1095, 3.Distorted by unusually high 
death rate in 1906. 
Source: Buyton, 1978: 142. 
                                                 
44 The coal mining labour force included those who worked below ground and those 
who worked on the surface. Above ground were those responsible for screening, grading 
and cleaning the coal in preparation for transport from the pithead to customers. They 
included many older miners who were too unfit and physically incapable of working 
underground, up to the Second World War. In some districts (such as South Wales, 
Lancashire and East Scotland) these also included several thousand female workers 
(women working underground had been banned by legislation in 1842) (McIvor and 
Johnston, 2007: 28). On the other hand, women were employed on the surface until the 
1960s in some areas, principally Lancashire and Scotland. Dragging tubs, working the 







By 1936, the number of persons killed annually had dropped to 790, and 
to 550 by 1945. The number decreased again to 151 in 1967. Likewise, 
the incidence of fatal accidents has dropped dramatically. This is due to 
the great improvements in mining techniques and safety measures since 
the First World War, but especially since the nationalisation of the mines 
(Anderson, 1982: 58; NUM, http://www.num.org.uk/). 
 Compared to other industries, the mining industry had the highest 
fatal accident rate, as can be seen in Table 3-3. The proportion of persons 
injured by accidents in coal mines in 1932 was exactly ten times higher 
than in factories, and about twice as high as at the docks and in other 
industries. 
 
Table 3-3 Fatal Accidents in 1932 
Occupation Fatal accidents 
Fatal accidents per 1,000 
employed 
Mines 907 1.11 
Shipping 138 .77 
Docks  63 .68 
Quarries  50 .71 
Constructional Work  71 .35 
Railways 202 .45 
Factories 540 .11 
Source: TUCGC, 1936: 15. 
 
In terms of working hours, in the 1890s coal miners were amongst those 
working the lowest hours, at 47-55 per week, while it was not uncommon 
for foundry labourers to work 72-84 hours per week (see Table 3-4). 
There has been statutory regulation of mining hours since 1908, when the 
maximum was fixed at eight hours plus winding down time (about half an 
hour underground). In 1919, the maximum was reduced to seven hours. 
Following the 1926 dispute, the owners were empowered to increase 





extended to eight hours in all coal-related fields, with the exception of 
some select areas (TUCGC, 1936: 13).  
 




Engineering workers 54 
Textile workers 56 
Railway ticket agents 56-62 
Brickmakers 54-69 
Chemical workers 53-70 
Railway guards 64-70 
Paper workers 66-78 
Bakers 70 
Sailors 72 
Foundry labourers 72-84 
Retail clerks 82 
Tailors 56-96 
Restaurant waiters 96 
Source: McIvor, 2001: 114. 
 
On the other hand, the nature of mining work changed radically 
with the advancement of technology.45 “The mechanisation46 of coal 
production was a long, uneven and incremental process. The first 
machines designed to undercut the coal were developed in the middle of 
the nineteenth century” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 33).  Throughout 
the nineteenth century, owing to the supreme position of British coal in 
world trade, there was no great incentive to improve mining practice. 
Compared to other industries, the productive methods at the beginning of 
the present century were little different in principle from those of 100 
                                                 
45 The main changes were: “the shift from board and pillar (sometimes called ‘room and 
stoop’ or ‘pillar and stall’) to longwall methods of coal extraction; the application of 
mechanical power to hewing, drilling and tunnelling; haulage mechanisation with 
conveyor-belt coal transportation systems; integrated ‘power loading’ coal face 
machinery; power-driven moving hydraulic props; and improved lighting and ventilation 
methods, not least with electrification of the pits” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 33). 
46 There are usually three operations involved in coal-mining: undercutting the coal, 





years previously. By 1934, nearly half of the coal produced was cut by 
machines; the horsepower of electric motors below ground was over 
1,000,000; 30% of the coal output was conveyed mechanically (TUCGC, 
1936: 10). 
 
Table 3-5 Power Loaded Output and Mechanisation 
Year % of output power loaded 
% of output mechanically 
cleaned 
1930 - 29.8 
1937 - 43.8 
1947    2.4(i)     48.3 (i) 
1950 3.8 52.1 
1955 9.9 57.9 
1960 37.5 62.1 
1965 80.7 65.2 
Source: MOP, 1967: 62. 
 
 
“One of the most important strategies during the nationalisation era was 
power loading. Between 1947 and 1957, the proportion of power loaded 
coal in the UK rose from 2% to 23%, and at the end of the next ten years 
the figure had jumped to 86%, with 90% of British coal being power 
loaded by the 1970s” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 151).  
 
 
Miners, Working Conditions and Industrial Injury in Korea 
 
There were no women and children in underground work in mines in 
Korea because the coal industry was started under Westernised labour 
laws, in which they were prohibited from working inside a drift. However, 
this did not mean that the working conditions in Korea were similar to 
that of contemporary Western society from the late 1940s onwards. In 
contrast, Korean miners worked in different conditions to contemporary 







Because of about forty degrees terrestrial heat from a hundred or 
thousand metres of underground, cave-in of mine roof, heavy and 
intensive working in dusts of stone, coal and clouds of smoke from 
powder explosion, any healthy man becomes as good as a living dead in 
several years (Ann, 1988).  
Regarding working hours, the labour-related laws stated that miners who 
worked in a noxious or hazardous workplace should be limited to work 
under 6 hours per day and under 36 hours per week. However, miners in 
fact worked 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week from entry into the 
workplace to leaving the mines, without any allowance for overtime work. 
This is because mine employers did not regard time assigned in entry into 
drift, for example in time spent, preparation for work and leaving drifts, 
as working hours. This means that, in fact, miners worked two extra hours 
without payment (Pyun, 1994; Ann, 1988).47 
 In addition, a three-shift system was carried out in pits. This 
implies that the pits were operated for 24 hours per day and miners were 
not able to rest for any significant duration. What is more serious is that 
miners had just two days holiday from work per month. In other words, 
employers wanted miners to work 28 days per month and so paid perfect 
attendance allowance when they achieved this quota. 
 
                                                 
47Likewise, labour-related laws stipulated that six working hours per day covered from 
beginning to end. Mine operators maintained that the hours for entering and leaving a 
drift should not be included in the working hours. However, according to the principle 
that workers were in danger just after entering mines in most Western countries, six 
hours covered the period from entering to leaving. In addition, these countries adopted a 
four-shift system and the five-day working week. This is compared to the three-shift 










Bank and General 
Companies 
2,300 1,900 0.5-1.0 
Traffic, Print, Postal 
Services 
2,600 2,100 1.0-1.5 
Manufacturing 2,900 2,200 1.5-2.0 
Agriculture and 
Construction 
3,500 2,800  
Mining Industry 4,000  4.0-7.0 
Note: 1) Calorie per day for Korean Adult: 2,400-2,700, Labour Intensity = 
(Consumption of Energy in Working – Consumption of Energy in Normal 
Condition)/Basal Metabolism. 
Source: Nam, 1991: 149. 
Working in the coal industry was generally recognised as very intensive 
labour. As can be seen in Table 3-6, the calorie, which was seen as an 
index of labour intensity, was highest at 4.0-7.0 in the case of coal miners, 
in contrast to 1.5-2.0 in manufacturing workers and 0.5-1.0 in white-
collar workers. This showed that labour intensity in miners was a 
maximum of three times greater in manufacturing workers and over seven 
times than in white-collar workers (SJC, 2001: 41; Nam, 1991: 148).  
 In general, the coal industry is notorious for having bad working 
conditions. However, miners’ working conditions in Korea had been 
recognised as being much more serious because there were many small 
coal businesses that rested mainly on manual labour. In other words, the 
coal industry needed much initial capital48, but there were many small 
companies in Korea called a rented part of a mine or a subcontracted 
mine whose employers were not interested in mechanisation for digging 
coal. Likewise, the coal employers preferred dependence on labour power 
                                                 
48 The coal industry necessitates a great sum of funds because it is necessary to 
accurately examine the situation of a coal seam underground. Based on this, a design of 
drift work and exploitation of work from the coalface was determined. Likewise, in the 
early stages, ample funds should be raised for a long-range and comprehensive 





of low wages rather than mechanised mining. Thus, miners were always 
at a structured risk (Ann, 1988: 18): 
 
Of course, it was hard work. People at present cannot work in pits no 
matter how much money they can receive... There was no lantern. 
Instead, there was Gandrae [a carbide lamp which used gas as fuel] … 
In former days, there was also an electric car. Therefore, through 
manpower, coal should be drawn to the outside. Our work was great 
hardship (Kang, June 2003, recited in Yoo et al., 82). 
 
On the other hand, working by hand, even in big pits that have relatively 
good working conditions and high mechanisation, was still conducted in 
the case of mining coal, digging in the ground and building a pit prop. 
Accordingly, increased productivity was greatly based on an increase in 
human strength (Nam, 1991: 147).  
 Thus, miners in Korea worked in extremely bad working 
conditions, much worse than those of contemporary Western miners, and 
were, without doubt, exposed to industrial hazards. It is generally 
acknowledged that there is a causal relationship between industrial 
disaster and labour hours, labour intensity and working conditions. This 
fact is helpful in understanding the high rate of industrial disasters in 
Korea. Namely, it can be explained in the context of the low level of 
mechanisation, high labour intensity under the contract work system, and 
industrial policy focusing on high economic growth. Following the 
introduction of Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act 
(hereafter IACIA) in 1964, there were, on average, around 200 deaths per 
year through industrial accidents, although after the 1990s, the mortality 
rate had fallen to about 40 workers (see appendix E).  
Compared to other industries in Korea, the rate of industrial 
accidents in the coal industry was much higher. It is generally assessed 
that miners were exposed to industrial danger over two times more often 





Table 3- 7 Workers’ Deaths by Industrial Disaster, per million 




1977 6.0 136.9 42.5 
1979 4.9 139.3 43.2 
1981 7.8 133.8 50.8 
1983 5.8 117.4 38.9 
1985 5.6 102.5 38.6 
1987 5.3 146.9 35.4 
1989 6.5 133.5 38.0 
1991 5.8 108.9 33.5 
1993 5.5 101.4 26.4 
1995 7.0 68.3 17.9 
1997 6.5 69.1 21.4 
1999 6.1 49.2 14.1 
Source: FKCWTU, 2005: 432. 
 
Table 3-8 Mortality per million tonnes in Coal Industry (unit: person) 
Nation America Britain Japan Korea 
No. of Deaths 0.2 0.4 2.6 9.15 
Source: Ann, 1988: 29. 
 
Compared to other countries, the rate of industrial disaster in Korea was 
very high. Korea was five times higher than the Philippines in terms of 
rate of frequency, and as much as 23.5 times higher than America in 
terms of the rate of deaths per million (SJC, 2001: 54). According to 
Table 3-8, during the process of digging one million tonnes of coal, 45 








2.  Miners’ Organisation and Compensation Politics 
around CWP in Britain and Korea 
 
 
Trade Unions and Labour Politics in Britain and Korea 
 
Trade Union Congress and Social Corporatism in Britain 
 
Prior to 1824, trade unions were not recognised as a legal existence. 
However, since the creation of Trade Union Congress (hereafter TUC) in 
1868, only a peak organisation of organised labour, trade unions had 
developed very quickly so that they could be recognised as the ‘fourth’ 
estate by 1945. For three decades after the war, trade unions enjoyed their 
political influence as an important partner of political groups.  
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, during the two world 
wars, the image and role of trade unions changed decisively. Trade 
unions’ officials worked unceasingly to improve industrial relations and 
to increase output. Many of them assumed heavy additional 
responsibilities without complaint and with very little compensation 
(Pelling, 1987: 222). In particular, the unions could influence manpower 
policies that were vital to the war effort and had worked in partnership 
with the Government to administer those policies. Soon after the Second 
World War, the attitudes of the trade unions towards the Government 
were transformed from hostile to positive and the reverse was true 
(Barnes and Reid, 1982).  
Secondly, the close relationship between TUC and the 
Government49 could also make this possible. The trade unions had close 
                                                 
49 General Secretary of TUC, Mr Vincent Tewson, mentioned: ‘Our industrial and 
political organisation has developed side by side. That is perhaps the deepest and most 





organisational, financial and human links with the Labour Party. They 
were represented at Labour’s annual conference, where their delegates 
could predominate by virtue of the block vote. Trade unions also enjoyed 
representation on Labour’s National Executive Committee (Dorey, 1995: 
17). In addition, unionists directly participated in politics. For example, 
Attlee found posts for six union-sponsored Members of Parliament of 
twenty cabinet members (Pelling, 1987: 226).  
Due to this base, trade unions had been related to the formation 
and development of social consensus and social corporatism. First of all, 
trade unions had deeply contributed to the formation and development of 
the wartime and post-war consensus, which materialised into Butskellism 
and the welfare state. The consensus and Butskellism were similarly 
identified as ‘a mixed economy, economically dominated by private 
industry but with an extensive industrial public sector, including coal, 
steel, the railways and the utilities, and a range of public services, 
including a largely universalist welfare state’ (Baldock et al. eds. 1999: 
25). Trade unions supported the trend and made active efforts. In other 
words, trade unions intervened to the introduction of social policy before 
and after the Second World War. For example, The Beveridge Committee 
was set up as a result of ceaseless and strong pressure from trade unions 
(Jones, 2000: 107). Beveridge also pointed this out:  
 
The political background was that the General Council of the TUC for 
some time had been pressing the Government for comprehensive review 
of social insurance … The Ministers [Minister of Health, Mr Malcolm 
MacDonald, Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Ernest Brown] 
receiving the deputation [of Council of TUC] were sympathetic and 
promised action as rapidly as possible. Four months later their efforts 
materialised in the appointment of the Inter-Departmental Committee 
(Beveridge, 1953: 296).  
 
                                                                                                                        
fellow delegates, we are on the threshold now of still more profound and far-reaching 






Also, the policies of the Labour Party had been carefully coordinated with 
those of the TUC by the interlocking of membership on drafting 
committees (Pelling, 1987: 226).  This meant that trade unions could 
intervene in social policy through the Labour Party. For example, from 
1940 to 1951, trade unions had had a great influence on political areas. 
Trade union representatives continued to sit on a variety of governmental 
committees after the war, addressing a whole range of economic, 
industrial and social issues, and helping to formulate policies in these 
areas. This shows that the Labour Party and the trade unions shared a 
great many policy objectives and political goals, and consequently found 
it desirable, even necessary, to work together (Dorey, 1995: 18). 
The 1970s is characterised as the period of social corporatism in 
Britain. Regarding corporatist body and practice, there had been the 
corporatist body National Economic Development Council since 1962. 
This was created by the Conservative Government for the discussion of 
economic problems and negotiation between economic subjects 
(Kavanagh, 1996: 199). The high point of a corporatist characteristic was 
usually found in the ‘social contract’ of the 1970s. In this period, 
corporatism seemed to become an important part of British political life. 
For this, Middlemas (1979) maintained that Britain could be called 
corporatist or tripartite and Kavanagh (1996) recognised this period as the 
‘corporatist’ phase.  
As discussed briefly, during the so-called Golden Age of the 
welfare state, based on political consensus and corporatism, trade unions 
had enjoyed their power and influence in governmental and industrial 
areas. This meant that trade unions played a main role in the growth of 
the welfare state and socio-economic policies through tripartite bodies, 
and participation and policy-making in the Labour Party. This 





had been social corporatism in the mining industry, especially around the 
1970s.  
 
NUM and Labour Politics in Britain 
 
With regard to development of the Labour movement50 in the mining 
industry, there are distinct periods in accordance with the national level of 
industrial relations: before nationalisation, from nationalisation to 
privatisation, and after privatisation. The second period will be examined 
mainly in this part because the IIS and the CWPS were introduced during 
this period.   
 In the early part of the eighteenth century, there was almost no 
organisation among the mineworkers. Disputes between miners and 
employers could easily flare into riots and there was no regular pattern to 
this action (Burton, 1976: 43). Through the eighteenth century, miners 
started to organise their own organisations. Finally the Miners’ Federation 
of Great Britain (hereafter MFGB) was created in 1889 as the first 
national trade union, which survived attack from employers and the 
Government (NUM, 2007).  
 The MFGB, which was affiliated with TUC in 1890, became the 
best-organised group of British workers, with over 900,000 members in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century (McIvor and Johnston, 
                                                 
50 There are several types of workers’ organisations in the coal industry according to 
objects of representation: NUM for blue collar workers, the British Association of 
Colliery Management for supervisory grades and salaried management staff, the Colliery 
Officials and Staffs Area for clerical workers, and the National Association of Colliery 
Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) for colliery deputies and under-officials. 
This part will focus on NUM, which organised all the non-supervisory and non-clerical 
workers in and around collieries by a ‘closed shop’ agreement with NCB, because it 
represented the vast majority of miners in the mining industry and industrial relations in 
this industry have been developed between NUM, the Government and employers. On 
the other hand, wage earners in coalmining are divided into three main categories. These 
are underground face workers, underground construction and maintenance workers, and 
surface workers (including various types of ancillary workers and clerical staff). There 





2007: 44; NUM, 2007). The MFGB campaigned not only for higher 
wages, but also for a five-day week, a further reduction in working hours 
and, significantly, nationalisation of the coal industry (NUM, 2007) 
through collective bargaining, strikes51 and state politics. In 1909, the 
MFGB affiliated with the Labour Party and within a year was sponsoring 
eighteen Members of Parliament. In the general election of 1924, the 
Labour Party won 151 seats, of which 40 had members sponsored by the 
MFGB. The miners’ Members of Parliament acted in parliamentary 
debates and party discussions in the interests of general miners or their 
own coalfield miners (NUM, 2007; Howell, 1996: 40-41).  
 However, the MFGB, before nationalisation of the mining 
industry, was a loose federation of autonomous unions52 and this limited 
its effective operation. This is because district unions existed based on a 
variety of formulae, ideologies and histories, with their own myths, 
symbols and ethos. The influence of the Federation on their district 
organisations was also extremely weak. Only three, or very occasionally 
four officers were employed by the MFGB and the national officers had 
no power to pursue a national policy (Barou, 1947: 237; Howell, 1996: 
35-36).  
In 1944, a powerful new national organisation for miners, the NUM, 
was formed to overcome the existence of a separate and loose type of 
federation. It clearly pointed out its purpose: 
 
… advance and protect the interests of members in relation to questions 
of wages, hours holidays, conditions of employment, safety, 
                                                 
51 Strikes of miners were accompanied by endeavours to protect their skills, enforce 
areas of control over their labour, and collective terms. Miners were among the first non-
craft workers in Britain to organise themselves at work into combinations or unions 
(Douglass, 2005: 2). 
52 ‘The individual districts differ greatly in strength and importance. Numerically, the 
strongest groups were, in 1944, those in Yorkshire with 115,000 members, Durham with 
106,472, South Wales with 100,000, Scotland with 51,000, and Lancashire with 
40,000…. These were the more difficult to overcome in that they reflected differences in 





compensation and all other questions arising out of and/or in 
connection with the members’ employment or occupation (NUM, 1974: 
3(b) of Rules).  
 
In the immediate post-war years, the NUM was virtually a closed shop 
with around 700,000 members. The NUM was also affiliated with the 
main Labour Movement Federation, the TUC, and a progressive political 
party, the Labour Party (Morgan, 1989: 16). In addition, “in the early 
years of nationalisation, the NUM developed a supportive and co-
operative relationship with NCB and wielded considerable influence 
within this largely consensual relationship” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 
203).  
 During this period, strikes were still the measures taken to 
embody miners’ demands. Collective activity rose in the late 40s and 50s 
to a peak in 1956/57, when nearly 75% of all reported stoppages were in 
coal. These were almost all confined to one pit at a time and were mainly 
over wages, especially the rates set by piecework. The reform and 
progressive standardisation of the wages system, culminating in the 
National Power Loading Agreement in 1966, tended to work against these 
strikes, and they declined in the 1960s despite the high rate of closures. 
From the late 1960s, strike activity grew again: between 1969 and 1972, 
the NUM leaders had to run to keep control of a wages militancy that 
surprised and temporarily disoriented them. There was a series of disputes 
in Yorkshire in the late 1960s and the failure to get a national strike in 
1970 did not stop strikes in South Wales, Scotland and parts of Yorkshire. 
The NUM fought and won two national stoppages over pay in 1972 and 
1974. The 1972 strike was preceded by an overtime ban and lasted from 9 
January to 28 February. In 1974, after a second national strike and a 
general election that brought further substantial rises in minimum rates, 
average earnings went up sharply once more to £43.40 in that year and to 





 On the other hand, there had been machinery for joint 
consultation in the coal industry, such as joint consultative councils and 
conciliation committees at national, divisional, area and pit levels. The 
wartime Greene Tribunal of 1942 established a national procedure with 
compulsory arbitration for the first time, whereby unresolved district 
questions could be carried to a Joint National Negotiating Committee and 
then, failing agreement there, to a National Reference Tribunal. This 
procedure was adopted by the nationalised industry and the conciliation 
and arbitration scheme was set up under the Nationalisation Act (1946). 
Early reports of the Coal Board reveal great enthusiasm for joint 
consultation, which was seen as a means of promoting unity, a method of 
tapping the knowledge and experience of the labour force, and a channel 
for communications (McCormick, 1979: 58; Jencks, 1966: 97). Likewise, 
the NUM worked with the NCB to move to a nationally negotiated day 
wage structure, the keystone of which was the National Power Loading 
Agreement of 1966. The union also co-operated over the pit closure 
programme of the 1960s, letting jobs go in the hope of securing benefits 
for the survivors. The NUM secured the Plan for Coal (1974) through a 
social contract with the Labour Government. This appeared to give the 
miners security, allowing the old consensus to return (Morgan, 1989: 17-
18).  
 The corporatist period had been changing through Thatcher’s 
Government with the ideology of neo-liberalism. Thatcher’s policy for 
privatisation, especially pit-closure programmes in the coal industry, was 
bitterly opposed by the NUM, and resulted in the 1984/85 British miners’ 
strike. The aftermath of defeat of the strike was profound because the 
NUM had been losing their influence in political areas and their own 
members, with national agreements with the Government and the NCB 
terminated, including conciliation procedures and consultation, which, in 





55; Douglass, 2005: 27-42).  
 
FKTU and State Corporatism in Korea 
 
Against the leftist labour movement led by the ‘National Council of Trade 
Unions’, during the three years of the nation’s liberation from the 1910-
1945 Japanese colonial rule, an anti-communist labour organisation 
named the ‘Korea Trade Union Federation’ was created in 1946 by right-
wing politicians under the help of the American Military Government, 
and soon took the initiative on the leftist labour unions. Whereas the 
progressive labour movement went out of existence in the late 1940s until 
the democratic labour movement appeared in the 1970s, the Korea Trade 
Union Federation was reorganised into the ‘Federation of Korea Trade 
Unions’ (hereafter FKTU) in 1960 by the military junta and existed only 
as a national workers’ organisation until the organisation of the Korean 
Trade Union Congress in 1990, which was a confederation of democratic 
trade unions and became the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(hereafter KCTU) in 1995.   
On the other hand, during the rapid economic growth between 
1960 and the mid-1980s, the Korean developmental state for price 
competitiveness in the export market and rapid economic growth was 
characterised by factors such as low wages and long working hours, 
massive investment and mass production by Chaebols, and state 
repression of labour resistance against factory tyranny, as can be guessed 
by the organisation of trade unions. This means that there was a strong 
labour discipline system in the workplace and no participation of trade 
unions in labour politics. 
During this period, the labour movement was held in check by the 
government or the employer. Workers were subjected to unitary industrial 





and their existence and rights were severely limited. Under the strong 
barrack-like control of the state, the FKTU functioned as an economic 
entity abiding by the ‘growth first, distribution later’ logic, the 
anticommunism, and the economic-growth promotion policy. The FKTU 
had had a perspective of the economic growth-first ideology from the 
outset, as was shown in their organisation platform: 
 
The dawn of New Year starts for overcoming a serious economic crisis 
and deciding the fate of our country to hang in the balance. Raising a 
beacon of the Military Revolution, we, workers, do our best in nation-
building for modernisation (FKTU, “Platform” in Annual Report, 1979: 
573). 
 
Also, the FKTU maintained its stance of ‘anticommunist labour 
movement’, which was the same with the Government. Bae Sang-Ho, 
president of the FKTU, gave an opening address on 19th January 1974 as 
follows:  
 
Some religious organisations, including the Urban Industrial Missions, 
which infiltrated the front line of our organisation, are continuing to 
manoeuvre behind the scenes. This results in a labour-management 
dispute and disruption of our organisation. We vowed to explode the just 
power of deterrent, crush all who had infiltrated our organisation and 
completely eliminate them from the face of the earth with the mettle to 
overthrow the National Council of Korean Labour Unions in the old 
days (recited in Min, 1989: 46). 
 
As mentioned above, the FKTU yielded to the political discourse of 
government and accepted the policy of the Government without reserve. 
In other words, the union was a faithful supporter in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Likewise, the FKTU did not have a minimum independence from the 
state and management but was merely a subordinate to the favours 
granted, relying on strategic decisions made by the Government and 
management. In particular, the institutionalisation of the enterprise union 





be fragmented at the enterprise level, and confined the activity of labour 
unions to purely economic activities. Thus, the FKTU’s leaders were 
isolated from their rank-and-file members and its activities were limited 
just to the narrow petition of workers’ rights, especially wage increase. In 
fact, the legal, administrative, and physical repression over the workers’ 
basic rights under the authoritarian labour regime made it impossible to 
have autonomous collective bargaining between the management and 
union (Choi et al., 2001).  
Under the then authoritarian rule, there was no participation of 
trade unions in social policy and state politics. If there had been, it would 
have been a pseudo-machine for consultation, which could have been 
recognised as ‘state corporatism’ (Choi, 1988; Schmitter, 1974). This was 
based on labour-exclusive, tripartite developmental coalition. In other 
words, bureaucrats, big companies, rightist trade unions etc. had formed 
dominating coalition, called developmental coalition, since the 
industrialisation. This meant that independent trade unions had been 
excluded in this coalition and workers were working in extremely bad 
conditions for the sake of modernisation of the fatherland. On the other 
hand, this regime did not permit any resistance against this coalition, the 
ideology of developmentalism and anti-communism. In this context, ‘the 
model of political economy called “the developmental model” can be 
identified as a “government-led growth strategy and authoritarian political 
regime”’’ (Choi et al., 2001) or ‘state-dominated alliance’ (Shin, 2003: 
77-78). It is natural that the coalition and the developmental model made 
‘a negative contribution to welfare policy development’ (Woo, 2004: 35).  
To sum up, before the political democratisation and the Great 
Workers’ Struggle in 1987, industrial relations in Korea were 
characterised as labour control by despotic domination in a military 
fashion.  





subordinated to the Government, was accomplished by sacrificing a 
worker’s health. In fact, ‘Korean industrial accident rates were very high 
from the early period of industrialisation up to the middle of the 1980s. 
During the period 1978-80, for example, 126,250 accidents occurred each 
year involving 127,641 workers. During this period, 1,402 workers died 
each year from workplace accidents. These rates were comparatively very 
high. Korea’s industrial accidents rate in 1976, for example, was five 
times that of United States and England, and 15 times that of Japan’ (Koo, 
2001: 54-55).  
The period from 1987 to 1997 can be defined as the ‘recognition 
period of the labour movement as a social entity’. With the Great Worker 
Struggle in 1987, so-called democratic trade unions were organised 
against the existing trade union, FKTU, which had been criticised as 
yellow unions or company unions, and resisted authoritative control over 
the labour movement. As a result, workers continued to demand and 
attain high wage increases and dramatic improvements in working 
conditions. During this period, the general strike for labour law revision 
at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 served as the opportunity for 
the labour movement to firmly consolidate its presence as a fully-fledged 
social entity. Through the onset of the financial crisis at the end of 1997, a 
period of ‘coexistence of compromise on and resistance against 
globalisation and restructuring’ began. A tripartite body of labour, 
management and the government, including the group of democratic trade 
unions, the Korean Tripartite Committee, was established in 1997 (Yoo, 
2005). 
 
FKCWTU and Labour Politics in Korea 
 
The modern mining industry and the labour movement in this industry 





strikes in this period were the 1928 graphite miners’ strike in 
Youngheong and the 1930 miners’ strike in Shinheong (FKCWTU, 1974). 
The strikes were conducted by the leftist trade unions and after the 
liberalisation in 1945, there was miners’ self-governing management in 
some mines under the leadership of National Council of Trade Unions. 
However, after the establishment of the Government in only the southern 
part of Korea, unilaterally supported by the American Military 
Government, a miners’ organisation was set up under the leadership of 
right-wing groups and this union was reorganised into the Federation of 
Korean Coal Workers’ Trade Union (hereafter FKCWTU) by the military 
junta soon after the 5.16 military coups (Nam, 1991: 155-156). 
The developmental state based on authoritarianism tried to secure 
fuel for industrialisation with repression of the labour movement on 
behalf of mining companies through the police, army security guards, the 
National Intelligence Services who conducted dismissal strikes, 
surveillance, arrest of leaders of the labour movement etc. (Ann, 1988). 
There was an industrial union for miners called the FKCWTU, 
which was created in 1949. Its density and power of combination were 
very high. The rate of entering the union reached about 80%, such as 
66.7% in 1964, 85.8% in 1977, and 68.8% in 1985 (Kangwonilbo, 6 June 
1986; Park and Park, 1989: 31-32). By company size, trade unions were 
organised in most mines more than 300. 
The type of FKCWTU was based on an industrial union but the 
factual function was confined in an enterprise union. In the constitution of 
FKCWTU, the right to strike as well as collective bargaining was 
subjected not to the FKCWTU but to a branch or a federation of branches. 
This resulted in collective bargaining by the company (FKCWTU, 1980).   
The ideology of FKCWTU on base was similar to the FKTU and 
the developmental state. The first slogan of the establishment of 





leftist labour movement, and Struggle for Anti-communism and National 
Salvation’ (FKCWTU, 1974: 41). This showed that the union functioned 
as an economic entity abiding by the ‘growth first, distribution later’ logic, 
anticommunism, and the economic-growth promotion policy in 
accordance with the developmental government. Likewise, the FKCWTU 
was also not independent from government like all the trade unions under 
the FKTU before the 1980s. The executive members of FKCWTU were 
interested in concession hunters for themselves and even repressed 
workers’ strikes on behalf of employers and the authoritarian government. 
In this context, Ann states: ‘The history of FKCWTU is a history of 
company union’ (Ann, 1988: 57).  
In this context, it is natural that a significant portion of activities 
of FKCWTU had been to make a recommendation to the Government for 
the growth of the mining industry through rising coal prices, subsidies to 
miners, effective energy policy etc. These activities were tacitly supported 
by coal-mine employers (Nam, 1991: 167). In other words, the FKCWTU 
limited its activities to the narrow petition of workers’ rights, and there 
were few activities for state politics and no consultative machines 
between tripartite actors.  
However, there had been strikes of miners in the mining industry, 
for example, the 1967 general strike for 48 hours in the Pungjeon District, 
the 1968 general strike for 48 hours in Seokkong Mine, petitions and the 
strike for withdrawal of ‘Oil first and Coal second’ policy in the 1960s, 
the 1980 strike in Sabuk, the 1985 strike in Jangsung mining station under 
the Seokkong Mine, and the 1986 strike in Kyeodong Mine. From time to 
time, the strikes were drawn from the FKCWTU and assessed as a yellow 
union or a company union. The features of these strikes are as follows: 
firstly, the main purpose was related to economic aspects, i.e. wage rises, 
rather than political issues; secondly, the strikes were conducted in large 





companies; thirdly, these strikes were characterised as a kind of wild cat 
strike. In other words, the strikes occurred from the reluctant response of 
trade unions’ leaders to demands and resistance of the rank and file (Nam, 
1991: 161-162).  
These characteristics in ideology, attitudes towards the 
Government and political activities of miners’ organisations are the gist of 
the difference with the British miners’ organisation. In this context, CWP 
was actively put on the table of collective bargaining, although the issue 
should be regarded as a subject of the main issues of social welfare and 
welfare politics (Yoo et al., 2001).  
Role of Trade Unions for Compensation of CWP in Britain and 
Korea  
 
Efforts of Miners’ Organisations for Compensation in Britain 
 
There have been controversial debates about the role of trade unions in 
compensation for industrial injuries and industrial diseases of workers in 
Britain. On the one hand, some scholars assert that unions, including 
miners’ organisations, played a very proactive role in occupational health 
policy, not just in compensation struggles, but also in prevention and 
rehabilitation (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 203; Burton, 1976: 39). On 
the other hand, others indicated that the ‘trade unions had no overall 
policy regarding accident prevention, initiating very little legislation, and 
focusing instead on merely improving existing legislation and getting 
collective bargaining agreements regarding safety’ (Clutterbuck, 1980: 
144). The report proposed by the Robens Committee in 1970 showed an 





compensation: ‘The single most important reason for accidents at work is 
apathy’ (Robens Committee, 1972: 25).  
 However, miners’ organisations seemed to be proud of 
compensation as well as occupational health and safety for miners. For 
example, the Miners’ Charter in 1945 showed forth “a conscious step in 
the direction of prioritising prevention, whilst continuing to maintain a 
strong union interest in compensation, rehabilitation and re-employment 
for pneumoconiotics” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 201): 
 
The endeavours of the Union over the years to secure redress for our 
members who suffered chest ailments cannot possibly be adequately 
described in a document of this kind. The tale of woe which gave 
impetus and dynamism to these efforts does not lend itself to adequate 
portrayal on paper. However, it is vivid and commonplace enough as 
not to require emphasis among miners (Evans, 1963: 1).  
 
As can be seen in their comments, miners’ unions are located in a special 
position of occupational health and safety as well as compensation, due to 
pits being amongst the most hazardous workplaces. Their activities can be 
found in their efforts for the provision of medical knowledge, introduction 
of relevant schemes, support for litigation of miners and employment of 
miners with pneumoconiosis. In terms of the struggle for medical 
knowledge, this will be discussed in the following section. Thus, the other 
points will be explored here.   
 Firstly, trade unions have contributed to the introduction of 
relevant schemes and an increase in compensation. In detail, the coal 
mining unions were active in monitoring, lobbying and attending the 
National Joint Pneumoconiosis Committee53 for compensation legislation 
and to represent members’ interests under both the social insurance 
schemes and common law. As a result, some compensation was, for 
                                                 
53  “The National Joint Pneumoconiosis Committee was part of the coal industry 
consultative machinery on which the union represented the voice of Labour” (McIvor 





example, paid for a disability assessment of less than 10% (McIvor and 
Johnston, 2007: 223).  
 Secondly, trade unions had supported miners’ litigation for 
compensation under common law. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the 
activity of trade unions led to a big burden to employers as well as the 
unions in terms of financial aspects. This created an element for the 
introduction of the CWPS.  
 Thirdly, the trade unions made an effort for the employment of 
miners with pneumoconiosis. One of the consequences of the 1943 
Pneumoconiosis Compensation Scheme was that pneumoconiosis-
certified miners were forced to leave the coal industry. After 1943, miners 
were being suspended in a relatively early stage of disability, hence the 
issue of rehabilitation and re-employment was more important (McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 86, 200). As a result of the efforts of miners’ trade 
unions, “the 1948 Employment of Pneumoconiosis Cases legislation 
allowed the employment of ‘seriously incapacitated’ men in ‘approved 
dust conditions’ on the surface, and for the employment/re-employment 
of men in the earlier stages of pneumoconiosis in ‘approved dust 
conditions’ underground” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 87). 
 
Efforts of Trade Unions for Compensation of CWP in Korea  
 
Korean trade unions have only recently been interested in industrial safety 
and compensation. There are several reasons why they did not previously 
focus on this issue. Firstly, the Korean Government was characterised as 
a productivist state before democratisation in the late 1980s. This meant 
that they had paid attention to economic growth rather than social welfare. 
Secondly, Korean trade unions had existed as a kind of department of the 
authoritarian governments rather than as a critic or an interest group with 





not independent in the sense that they was established by the Government 
and had received finance from the Government. In addition, even the 
unions tended to have shared the productivist perspective with the 
Governments Thirdly, Korean trade unions could not help having an 
interest in wages, welfare and the level of the company because the 
unions were based on an enterprise union. In other words, trade unions in 
Korea had not been interested in long-term policy and universal issues. 
 With democratisation, while what new trade unions called the 
‘democratic labour movement’ had been activated, the existing trade 
unions had become more independent and democratic. The change 
enabled trade unions to draw attention to industrial health and safety as 
well as compensation of industrial injury and disease. In reality, two 
leading umbrella labour organisations, KFTU and FKTU, set up a 
division to be in charge of these issues and made an effort. However, it is 
assessed that the unions still have a lack of interest and activities in these 
areas. The crucial reason of many for this is the structure of the 
organisation characterised as a company-based trade union. In this 
structure, the main point at issue in collective bargaining tends naturally 
to stay with wages. If there is an interest in the issue, it is not in a small 
company but in a big company. Thus, compensation for injured workers 
has been developed in very limited companies: 
 
“Big companies have completely settled compensation of industrial 
disaster. The conservative journals criticised injured workers for getting 
too much compensation but this just corresponded to big companies’ 
workers. Under 300 workers, there is 70-80% of all the disaster. We 
should resolve this part” (Interview with Kim, E.G.). 
Prior to many industrial disasters in rapid industrialisation, professionals 
and civic groups have played a key role. Many of the organisations 
concerned have been created by injured workers, as well as by 





politicalised this issue and intervened in the introduction of relevant 
schemes. Despite their contribution, it tends to be assessed that the 
activities resulted only in a short-term and tentative resolution.   
 As briefly discussed, while trade unions do not carry out their 
resposibility, civic groups, professionals and the people concerned have 
tried to resolve the problems. This characteristic is represented in the area 
of pneumoconiosis. 
 In Korea, professionals54 indicated the issue of pneumoconiosis 
and took the initiative in the introduction of schemes. With regard to a 
professional’s role, the participants bear testimony as follows: 
“Up to the late 1970s, employers as well as pneumoconiosis patients 
didn’t know about pneumoconiosis. The level of recognition was very 
low. So doctors of preventive medicine started to be responsible for this 
disease. … In particular, Dr Yoon is a pioneer. … Korean Industrial 
Health Association managed to persuade the Ministry of Labour. The 
development of the pneumoconiosis system should be ascribed to him. 
The Association of Pneumoconiosis Patients and the FKCWTU don’t 
play an important role. They just submitted a proposal that we made” 




At present, it seems that the Association of Pneumoconiosis Patients 
(hereafter APP) is the most influential actor regarding the issue of 
pneumoconiosis. The body was set up in 1979 by retired miners with 
pneumoconiosis for the purpose of mutual aid. Therefore, it was initially 
just a kind of social meeting of ex-miners. However, in 1983, they 
reached an agreement that this association should be changed to the APP 
as an association focusing on pneumoconiosis. Since the momentum 
began, the organisation has positively participated in activities for the 
                                                 
54 There are the representative bodies such as the Catholic Medical Centre (1963), 
Pneumoconiosis Research Institute (1984), Industrial Disease Research Institute (1988), 
Korea Safety and Health Association (1992). 
55Even interviewees assert that the establishment of APP was their product: ‘I ordered 
Shin, my patient, to organise the APP. He was very clever and finally did that’ 






reform of acts concerned, representation of their interests, their 
hospitalised members etc. Now there is no doubt that the APP is a main 
actor in compensation politics surrounding pneumoconiosis.  
 However, there has been criticism about the APP in several 
aspects. The most crucial point is that they have only represented HPP 
rather than SPP or pneumoconiosis patients in general. There are several 
reasons for this. First of all, it is easier that the hospitalised patients are 
organised. They are gathering at the hospitals and their loyalty to the APP 
is strong because of fear of leaving the hospital. In addition, they 
regularly pay their membership fee. Due to these reasons, the APP tends 
to concentrate on very limited issues such as the development of the 
hospital’s quality of service. The most serious problem is that the APP is 
the main actor rather than the trade unions. In other words, the KCTU has 
not handled the issue of pneumoconiosis because its current patients with 
pneumoconiosis are not members and the FKCWTU is always affiliated 
not with KCTU but with FKTU.  
 In the case of the FKCWTU, it has made an effort to advance 
miners and ex-miners with pneumoconiosis. With regard to 
pneumoconiosis, the organisation has taken action for the improvement of 
treatment to ex-miners with pneumoconiosis, protection from 
pneumoconiosis, amendment of APPPPW etc. However, it has been 
assessed that its activities are very limited, ceremonial, formal and inertial. 
What is worse, is that while the APP replaces its role, the FKCWTU has 
little influence on the APP:     
 
The FKCWTU and the APP have lately become estranged, so there is 
not much collaboration. This is because the APP would like to rush 
forward their small interest without long-term policy. On the contrary, 
the FKCWTU want to rationalise in line with long-term policy and in 
favour of all the ex-miners with pneumoconiosis. But the APP dislikes 






On the other hand, the FKTU, whose affiliated body is the FKCWTU, 
does not touch on this issue:  
 
“We are reluctant to take the issue related to pneumoconiosis because 
of the APP. It is very strong, bullish, rash… . It is impossible to 
communicate with the APP. There is something wrong and 
inconvenient; the APP obstinately acts regardless of position and 
situation. Nobody wants to touch it” (Interview with Cho, C.W.). 
 
As can be recognised from the above, trade unions do not make much of a 
contribution towards compensation of pneumoconiosis. In fact, the 
organisation in charge is the APP. However, its activity does not go 
toward structural reform and legal/institutional change and the direction 
and extent of development tend to depend on the personality of the 
participants:  
 
“The policy has resorted to a temporary makeshift. In order to give 
more money, the resolution has made. There are no fundamental 
principles or philosophy to find solutions. The development has been 
based on the personality of the participants. Therefore, there are no 
structural or institutional suggestions” (Interview with Cho,C.W.).  
 
As can be shown in this section, trade unions seem to have existed on the 
issue of pneumoconiosis on the sidelines. The KCTU has pretended to be 
indifferent to this problem because ex-miners were not its members but 
those of the FKTU and the FKCWTU. On the other hand, the FKTU and 
its affiliated organisation, the FKCWTU, handed over its rights and 
responsibility to the APP, for the reason that the APP did not want their 
intervention. In this situation, efforts for the protection and compensation 












CWP as an Occupational Disease 
 
Although coal dust-induced lung disease in Britain was identified in 
ancient times, it was not until 1943 that CWP was recognised as an 
occupational disease (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 88). In terms of Korea, 
CWP was naturally accepted as an occupational disease in the IACIA 
(1964) but what its existence was received was in 1956.  According to a 
finding by Dembe (1996: 230-231), ‘social factors are a key role in 
shaping physicians’ recognition and conception of occupational 
disorders’. In relation to this argument, the role of trade unions in 
accepting CWP as an occupational disease will be examined in this 
section.  
 
Discovery of CWP in Britain 
 
The impairment of the lung condition engaged in the coal industry 
seemed to exist soon after the days coal mining began. The recognition of 
pneumoconiosis began in the fourth century BC (Evans, 1963: 1; McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 64; Rosen, 1993: 22-23). However, it was not until 
the early 1800s that pneumoconiosis was recognised with its current name. 
It was initially described with the terms ‘miners’ anthracnosis’ or 
‘coalminers’ phthisis’ in 1801, and was first linked to coal mining in 1831 
(Bloor, 2000: 129). From the late nineteenth century and especially the 
early twentieth century, the pneumoconiosis issue started to be discussed 
more openly. After that, there were three steps with regard to the legal 





emphysema and bronchitis in 1994. The focus of this section will be on 
the recognition of CWP.    
 There may be many reasons for recognising an occupational 
disease as a social problem. Focusing on participants and their political 
relations, there is the Government, experts such as doctors, employers 
such as NCB, and trade unions, but the most important factor was the 
efforts made by the trade unions toward recognition and compensation of 
CWP, with the support of experts’ special knowledge. 
 In respect of the legal recognition of pneumoconiosis, such as 
silicosis and CWP, lung diseases in coal mines were discovered in 
medical literature from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, but 
it was not until 1919 for silicosis and 1943 for CWP that pneumoconiosis 
was accepted as an industrial disease.56 In other words, silicosis was 
recognised in 1919 as an occupational disease but CWP must wait about 
24 years more for recognition in 1943.  
The reason was that it took a long time to secure acceptance that 
coal dust in itself could cause and because of employers’ resistance. 
However, there had been debates as to whether coal dust might be the 
source of contracting pneumoconiosis after the recognition of silicosis in 
1919 (refer to Bloor, 2000: 130 about these debates). The typical 
insistence that denied coal dust as a cause of pneumoconiosis was from 
employers (Bufton and Melling, 2005: 85). The Coal Dust Research 
Committee under the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners’ 
Association confirmed that only men exposed to silica, not coal dust, 
were in danger and in need of protection (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 78). 
The official position of the Government also supported the innocence of 
                                                 
56 Advances in medical knowledge and state acceptance of industrial diseases frequently 
took different trajectories. From its first recognition as a distinctive industrial disease in 
the eighteenth century and its appearance in medical journals in the 1830s, ‘miners’ 
lung’ had disappeared by the last few decades of the nineteenth century, only to be 





coal dust. The Medical Research Council, which was established in 1913, 
set up an Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee in 193157 and played 
a vital role in the discovery of industrial diseases (McIvor and Johnston, 
2007: 82-83). Yet, the Medical Research Council had maintained the 
belief by the early 1940s that coal dust did not cause pneumoconiosis, 
unlike silica.  
 In this situation, it was estimated that there were a lot of miners 
with pneumoconiosis from coal dust and, in particular, the problem was 
acute in South Wales (Bloor, 2000: 130). In particular, there had been 
endeavours of trade unions for the recognition and compensation of CWP, 
especially since the 1930s, and these can be explored in four dimensions.  
 Firstly, trade unions had criticised the Government’s policy for 
health and safety in the workplace and had furthermore challenged this 
widespread recognition of medical knowledge. In addition, trade unions 
campaigned aggressively to get reforms challenging accepted medical 
knowledge along the way. The campaigning of labour organisations and 
persistent evidence of lung disease among anthracite coal miners led to an 
expansion of compensation rules in 1934, and the fresh scientific 
investigation which transformed the medical understanding of respiratory 
illness among industrial workers (Bufton and Melling, 2005: 63, 232-233).  
 Secondly, there had been efforts made by trade unions for 
medical examination and provision of materials, especially from the early 
1930s. For example, “in November 1933, the South Wales Miners’ 
Federation submitted a list of 59 cases of certified silicosis where miners 
had been refused compensation by the Home Office in support of their 
case for legislative change. A few months later they added a detailed 
report from a University of Wales geologist, whom the union had 
                                                 
57 The Medical Research Council’s Industrial Pulmonary Diseases Committee had been 
established after the Mines’ Minister, Emmanuel Shinwell, had decided that lung 
diseases among Welsh coal miners required fresh investigation (Bufton and Melling, 





commissioned to investigate the causes of rising respiratory disease rates 
in the coalfield” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 192).  
 In addition, trade unions had resisted the then fixed knowledge of 
pneumoconiosis. In particular, trade unions (TUC58, as well as the MFGB 
and the NUM) actively sought to accumulate and change knowledge of 
the dust problem on behalf of workers. They employed experts in order to 
examine the prevailing orthodox of medical knowledge and provide 
expert investigators with relevant epidemiological evidence, which Bloor 
described as an ‘instrumental use of expertise’ (Bloor, 2000: 133; McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 187-188). As a result of their efforts, “the South 
Wales Miners’ Federation59 was particularly active in exerting political 
pressure to redirect epidemiological research into the dust problem and to 
reform compensation legislation. The interest of this organisation was 
prompted by the severity of the dust problem in the region, especially in 
the anthracite, hard coal area to the west of the South Wales coalfield. In 
the 1940s, around 80% of all prescribed pneumoconiotics in Britain were 
located in South Wales. The South Wales ‘Fed’ thus generated its own 
knowledge base through independent epidemiological studies and 
engaged directly with the dominant medical discourse. Through this 
process, the union employed its own medical and geological experts, 
supported ‘independent’ expertise that pushed the union’s cause, and 
contradicted opposing evidence by clandestinely sprinkling silica dust 
underground” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 187-188). 
                                                 
58 ‘The subsequent exchanges which took place in 1928-32 between the TUC and 
medical experts on the causes and extent of dust hazards at work provide an insight into 
the complex relationship between scientific investigation and the range of political 
influences which framed compensation rights in Britain during the early twentieth 
century’ (Bufton and Melling, 2005: 65).  
59 In the mid-1930s the South Wales Miners’ Federation was suggesting to the mine 
owners methods to deal with issue of mine dust (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 80). From 
1931 to 1948, 22,000 British miners had left their work because they had contracted 





 Thirdly, trade unions tried to follow a political route. In other 
words, the MFGB would attempt to exert political pressure (particularly 
through the mining Members of Parliament) to secure government-funded 
research and to amend the existing compensation legislation (Bloor, 2000: 
133).  
 In response to the efforts of trade unions and the growing fissures 
in expert medical knowledge about the nature of silicosis and of 
anthracnosis, the Government asked the Medical Research Council to 
investigate this problem. The examination extended over the years 1937 
to 1942 and three ‘Medical Research Council Green Reports’ (numbers 
243, 244 and 250) were finally produced. The Medical Research Council 
conducted interviews with 470 coal trimmers from four South Wales 
ports in 1942, who had not been exposed to silica rock but were suffering 
from a dust-related lung disease. These cases showed that coal dust must 
be an immediate cause of the problem. In other words, the Industrial 
Pulmonary Diseases Committee under Medical Research Council became 
convinced that “there was a strong correlation between the incidence of 
pneumoconiosis and the concentration of coal dust particles below 5 
microns in size” (Bloor, 2000: 130; McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 84-85, 
91, 193-194; Bufton and Melling, 2005: 155-78; Bufton and Melling, 
2005). In 1943, for the first time, a disease caused as a consequential 
result of coal dust was legally recognised as commensurable in the Coal 
Mining Industry (Pneumoconiosis) Compensation Scheme (Bloor, 2000: 
130-131; McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 86). 
 As discussed above, by the early 1940s, CWP had been accepted 
as an industrial disease. As discussed in this section, the recognition of 
CWP in Britain in 1943 was the result of a coalition of progressive forces, 
especially trade unions and medical specialists, in which the unions 
played an important, and perhaps even the pivotal role. The fight against 





and, for some medical professionals, almost became a crusade (McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 124).  
 
Discovery of CWP in Korea 
 
The first occupational disease to be reported in Korea was 
pneumoconiosis and it is not too much to say that the history of industrial 
health was the history of pneumoconiosis in Korea. After workers with 
silicosis and CWP in Korrea were discovered for the first time in 1954, 
schemes, administration and programmes for occupational health and 
safety were established focusing on pneumoconiosis, and these were 
maintained until the 1990s (Jung, 2001: 384).  
 There had been 26 mines for gold, silver, copper, steel and coal 
in just the southern part of Korea since 1898, and since colonialisation of 
Japan in 1910, mines for metal and coal had been developed greatly, but 
there was no record of pneumoconiosis (Yoon, 1988). Based on the 
Labour Standard Law, which was promulgated in 1953, Jangseong 
Hospital and the Medical School at Catholic University jointly held a 
health examination of miners who worked in Kangwon Province in 1954 
(Choi, 1954; Cho, 1991). Dr Young-Tae Choi discovered silicosis in 117 
of the 3,517 persons examined (prevalence of 3.3%) and published it in 
the house journal issued by Korea Coal Corporation Law (Choi, 1954).60 
This was the first report of pneumoconiosis. It was estimated that the 
majority of patients with pneumoconiosis were miners who were drafted 
                                                 
60 Henceforth, there had been four epidemiological examinations until 1984 (1967, 1974, 
1979, 1984) by other researchers and some doctors who worked for hospitals in mining 
areas also explored pneumoconiosis (Yoo and Won, 1991). In detail, from 1958 to 1965, 
Dr Lee, K.K. examined almost twenty thousand miners in the Gangwon Province and 
issued the results. According to his report, there was 5.9% prevalence in drillers, 1.7% in 
hewers(Jung, 2001: 49). Yoon, I.J. reported 10.8% pneumoconiosis prevalence in 1974, 
and 16.1% in 1979 after examination of miners in the Gangwon and Gyeogsangbuk 





into Japanese mines in the colonial era (1910-1945) and had worked in 
Korean mines since their decolonisation from Japan.  
 At that time, the IACIA did not exist and so the Korea Coal 
Corporation Law, a government-owned corporation, partly compensated 
the miners with pneumoconiosis as a bonus based on its own rule named 
the ‘Korea Coal Corporation Law Regulation for Safety and Health’, 
which was introduced in 1959. However, other small coal mines almost 
did not recognise nor examine pneumoconiosis.  
 This discovery of patients with pneumoconiosis brought about a 
momentum of various changes. First of all, the discovery of 
pneumoconiosis resulted in the expansion of a health examination for 
workers, which officially started in 1956. Two years later, the medical 
examination for workers was expanded to companies that employed over 
30 workers and 78,180 workers in 513 companies were covered. Most 
companies that actually conducted the examination were still big 
companies, including a few mines such as the Korea Coal Corporation 
Law, but even in these companies the examinations were perfunctory. 
 The discovery also resulted in the establishment of professional 
institutes for research and medical treatment. For instance, the Catholic 
Medical Centre started to educate public health officials on industrial 
health and safety in 1963, and this centre took the lead in establishing the 
Korea Industrial Health Association in 1964, whose members were public 
health officials of companies and universities. On the other hand, soon 
after the enactment of IACIA in 1963, the Catholic Medical Centre set up 
a clinic with 50 sickbeds for patients of occupational disease in the St 
Mary’s Hospital, which was run by the Catholic University of Korea, in 
order to examine pneumoconiosis patients. By 1970, the numbers of 
sickbeds had increased to 250 due to an increase in the number of patients 





 A number of relevant laws were also introduced as a result of the 
health initiative. The Mining Safety Act for the safety of miners was 
introduced in March 1963 and the IACIA was also enacted the same year. 
Finally, in 1981, the Industrial Safety and Health Law was legislated and, 
based on the law, the Working Condition Examination System has now 
been in force since 1982. These laws brought about compensation 
measures for industrial diseases and injuries in the workplace. Thus, 
precise and thorough medical examinations were carried out and statistics 
of incidences of industrial disease started to be compiled. With regard to 
pneumoconiosis, the Pneumoconiosis Examination Committee was 
established in 1964 and with the new creation of the industrial safety 
department under the Ministry of Labour in 1966, pneumoconiosis 
patients started to be managed more systemically. 
 As can be seen in the above discussion, there is a distinct 
difference between Korea and Britain in terms of the recognition of 
pneumoconiosis. While British miners struggled to put pneumoconiosis 
on the list of prescribed industrial diseases, it was unnecessary for Korean 
miners to struggle to put pneumoconiosis into a category of occupational 
disease. This is because the Government already knew medically-related 
information about pneumoconiosis from Western countries and Japan at 
the time of the introduction of the 1953 Labour Standard Law and the 
1963 IACIA. Therefore, a crucial disputed point was whether miners with 
pneumoconiosis existed in Korea. Another difference with Britain was 
that specialists had played a key role in making pneumoconiosis a social 
issue in Korea unlike the British case.  
On the contrary, trade unions have been interested in this issue 
since the middle of the 1970s. Kim, a trade unionist who was responsible 
for the area of industrial health and safety in trade unions, confessed that 
‘it was not until 1976 that trade unions made efforts to give more or less 





Annual Reports of the FKCWTU and the FKTU showed that they started 
to have an interest in occupational disease since the mid-1980s when 
there was an establishment of APPPPW. However, it is more exact that 
occupational diseases have come just recently to the interest of trade 
unions. Until the middle of the 1990s, peak organisations of trade unions 
did not express much interest in industrial health and safety. In this 
situation, what is a great tragedy to ex-miners with pneumoconiosis is that 
the KCTU, a more progressive umbrella labour organisation, has not 
drawn attention to the issue of pneumoconiosis: 
 
“We know the industrial disease, pneumoconiosis, is very important to 
trade unions. But we have no interest in this problem, no, exactly we 
cannot be interested in this issue. There are two main reasons. First of 
all, this issue has been handled by the FKCWTU and the APP. The 
FKCWTU, as you know, is affiliated with FKTU, which is our rival. 
Next, pneumoconiosis patients were not members of our organisation in 
the past and now they are not workers anymore. When my organisation 
was created, at the time, most mines disappeared (Interview with Kim, 
E.G.). 
The KCTU has not been interested in the pneumoconiosis issue. Just 
FKTU is there. When the KCTU was set up, there were no mines. The 
Democratic Labour Party (DLP) created by the KCTU is similar with 
the KCTU on this topic. On the other hand, the APP doesn’t also feel the 
help of KCTU and DLP because it would like to meet just the 
Government or conservative parties” (Interview with Cho, K.H.).    
 
As can be seen in the statement of the union director Kim, in charge of 
industrial health and safety in the KCTU, pneumoconiosis patients were 
not members of the KCTU because it was created in 1995 and, at present, 
they have a closer network with the FKCWTU and the FKTU. In addition, 
the KCTU does not want to have a troublesome problem, because the 
KCTU has felt that the executives of the APP are irrational and too 
stubborn.   
 Another reason that trade unions did not work on positive lines 
was the existence of APP, which intensified activities for the interests and 





As can be seen above, trade unions took a negative attitude towards the 
compensation of pneumoconiosis patients.  
 On the other hand, it was not until the 1980s that miners 
recognised pneumoconiosis as an occupational disease. It seems that most 
miners had no information about the disease when they were employed in 
mines. According to a survey, only 2.7% of those questioned were miners 
who had known about pneumoconiosis through a government agency, 
while 6.0% recognised it through a company. In contrast, most miners got 
the information from their colleagues at work and from doctors who 
examined them (Yoo et al., 2002: 134). 
 
 
Situation of Ex-miners with CWP in Britain and Korea 
 
Situation in Britain 
 
By 1977, Dr Ian Jones, Chief Medical Officer of the Fife Health Board, 
found that “only one in four of the miners was in good health; two out of 
three had some form of disability related to mining, and one in three had 
chest problems” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 58). This shows that most 
miners and ex-miners had been exposed to danger at work, which had 
resulted in an occupational disease named pneumoconiosis. As far as 
pneumoconiosis is concerned, it is still the main industrial disease and 
incidences have not disappeared. In particular, in the case of CWP 
related to coal dust, Table 3-9 shows that the incidence of patients with 
CWP increased in the 2000s, although most coal mines existed a long 
time ago. Most new compensated cases of pneumoconiosis, excluding 





industry; other industries affected are quarrying, foundries and potteries, 
where silica is the predominant cause.61  
 There were 1,055 new assessed cases of CWP, apart from 
asbestosis, in the Industrial Injuries Scheme in 2004, similar to 2002 and 
2003, a large increase on previous years (see Appendix F). This is 
believed to be due to a publicity campaign by the Department for Work 
and Pensions, inviting people whose claims had been wrongly disallowed 
between 1994 and 1999 to re-claim, and also a more accurate method of 
data collection introduced in April 2002.  
With regard to deaths of ex-miners related to occupational 
diseases, “even as late as the 1990s mortality from CWP was outstripping 
mortality from all other pneumoconiosis diseases (including silicosis and 
byssinosis) by a ratio of 5 to 1. Very quickly, around the middle of the 
twentieth century, dust became the major occupation-related killer in 
mining communities. By the late 1940s, recorded deaths from 
pneumoconiosis had outstripped deaths from accidents in British coal 
mining, and by the mid-1950s pneumoconiosis deaths outnumbered 
mining accident deaths by a ratio of 4 to 1. The total recorded death toll 
of coal miners in Britain who died from CWP was more than 40,000 
between 1930 and 1990” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 54). Table 3-10 
shows the deaths due to work-related pneumoconiosis. The number of 
deaths from pneumoconiosis fell from the high figure of 321 cases in 
1999, to 279 cases in 2000 and 240 in 2001; but this rose again to 271 
cases in 2002, to fall to 231 in 2003. Likewise, although deaths are on a 
long-term downward trend, they are still in progress.62  
 
                                                 
61 HSE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/coal.htm. 




















1994 174 1,246 276 7 10 1,713 
1995 166 1,317 287 6 10 1,756 
1996 196 1,322 223 3 1 1,745 
1997 191 1,367 230 5 5 1,798 
1998 165 1,541 268 5 8 1,987 
1999 171 1,615 321 6 9 2,122 
2000 186 1,633 279 4 7 2,109 
2001 233 1,862 240 2 7 2,344 
2002 234 1,867 271 - 6 2,377 
2003 235 1,885 231 3 7 2,349 
2004 266 1,969 214 4 5 2,458 
Sources: HSE, http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/tables/dc01.htm 
 
According to a recent survey, most pneumoconiosis patients are elderly. 
The majority of IIS claims (65% in 2004) are made by people aged 65 
and over (see appendix G). The reason that there are so many elderly 
people with CWP is that there is a long delay of almost invariably 10 
years or more between exposure and onset of disease, and hence, most 
new cases or deaths from pneumoconiosis reflect the working conditions 
of the past. Another characteristic is that most patients are the simple 
patients under ten or less in percentage of disablement.   
 
Situation in Korea 
 
CWP had been in first place for incidences of occupational diseases in 
Korea. At present, CWP is still a serious occupational disease and 
although it is not ranked first anymore, it still remains a concern in second 
position behind diseases of the heart and brain (see appendix H). What is 
noted is that the occurrence of CWP still keeps around 400 persons 






Table 3-10 Annual Examination of Pneumoconiosis 
Year Examination Disability Hospitalisation 
Fatality by 
Pneumoconiosis 
1990 3,495 1,444 327 254 
1992 3,732 1,318 312 302 
1994 3,943 1,355 548 237 
1996 3,904 1,407 486 302 
1998 4,025 1,454 325 304 
2000 5,428 1,689 443 371 
2002 6,502 2,030 568 828 
2004 8,496 4,820 419 1,547 
Source: FKTU, 2005: 440. 
 
Although there have been different opinions of the total number of 
patients with pneumoconiosis63, the official data released by the Ministry 
of Labour shows that there were 16,709 persons with pneumoconiosis in 
2001 (Yoo et al., 2001). Interestingly, the number of medical 
examinations related to pneumoconiosis has gradually increased and, 
therefore, the number of persons has grown from less than 5,000 before 
2000 to 8,496 in 2004 (refer to Table 3-10). According to the increase in 
examinations, the number of ex-miners with pneumoconiosis disability 
and the HPP has increased annually. In terms of the death toll, since the 
                                                 
63 The APP does not agree with the statistics of the government. It asserts that the 
number of patients reach from 50,000 to 60,000, even 100,000 including the hospitalised 
patients. Dr Choi et al. (1999) concluded that the numbers were 13,749 based on a 
survey in which he investigated the registration card of pneumoconiosis from regional 
headquarters and 45 branches of Welco. Where does the difference come from? It stems 
from the criterion that is defined as a patient and the scope of estimation. First of all, the 
Government recognises people who are defined by the APPPPW as sufferers. It means 
that the qualification of pneumoconiosis patients should be given to an ex-miner who 
receives a ‘provisional grade’ of disabilities of grades. The APP, however, maintains 
that the provisional patients in addition to this number are also contained in 
pneumoconiosis patients. For instance, because an ex-mineworker who had worked over 
10 years in mines has the possibility of pneumoconiosis, the man should be calculated as 
a pneumoconiosis patient. In addition, the APP asserts strongly that a person who used 
to live in a mining town, for example the families of miners, should be counted as 
sufferers if the miner has pneumoconiosis. In fact, the current law does not consider any 
person except an ex-miner as a pneumoconiosis patient, despite symptoms of 
pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, the APP thinks that there is another type of provisional 
patient, which does not know the pneumoconiosis institutions and laws yet owing to a 
shortage of the information despite the disease. Likewise, the APP counts the number to 
include provisional patients or unveiled patients, whereas the Ministry of Labour permits 





APPPPW was put into force in 1985, 6,672 patients had died of CWP by 
the end of July 2001 and this number has dramatically increased over 
subsequent years. 
Despite the increase in persons with disability, the number of 
pneumoconiosis patients, taken as a whole, seems to be on a downward 
trend. As shown in Table 3-11, the rate receiving the bereaved family 
members’ consolation benefits outnumbers the rate receiving the 
disability consolation benefits, although the number of disabilities is still 
higher than that of fatalities. In 2004, 1,547 persons received the bereaved 
family members’ consolation benefits while 4,820 persons were awarded 
the disability consolation benefits. Despite the increasing rate in disability 
and fatality, the rate of fatality is higher than that of disability. This 
means that the total number of persons with pneumoconiosis is decreasing 
slightly. What should be considered is that the number can fall 
significantly if the age of pneumoconiosis patients is taken into 
consideration.   
 
Table 3-11 Number and Ratio (%) by Age Groups 
Definition of Ages Total HPP SPP 
40-50 under 25 (2.3) 18 (3.2) 7 (1.4) 
50-60 under 194 (18.1) 82 (14.5) 112 (22.0) 
60-70 under 598 (55.7) 299 (52.9) 299 (58.9) 
70 over 256 (23.9) 166 (29.4) 90 (17.7) 
Total 1,073 (100.0) 565 (100.0) 508 (100.0) 
Source: Yoo et al., 2001. 
 
The increase in fatalities from pneumoconiosis can be explained in the 
ageing and the consciousness of pneumoconiosis patients of the APPPPW. 
Many miners started their work in the 1940s and by the 1980s were over 
60 years old. They had suffered a lot of hardship due to poverty and 
disease during this period and, therefore, the rate of the fatalities may well 





APPPPW and democratisation enabled PP to more easily know the 
institution concerned and to have the consciousness of rights. This 
resulted in the entrance of more PP into pneumoconiosis institutions. As a 
result, the fatalities rose during and after the 1980s and are now 
increasing dramatically because of an advanced age. According to a 
survey (Yoo et al., 2001), nearly 80% of the total number of 
pneumoconiosis patients are over 60 years old (see Table 3-11).  
 
 
4. Compensation System for Ex-miners with CWP in 




Social Welfare System and Benefits for Miners in Britain and Korea 
 
The elderly with pneumoconiosis are ex-miners with an industrial disease 
as injured workers at work. In general, their life is exposed to poverty, old 
age and unemployment. Thus they have been protected by various social 
institutions and, therefore, there will be a description about social security 
and the compensation system for ex-miners with pneumoconiosis in this 
section.  
 
Social Welfare System and Benefits for Miners in Britain 
 
Since the Second World War, there has been a comprehensive social 
welfare system in Britain in line with The Beveridge Report, which has 
been assessed as being ‘a landmark in the history of social security’ 
(Pearson, 1978: 29). As can be seen in Figure 2, the outline of the British 
social welfare system is composed of two axes of social security and 











In the case of social security, there is social assistance, national insurance 
and demogrant.64 This category is related to income maintenance that has 
been secured based on The Beveridge Report. The report focused on the 
prevention of ‘want’, or poverty65 based on a principle of social policy, 
‘the primacy of minimum standards’ (Baldock et al., 1999: 258): ‘Social 
security benefits would be provided in such a way that no one would have 
to live on an income that was lower than the Government’s stipulated 
minimum standard’ (George and Wilding, 1984: 10). The perspective of 
minimum standards is in accordance with universality and Beveridge 
expected that the comprehensive system of national insurance and means-
                                                 
64 Demogrant is a noncontributory benefit paid to individuals solely on the basis of 
meeting specified demographic criteria, such as age, residence and disability without 
other tests (Spicker, 2009). The benefits are Child benefit, disability living 
allowance/attendance allowance, carer’s allowance, industrial injuries benefits and war 
pensions, war widow(er)’s pension  etc. (Millar, 2003: 3). 
65 Beveridge indicates six fundamental principles of social insurance: Flat rate of 
substance benefit, Flat rate of contribution, Unification of administrative responsibility, 
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tested assistance proposed by the report would ensure ‘freedom from 
want’, with three policies external to the system: full employment, family 
endowment and a national health service (NUM, 1979: 6; Wikeley and 
Ogus, 2002: 4; George and Wilding, 1984: 10). Interestingly, the political 
groups based on different ideologies in Britain have stuck to this principle. 
In this context, George and Wilding wrote as follows: ‘Writers of such 
different political persuasions as Crosland, Beveridge and Hayek are 
agreed on the primacy of minimum standards in social policy’ (1984: 8). 
 
Table 3-12 Classification of UK Sources of Support in Old Age, Including 
Benefits in Kind 












•Means-tested benefits  
•Minimum Income 
Guarantee  
•Benefits in kind, e.g. 
travel concessions, help 











investment income, other 
capital including property  
•Benefits in kind, e.g. 
family support  
Source: Mayhew, 2001: 7 
 
As can be seen in the above discussion, there has been ‘the general 
consensus on the desirability of minimum standards achieved through 
social policy’ in Britain. Beveridge’s minimum standard principle is 
completed by earnings-related pension (the so-called SERPS). The 
income maintenance structure can be understood well from Table 3-12. 
There are four tiers of British benefit sources: the basic state pension, 
which is flat rate-related pension from the state in the first tier; earnings-





in the second tier66; private pensions from private individuals in the third 
tier; and in the form of means-tested social security benefits and the so-
called Minimum Income Guarantee in the fourth tier of support 67 
(Mayhew, 2001: 8).  
In addition, since the National Health Service Act in 1946 and its 
enforcement in 1948, all the people have received its comprehensive 
medical service free of charge. The National Health Service was 
consciously designed to avoid such inequalities by removing healthcare in 
Britain from the distribution of goods and services that typically results 
from market forces. It is still funded mainly through taxation, and is still 
free for most patients at the time of use (Baldock et al., 1999: 321). Thus, 
the National Health Service was proposed as a provider of universal and 
free benefits for every man, woman and child. Of course, this also applies 
to the elderly with pneumoconiosis who may be exposed to other diseases 
as well as the industrial disease. What is better is that they received a 
variety of benefits in kind including nursing home service, travel 
concessions, help with daily living etc., as well as free healthcare. 
Generally, it is natural that at present, ex-miners with CWP may 
be injured, old, disabled, unemployed or poor. Therefore, the sufferers 
may be related to many of the benefits of the comprehensive welfare 
system. As a citizen, retired mineworkers maintain at least the income 
maintenance from the universal flat rate pension in the first tier, although 
this is not enough. On the other hand, as can be seen in the fourth tier, 
means-tested benefits can be provided to poor ex-mineworkers. What is 
                                                 
66 The occupational pensions have been a highly significant factor in the UK pensions 
market for many years. 'Second tier' pensions include a state earnings-related pension 
known as SERPS, which was introduced in 1975 and was replaced by the ‘Second State 
Pension’. 
67 Under the fourth tier, the state provides certain benefits in kind, such as free 
healthcare (available to all age groups), television licenses, winter fuel payments, and 
transport concessions. Apart from state support in the fourth tier, there are some benefits 
for individuals such as investment income, income from employment, and income from 





important is that unlike Korea, the criteria for entitlement of means-tested 
benefits are based not on family but purely on an individual valuation of 
assets and income. Therefore, ex-miners at least have a secure income for 
a minimum standard of life in the first or fourth tiers. In addition, they 
have been cared for by the National Health Service without any payment.  
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 3-13, miners have 
developed their own benefits in line with social security through 
compromise with the Government and their own companies.  
Furthermore, they have also added a compensation system of their own 





Table 3-13 Social Security for Miners in Britain (1978) 
 Benefits for Workers Benefits for Mineworkers 
Sickness · Health Services 
· Sickness Benefit 
· Mineworkers’ Sick Pay 
Scheme 
Invalidity · Invalidity Pension 
· Invalidity Allowance 
· Non-contributory  
· Invalidity Pension 
· Attendance Allowance 
· Mobility Allowance 
· Mineworkers’ Pension 
Scheme Incapacity Benefits 
Industrial Accidents 
and Diseases 
· Industrial Injury Benefit 
· Disablement Benefit 
· Special Hardship Allowance 




· Constant Attendance 
Allowance 
· Exceptionally Severe 
Disablement Allowance 
· Mineworkers’ Sick Pay and 
Pension Scheme Benefit 
Pneumoconiosis · National Insurance Industrial 
Injuries Scheme 
· Mineworkers’ Sick Pay and 
Pension Scheme Benefit 
Redundancy · Redundancy Payment 
Scheme 
· Redundancy Mineworker’s 
Payments Scheme 
· Mineworker’s Pension 
Scheme Benefits on 
Redundancy 
Income Supplements · Child Benefit 
· Family Income Supplement 
· Supplement Benefits 
· Supplement Benefits 
Early Retirement  · Mineworkers’ Voluntary 
Early Retirement Scheme 
Social Services  · State Social Services · Coal Industry Social Welfare 
Organisation 
Old Age Retirement · State Pension · Mineworkers’ Pension 
Scheme 
Death - Dependants 
Benefits 
· Widow’s Benefit 
· Children’s Benefit 
· Mineworkers’ Pension 
Scheme (Industrial Widow’s 




 Coal Industry Benevolent 
Trust 
Unemployment Benefit 
Source: NUM, 1979.  
 
 
Social Welfare System and Benefits for Miners in Korea 
 
There are, as can be seen in Figure 3, three axes in the Korean welfare 





the 1990s, Korea established a comprehensive social welfare system with 
the expanded coverage of beneficiaries and higher benefits. However, the 
poor legacy and the factual contents of the welfare system showed how 
the existing welfare institutions are residual and limited, unlike their 
appearance.  
 




Source: Park and Byun, 2003: 4. 
 
As far as income maintenance is concerned, there are two benefits of 
social insurance and public assistance. However, the elderly in fact have 
no right to benefits from the social insurance because of their late 
introduction. The National Pension Programme was conducted in 1988 
and, accordingly, most older people currently aged 60 and over cannot be 
beneficiaries, as the pension required 20 years of contributions until 1998.  
 
Social Welfare System 
Social Insurance Social Welfare 
Service 
Public Assistance 




The Disabled   
Family  
· NBLS   
· Medical Aid  
· Aid for  
  the Disabled  
· Disaster Relief 
· Pensions 
· Health  
  Insurance  
· IACIA 
· Employment   





Table 3-14 Benefits and Services for Older People in Korea 
Category Type Benefit Payment 
Means-
tested 
- National Basic Livelihood Security  
- Basic Old Age Pension 
Contributory 
- National Pension 
- Government Employees’ Pension 
- Military Personnel Pension 
- Private School Teachers’ Pension  
Income 
Security 




- Medical Assistance Health 
Service 
Contributory - National Health Insurance  
Means-
tested 
- Elderly Care Service Voucher  
- Housework and Attendance Voucher 




Contributory - Long-Term Care Insurance 
In-kind 
 
On the other hand, as an important axis of income maintenance, the 
NBLS, a cash payment scheme, is a public assistance programme 
designed to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all Koreans. To 
be eligible for the NBLS, an elderly person must be below the poverty 
line and have no one legally responsible for supporting him or her, or, if 
the elderly person does have someone legally responsible, that person 
must be unable to work. Thus, the qualification of beneficiary is very 
strict. Therefore, it has been criticised that the system excludes some 
unprotected poor, elderly, disabled people, and children whose family 
income is above the poverty line but who live a very poor life. In addition, 
it is criticised that public assistance provides meager benefits, and is still 
highly stigmatised. 
As a kind of demogrant, there are limited services for the old 
people. Despite various types of benefits in kind, since 1980 some 
substantial services have been provided by the Government such as free 
subway and bus tickets, and free admission into public museums and 





implemented in 2008 as a non-contributory pension programme financed 
by both the central and local governments. It is provided to people over 
the age of 65 to help low-income elderly people receive pension benefits. 
However, these benefits are too small and are seen as pocket money. On 
the other hand, all Koreans are covered by National Health Insurance, but 
the patient has to pay a certain percentage at the point of use. This 
percentage differs according to clinics and general hospitals, whether 
outpatient or inpatient, and medical examination etc. Moreover, there are 
exclusion treatments from NHI. In terms of Social Services, these are also 
available for people with a disability, the aged without family support, 
and other qualified vulnerable people, but it has to be pointed out that 
these services fall far short of any sufficient level (Kwon, 1998: 469).   
As discussed, it is difficult that the Korean elderly cannot secure 
their income at the level of minimum standards of living and medical 
treatment under existing social security. Therefore, the elderly with 
pneumoconiosis in Korea seem to be excluded from the social welfare 
system. Thus, they are concentrating on benefits from the IACIA and this 






Industrial Injury System and Compensation for CWP in Britain and 
Korea 
 
Industrial Injury System and Compensation for CWP in Britain 
 
 Structure and Kind of Compensation for CWP 
It is treated as ‘the most important of the prescribed’ industrial diseases in 
Britain (Lewis, 1987: 120) and the Government has put it into the social 
insurance system since the establishment of the social security system in 
1946. Therefore, compensation for pneumoconiosis is based 
fundamentally on state provision. In addition, ex-miners with 
pneumoconiosis can receive compensation from employers but not from 
the Government. While the former is a part of social security, the latter 
results from a kind of compromise between employers and miners. On the 
other hand, there is another case that is not a part of social security but is 
a provision by the Government. Likewise, there are three kinds of benefit 
system: state provision under social security, state provision not from 
social security, and compensation from employers by compromise 
between Labour and employers. 
 The first types of state provision under social security are: IIS, 
the Workmen’s Compensation (Supplementation) Scheme, and the 
Pneumoconiosis and Byssinosis Miscellaneous Disease Benefit Scheme.    
 The IIS provides non-contributory, no-fault benefits for 
disablement because of an accident at work, or because of one of over 70 
prescribed diseases68 known to be a risk from certain jobs (DSD, 2005: 
11; Tolley, 2001: 304). The benefits payable under the scheme are 
sometimes described as Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefits, which 
are weekly benefits paid to people who become disabled because of an 
accident at work or due to certain prescribed diseases caused by their job 
on or after 5 July 1948 (Lewis, 1987: 263). The Workmen’s 
                                                 





Compensation (Supplementation) Scheme is compensation for an 
accident or disease from work before 5 July 1948. There are three main 
allowances: basic allowance, major incapacity allowance, and lesser 
incapacity allowance (DSD, 2005: 69). On the other hand, 
Pneumoconiosis and Byssinosis Miscellaneous Disease Benefit Scheme 
replaced the Workmen’s Compensaion Act (hereafter WCA) after 
nationalisation and now applies to anyone who wishes to claim for 
pneumoconiosis who finished before 5 July 1948 (Lewis, 2005).  
 The second type is the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers’ 
Compensation) Act 1979 (hereafter the 1979 Act), which is a state 
provision but not social security. This compensation system was created 
in 1979 and is an independent law to the Social Security Act. This Act 
was established for sufferers who are unable to claim damages from 
employers who have gone out of business or where there is no realistic 
chance of pursuing a Court Action (NUM, 2005: 4-5). It primarily 
compensates sufferers of asbestos-related diseases. Although the 
Prescribed Disease D1 is a listed disease, it is not intended to compensate 
coal workers who are expected to pursue their claims through the CWPS 
(NUM, 2005: 5).  
 The last type had been created by private arrangements with 
employers. They are pre-1947 Commutation Compensation, CWPS, Via 
Chronic Obstructive Plumonary Disease Claim etc. These institutions 
replace suing for damages at common law and were established based on 
compromise between employers and trade unions. 
 The IIS and CWPS of the schemes discussed are the main 
measures for pneumoconiosis. Therefore, these schemes will be discussed 








 State Provision for CWPS: IIS 
The condition of entitlement for benefits under the IIS is: firstly, a person 
has suffered personal injury as the result of an accident in the course of 
his employment; or secondly, he/she has contracted one of a list of 
specified diseases or illnesses in the course of his employment, which 
must be one of the employments listed in the Social Security (Industrial 
Injuries and Prescribed Diseases) Regulations 1985 (Tolley, 2001: 304, 
307). 
 Because pneumoconiosis is recognised as an industrial disease, it 
is an object of state provision. A claimant is compensated for 
pneumoconiosis when he is recognised as having the disease through 
medical examination. During a medical examination for a disablement 
assessment, a chest X-ray will be conducted by a member of the 
Pneumoconiosis Medical Board. The doctor, who is specially trained in 
industrial injuries disablement matters, will give claimants advice about: 
firstly, whether they have pneumoconiosis; secondly, to what degree of 
seriousness they are disabled; and thirdly, how long they expect their 
disability to last (DSD, 2005). Finally, claimants will receive a decision 
about their claim, the amount of any benefit they will receive, and the 
period for which they will receive the benefit. 
 Compensation for pneumoconiosis depends on the date of onset69, 
assessment percentages, and the degree of disablement based on ‘loss of 
faculty’. Although the Social Security Act 1986 removed the right to 
disablement benefit for assessments below 14%, an exception was made 
for byssinosis and diffuse mesothelisma pneumoconiosis. These diseases 
continue to attract compensation, provided that disablement is assessed at 
least 1% (Lewis, 1987: 120).  
                                                 
69 Workers employed before 5 July 1948 are compensated under the Pneumoconiosis 
and Byssinosis Miscellaneous Disease Benefit Scheme, while compensation after that 





 There are three kinds of benefit: lump sum payments, loss of 
earnings allowances, and dependants’ benefits. In the case of lump sum 
payments, these are full and final settlements. The calculation is based on 
the level of the initial assessment for pneumoconiosis and the claimant’s 
age at the start date of that assessment. Loss of earnings’ allowances take 
the form of weekly pensions and are calculated at two different rates. The 
higher rate is payable where the person is unable to work because of the 
condition, while the lower rate is payable if the disease prevents the 
clamant from remaining in their normal occupation. The allowances are 
payable until reaching the age of 65 and are paid in addition to the 
reduced earnings’ allowance. On the other hand, with regard to the 
dependants’ benefits, where a person dies having received benefit or who 
would have received such benefit had they survived, dependants may be 
entitled to weekly allowances. The important question here is whether 
death was caused by pneumoconiosis (NUM, 1992: 32-33).   
 
 Compensation of CWP from Employers: CWPS 
The CWPS, which was set up and came into effect in 1974, is a product 
of a voluntary arrangement between the mining unions70 and the NCB 
(DOE, 1974a; NUM, 1974). The objective of this agreement was to 
compensate ex-miners suffering from pneumoconiosis in return for 
stopping litigation to common law (NCB, NUM, NACODS AND BACM, 
1974). 71, in which employers and trade unions had felt a big burden.  
 The CWPS is a no-fault scheme and the coverage is all persons 
certified to be suffering from pneumoconiosis (including silicosis), with 
at least ten years’ service in coal mining (including employment with 
private or licensed mines and certain ancillary activities) or in 
                                                 
70 The relevant unions are the NUM, the National Association of Colliery Overmen, 
Deputies and Shortfirers and the British Association of Colliery Management. 
71  In reality, as return for the new provisions, the union agreed to withdraw 





employment involving exposure to dust (DOE, 1974a: 25), and it is 
usually a prerequisite that the claimant has an award of Industrial Injuries 
Disablement Benefit for the prescribed disease D1 (PD D1) in IIS (NUM, 
2005).  
 The provision of the scheme is lump sum payments, which are 
not taxed. Lump sums vary according to the age of the man at the date of 
onset and assessment percentages of the Prescribed Disease D1 (Lewis, 
2005; NUM, 2005: 2). This scheme formed a package with the various 
strands of state benefits payable under the IIS. Benefits at that time 
included the payment of an Industrial Injuries Pension, Special Hardship 
Allowance (later replaced by the Reduced Earnings’ Allowance) and 
Industrial Death Benefit. The scheme originally made provision for 
compensation in respect of loss of earnings (NUM, 2005; Lewis, 2005).  
 Apart from the lump sums, a sufferer could claim a weekly loss 
of earnings payment from the scheme provided he was in receipt of 
Special Hardship Allowance from the Department of Social Security and 
was either on a lower paid job (partial loss of earnings) or on sickness 
benefit through pneumoconiosis (full loss of earnings). Loss of earnings 
was paid up to and including the man’s 65th birthday.  
 In 1988, the scheme was reviewed and a Progression Payment 
Scheme was introduced. This allowed further payments for anyone whose 
assessments increased over and above 20%, with £200 paid per 10% 
increase. Only increases in assessments after 16 August 1988 attracted 
progression payments.  
 In October 1990, the Government abolished the Reduced 
Earnings’ Allowance for diseases/accidents with onsets after this date. 
This meant that men could not receive loss of earnings from the scheme if 
the onset of their disease was after this date. In 1996, after pressure from 
the NUM, British Coal agreed to review the scheme once again. It was 





were on sickness benefit, incapacity benefit, or invalidity benefit through 
pneumoconiosis. However, they stopped the partial payments for anyone 
who took up light employment. It was at this review that the lump sum 
tables were increased for the first time since the inception of the scheme 
and were back-dated to 1990. The progression payments were also 
increased from £200 to £300 per 10% for assessments over and above 
20%. It should be noted that anyone freshly certified with 
pneumoconiosis and eligible to claim the loss of earnings component with 
a date of onset prior to 1 October 1990, must be in receipt of the Reduced 
Earnings’ Allowance, or loss of earnings will not be paid (Lewis, 2005). 
 In posthumous cases, benefit is still payable where 
pneumoconiosis is shown on the death certificate as the cause of death in 
the absence of the Prescribed Disease D1 award. In these cases, the 
degree of disablement is assumed at 10% and the date of onset is taken as 
the date of death. Where disability increases after an award has been 
made, there is provision for progression payments of £300 for each 10% 
increase in disablement above 20%. In order to qualify for a progression 
payment there must be evidence that the disability has increased after 16 
August 1988 (prior to 4 December 1997 the amount payable was £200). 
This must be purely for pneumoconiosis and not for any other disease that 
may cause a higher disability (NUM, 2005: 2). 
 Since 1974, there have been some 90,000 claims and 
approximately £150 million paid in lump sum payments and some £45 
million loss of earnings payments. Since 2000, claims have averaged 100 
per month. The average lump sum payment is £2,700. There are currently 
some 95 loss of earnings claims, receiving, on average, £1,000 per month. 
It takes, on average, some 23 months to settle a pneumoconiosis claim. A 
major factor affecting this average is the practice of claimants delaying 





relevant State benefits, listed above, have been completed (National Audit 
Office, 2007: 13). 
 However, it is also true that the scheme has been criticised 
because of ‘the paucity of the amount of benefit’ and ‘exclusion of 
bronchitis and emphysema’. First of all, there had been much concern 
about the refusal by the Government to recognise emphysema and 
bronchitis as industrial diseases. Emphysema is common amongst miners 
and it can only be diagnosed during life when it is in an advanced state. It 
so frequently accompanies pneumoconiosis that it is possible that it is 
caused by it, yet only pneumoconiosis is recognised (Allen, 1981: 291). 
In terms of the amount of benefit, CWPS is compared with the 1979 Act. 
CWP was not an object of the 1979 Act and only applied to employees of 
companies that had ceased trading and had no insurance cover to 
compensate former workers. However, there is a dispute in the fact that 
the Act is more generous than the CWPS. Adam Price, who is a MP of 
Plaid Cymru, raised some points about the CWPS in the parliament. 
According to him, the pivotal problem in 1974 was that the CWPS is 
lower than the 1979 Act in benefits and many ex-miners could not receive 
benefits under the 1979 Act.72  
 In this context, NUM has also indicated the scarcity of benefit 
quantity: ‘The awards of compensation under the scheme no longer 
represent adequate compensation for miners suffering from 
pneumoconiosis and are significantly lower than awards under the former 
Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation scheme and the 
                                                 
72 ‘Compensation under the 1979 Act is far greater than the 1974 sister scheme. For 
example, a 54-year-old diagnosed with 40% disablement under the 1979 Act would 
receive about £35,000; under the coal workers’ scheme, he would receive only £13,000. 
It is clearly perverse that coal miners receive less compensation than other industries for 
the same injuries’. ‘Miners who have received compensation under CWPS are exempt 
from seeking a claim under the terms of the CWPS, and then claiming that these 
claimants are exempt from compensation under the 1979 Act. Surely exemptions should 
only come into play if a settlement has been agreed under the terms of CWPS’ (Price, in 





British Coal Respiratory Disease Litigation handling agreement for 
Chronic Obstructive Plumonary Disease. Awards from the CWPS should 
now be more in line with these schemes’ (NUM, 2005: 7).  
 
Industrial Injury System and Compensation for CWP in Korea 
 
There are three laws that are closely related to pneumoconiosis: the 
IACIA (1964), the APPPPW (1984), and the Industrial Safety and Health 
Act (1981). The IACIA and the APPPPW are in relation to compensation 
for industrial injury and disease while the APPPPW and the Industrial 
Safety and Health Act are for workers’ health and safety. This shows that 
the APPPPW covers both compensation and industrial health and safety. 
Here, compensation under the IACIA and APPPPW will be discussed.  
 
 Benefits from IACIA and APPPPW 
Elderly persons with pneumoconiosis are compensated under the IACIA 
and the APPPPW. The former supplements the latter in terms of 
compensation. Thus, the main compensation for pneumoconiosis is 
provided by the IACIA.   
 The IACIA73  is based on a principle of ‘no-fault liability’. 
Whether intentional or inadvertent, the employer shall be responsible for 
all work-related accidents. If a case is confirmed as a work-related 
accident or disease, the employee shall receive the insurance benefits 
regardless of the employer’s ability to pay (Kim, 2004: 2). There should 
be an ‘occupational accident’. The requirement of ‘occupational accident’ 
means any wound, disease, physical disability, or death of a worker, 
which is caused by his duties. In such cases, the confirmation criteria for 
                                                 
73 The purpose of this Act is to compensate rapidly and fairly any occupational accident 
of workers, and to establish and operate the insurance facilities in a bid to promote 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of the accident-suffered workers, by operating the 
industrial accident compensation insurance projects, and to contribute to the protection 
of workers by carrying out projects for preventing accidents, and other projects for 





the occupational accident shall be determined by the Ordinance of the 
Ministry of Labour (Article 4 in IACIA). 
 
Figure 4 IACIA Benefits and Process of Compensation 
 
Source: Kim, 2000: 9. 
 
There are seven types of payments of the IACIA: medical treatment 
benefits, work-off allowances, nursing benefits, survivor benefits, funeral 
expenses payments, and long-term disease compensation annuities, as can 
be seen in Figure 4.  
 In the case of work-related injury or disease lasting for four days 
or longer, the entire medical care expenses within the National Health 
Insurance's coverage of medical examinations will be covered. The 
medical treatment benefit shall be the total amount of medical care 
expenses. In the case of the work-off allowances, if the employee cannot 
continue to work for a period exceeding three days due to injury or 
disease, 70% of the lost income is paid. Disability benefits are paid in 
lump sums or pensions. Payments for Grade 8-14 disabilities shall be 
made in lump sums, and those for Grade 1-3 is paid in the form of 
pensions. Grade 4-7 beneficiaries are required to receive at least 50% of 























either lump sums or pension payments. A one-time payment totals the 
average salary for 1,300 days, and for a pension payment 5% will be 
added per additional pension beneficiary in addition to 47% of the annual 
average income. The maximum pension amount per year shall not exceed 
67% of the average annual salary. The long-term injury/disease 
compensation annuity is a payment provided in addition to medical 
benefits. It is granted to an employee who has not completely recovered. 
The benefits at a high rate for an insured employee who has not recovered 
from his work-related injury or sickness even after 2 years of medical 
treatment, and who has suffered from a Grade 1-3 disability, will be paid 
long-term disease compensation annuities. The beneficiaries of the 
injury/disease compensation annuity74  are not qualified for work-off 
allowances. Their benefits are paid as pensions, and the payment amount 
varies depending on the severity of disease. 
 On the other hand, the APPPPW gives three kinds of benefit to 
the elderly with pneumoconiosis: work reassignment allowances, 
disability consolation benefit, and bereaved family members’ consolation 
benefits. The latter two are related to compensation. The disability 
consolation benefit is paid in cases where a worker who is entitled to 
disability benefits under the IACIA retires, or where a retired worker 
becomes entitled to disability benefits under the IACIA due to 
pneumoconiosis. The amount of benefit will be equivalent to 60% of the 
lump sum disability compensation to be paid due to pneumoconiosis 
under the IACIA. On the other hand, the consolation benefits is paid to a 
worker or his/her bereaved family members, and with respect to the 
determination of bereaved family members, the provisions of the IACIA 
                                                 
74 Nursing Benefits: for an employee who, owing to work-related injury or sickness, 
medically requires constant or occasional nursing and actually receives nursing services, 
even though he has recovered from the injury or sickness. Funeral expenses shall be paid 
when a worker dies due to work-related accidents, and an amount equivalent to 120 






apply mutatis mutandis. The amount of benefit is equivalent to 60% of 
the lump sum survivors’ compensation under the IACIA (refer to Articles 
24 and 25 of the APPPPW).  
 
 Compensation System for Ex-miners with CWP 
As discussed above, sufferers of CWP can receive various benefits under 
the IACI. In addition, in return for stopping litigation to common law, 
they are also compensated under the APPPPW. The gist of these benefits 
is the fact that these schemes enable income maintenance and medical 
care. However, there are differences between HPP and SPP in terms of 
receiving these benefits.  
The special act compensates all patients with CWP by disability 
grade.75 There are three types of main pneumoconiosis consolidation 
benefits under the APPPPW: work reassignment allowances, disability 
consolation benefits, and the bereaved family members’ consolation 
benefits (APPPPW, Article 24 para. 1). Apart from a small number of 
patients receiving an annuity in the case of severe disability, most patients 
with CWP used to receive disability benefits by lump sum. However, they 
already seem to spend these benefits for the cost of living. Therefore, it is, 
without doubt, assumed that the benefits do not fundamentally contribute 
to resolving the poverty of patients.  
However, in terms of the existence of the nine prescribed 
complications that are related to CWP, pneumoconiosis patients can go 
into hospital (namely, the patients move from SPPs to HPPs) and 
APPPPW provides HPPs with very important benefits until they are 
healed. The benefits comprise shutdown benefits and medical care 
benefits. The payment of these benefits continues until the injury/disease 
                                                 
75 There is lump sum compensation and annuities in disability benefits. They are paid 
according to physical disability grades: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11. In the case of annuities, they are 






is completely cured. In particular, the shutdown benefit offers a guarantee 
of income for the worker unable to perform labour because of the 
industrial disease. The amount of shutdown benefits, equivalent to 70% of 
the average wage, is calculated and paid for every day that the employee 
is prevented from working. Basically, the benefits are given until the 
complications are fully resolved. Therefore, there are big differences 
between SPP and HPP in terms of benefits.  
 Therefore, the older people with pneumoconiosis want to be 
hospitalised because this guarantees regular income from the shutdown 
benefits and free medical care from the medical treatment benefits. 
Therefore, it is important to the sufferer whether or not they have 
complications. The APPPPW perceives eight diseases as complications of 
pneumoconiosis: pulmonary tuberculosis, pulmonary emphysema, 
pneumoconiosis, bronchial inflammation, dry pleurisy, etc. 
 Likewise, the acceptance of work-off allowance and medical 
treatment benefit creates the main differences between SPP and HPP. In 
addition, it tends to the difference in benefits such as survivor benefits 
and funeral expenses. This is because hospitalisation is a favourable 
condition in which to receive them. In reality, the majority of HPP have 
been given these benefits, whereas under 30% of SPP have taken them. 
 On the other hand, the adjudication process of pneumoconiosis in 
Korea is as follows. Firstly, the pneumoconiosis examining physicians 
assigned to the Ministry of Labour carry out the first health examination, 
which is usually based on the chest X-ray photograph. Secondly, if it is 
doubted as to whether a person has pneumoconiosis in the first health 
examination, he/she can be given a second health examination called ‘the 
close health examination of pneumoconiosis’. The result is finally 
decided by pneumoconiosis examining physicians of the Ministry of 
Labour and the Pneumoconiosis Deliberation Association of the Korea 





 There are three current issues regarding the pneumoconiosis 
problem based on the preliminary survey: the extension of complication 
range, the settlement of fair process of pneumoconiosis judgment, and the 
transformation into recuperation institutions from reception to 
rehabilitation. Firstly, an issue of the debate of complication range 
extension is whether or not APPPPW permits pneumonia as a 
complication of pneumoconiosis. Secondly, the Committee for 
Pneumoconiosis Examination currently judges whether or not a patient 
has a complication, the level of pneumoconiosis, the criteria of 
pneumoconiosis, and so on. There are currently 11 doctors who are 
examiners.76 Lastly, the current recuperation policy in Korean centres is 
not on the reception of patients but on rehabilitation.   
 
 




As will be discussed in this chapter, there are similarities and differences 
between Britain and Korea in relation to the mining industry, miners and 
pneumoconiosis. In this section, focus will be on the similarities and 
differences between the two countries, and their meaning will be 
explained in terms of social policy and industrial diseases. 
 There are similarities in the areas of development and decline of 
the mining industry, position and working conditions of mineworkers, 
identification of pneumoconiosis, and scale of ex-miners with 
pneumoconiosis. With regard to the coal industry, it was a key industry in 
                                                 
76 The ex-president of the Committee for Pneumoconiosis Examination was Dr Jeong 
and the members of this committee have rarely changed. During this process, some 
judging doctors like Jeong have had an opportunity to become corrupt. Won thinks that 





both Britain and Korea. In addition, there are similarities with the setup of 
the workers’ organisations that have been convincingly established and 
have many members. 
 In addition, the position of mineworkers is similar. They did not 
have a good social standing because the work was very difficult and 
dangerous, and, accordingly, people were reluctant to work in mines. In 
this situation, it was generally recognised that the job was for a man in a 
low social stratification. The situation of pneumoconiosis and its patients 
in Britain and Korea also seems to be similar. There has been CWP in 
two countries that ranked first in terms of industrial diseases and the 
disease is still the main industrial disease in these countries, although it is 
gradually disappearing. On the other hand, most patients with 
pneumoconiosis are the elderly over 65 years old in both countries.  
In addition, it seems that there are similarities between Britain and 
Korea in terms of the social welfare system. In particular, it is mentioned 
that there is a resemblance of industrial injury benefits in Britain and 
Korea. The industrial injury benefits of Korea are almost the same as 
those of Britain in terms of the kind of benefits and their contents. In 
some aspects of contents, Korean institutions are better than British. 
However, there are many more differences than similarities 
between Britain and Korea. With regard to the coal industry, there is a 
decisive factor in creating the big differences in ownership structure of 
mines between Britain with nationalized coal industry and Korea with 
mainly privatized coal industry.  
 The ownership structure naturally leads to a difference in the 
scale of mines. Mines based on plans for long-term and high 
mechanisation existed in Britain, while mines in Korea were owned by 
small and extremely profit-orientated employers, as well as some big 
companies. It is natural that there were different working conditions. 





interested in strategies to increase productivity rather than to strengthen 
safety. On the contrary, Britain was relatively interested in safety and 
mechanisation.  
 This difference reflected an attitude to handle dust in the 
workplace. In the case of Britain, the industrialised company NCB also 
tried to protect miners from dust. From 1947, ‘the NCB placed a much 
higher priority on health and safety than had previously been the case 
with the private owners, and by the mid-1950s it had established a 
comprehensive health and safety infrastructure, which included the Mines 
Medical Service, the X-raying of all new miners, and the Pneumoconiosis 
Field Research, while important links were established between the NCB, 
the Safety in Mines Research Board and the National Joint 
Pneumoconiosis Committee’ (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 182). As a 
result, ‘the effort which it did deploy was one of the reasons that rates of 
CWP fell’ (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 183). On the contrary, mining 
employers in Korea did not put their interest in occupational health and 
safety because their priority was mainly productivity. Therefore, 
industrial injuries were often hidden and miners were not educated about 
the dangers of pneumoconiosis.  
 With regard to the recognition of pneumoconiosis, there was 
basically interaction between employers, the Government and trade 
unions in Britain, while the Government and experts played a key role in 
finding miners with pneumoconiosis. The crucial difference in 
recognising pneumoconiosis as an industrial disease was the role of trade 
unions. Bufton and Melling (2005: 66) indicated two factors in the 
recognition of pneumoconiosis in Britain: ‘firstly, the struggle of trade 
unions for an extension of compensation rights; and secondly, the 
activities of physicians and campaigners who were primarily involved in 
the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of tuberculosis’. In Britain, trade 





pneumoconiosis, and pushed the Government and experts into research. 
Therefore, the British trade unions were at least a gauge lamp in 
investigating and recognising pneumoconiosis. In contrast, in Korea, 
trade unions and the Government, as well as mining owners, had kept 
silent about pneumoconiosis, while they were very positive to advance 
productivity.  
Regarding miners’ organisations and industrial relations, there 
were great differences between Britain and Korea. Despite being an 
industrial union in appearance, the FKCWTU did not have hegemony on 
individual trade unions while the NUM carried out its role as an industrial 
union. Collective bargaining in the Korean mining industry was confined 
to annual wage bargaining with a coal-owner in a company. On the 
contrary, the NUM discussed and compromised social policy-related 
issues as well as economic issues with NCB, a state-run company, on an 
industrial level.   
There are significant differences in social security in Britain and 
Korea despite the similarity in appearance. The British elderly are more 
comfortable than the Korean elderly because of relatively institutional 
social security. Britain offers free medical care and provides a social 
safety net with a comprehensive care system for people, including a 
variety of areas such as families with children, unemployed people, those 
on low incomes, elderly people, sick and disabled people, bereaved 
people, and others. On the contrary, Korean social security is recognised 
as ‘residual’ in terms of income maintenance and national health services. 
Therefore, industrial accident workers in Korea yearn to receive the 
benefits of the IACIA. In this context, ex-miners with CWP try to receive 
benefits such as shutdown benefits and medical treatment from the 
APPPPW, and hospitalisation for complications can meet this 





 On the other hand, the British worker who has an industrial 
accident can be provided with free medical treatment and social benefits 
under the social security system outside the IIA, such as income-based 
jobseeker’s allowance, income support, basic retirement pension, 





CHAPTER 4. COMPENSATION POLITICS AROUND 
CWP IN BRITAIN 
 
 




As discussed on Chapter 3.4, Britain’s industrial injury insurance laws 
used to be based on the IIA (1946) which replaced the WCA (1897). 
However, the IIA was incorporated into the Social Security Act in 1986 
which is now the legal source to be consulted regarding industrial injury. 
Likewise, there are important conversions of schemes related to industrial 
injuries compensation; the introduction in 1987 and several revisions of 
the WCA, the introduction of the IIA in 1946, and the incorporation of it 
into the Social Security Act (1986).  
 Before the introduction of WCA, industrial injuries were dealt 
with by the Compensation Under Common Law Act or Compensation 
Under Employer’s Liability Act in 1880. This legislation placed 
employers’ responsibility for injuries upon negligence or breach of duty 
(Brown, 1982: 1). However, it was difficult for workers to prove that 
employers were at fault. In terms of the first of our modern social 
insurance provisions (DHSS, 1981: 1) and reform of previous problems, 
there is no doubt that the WCA (introduced in 1897) was the most 
important piece of legislation in spite of criticism from some scholars. In 
particular, the WCA was based on a principle of liability without fault 
(DHSS, 1981, 1). This means that workers did not need to prove that their 
injuries were the fault of their employers. In addition the provision of 





(Pearson, 1978: 26-27). The WCA 1897 “first required employers to 
compensate workers for earnings lost as a result of accidents arising ‘out 
of and in the course of’ employment” (Clark and Smedley, 1995: 4). 
 The act applied only to certain hazardous industries, namely 
employment on or in railways, factories, mines, quarries, engineering 
works or buildings over 30 feet high (Pearson, 1978: 28-29). However, 
later, it was extended in 1906 to apply to sufferers from a scheduled list 
of industrial diseases (DHSS, 1981: 1).  
The Beveridge Report recognized the positive role of WCA, but 
presented the following criticisms: long and complex court litigation, 
limited benefits and application, just payments of compensation in lump 
sums and no provision for the medical and industrial rehabilitation of the 
injured worker (Beveridge, 1942; George, 1968: 170).  
 Based on these criticisms, the Beveridge Report was proposed 
and the Labour Government realized it as the IIA in 1946 (refer to 
Chapter 4). The crucial point was the incorporation of workmen’s 
compensation into National Insurance. The merging meant “a logical and 
inevitable progress from the principal of indemnity and individual-
employer liability to that of social responsibility” (Schweinitz, 1943: 236). 
The main characteristic was the separation of the IIA from the general 
social security system which was the case because Beveridge thought that 
employees injured at work should be treated specially. As a result, 
benefits from the IIA were higher than other kinds of National Insurance.  
 The IIA replaced loss of earnings with loss of faculty as the 
principal basis for compensation. This change prompted the introduction 
of the percentage disablement scale and there were some other reforms 
but the substance of the law governing industrial injury benefits remained 
largely unaltered until 1982 (Clark and Smedley, 1995: 4; Wikeley and 
Ogus, 2002: 715). However, a gradual process of integrating the scheme 





the 1970s, the separate Industrial Injuries Fund was abolished and 
differences between the general National Insurance and the industrial 
injury schemes proposed by the Social Security Acts decreased (Wikeley, 
2002: 715; Clark and Smedley, 1995: 4). In addition, there had been 
criticisms about the justification of preferences for injured workers. The 
Disability Alliance put the point forthrightly as follows: “the distribution 
of preferential compensation through the industrial injuries scheme on the 
basis of place and cause of disability, when the majority of people having 
the burden of severe disablement in our society are excluded, offends 
principles of social justice” (DHSS, 1981: 2).  
 In the light of this situation and criticism, the Government tried to 
reform the IIA and the Government with specific proposals for bringing 
about these changes set out in the ‘Social Security Act 1975: Reform of 
the IIS’ (DHSS, 1981). Finally the IIA was incorporated into the Social 
Security Act.   
 With regard to compensation for pneumoconiosis, there was the 
introduction of relevant basic schemes in 1928, 1943, 1946, 1974, 1979 
and 1993. Because other schemes will be examined elsewhere in this 
thesis, this section will focus on the Various Industries (Silicosis) Scheme 
in 1928 and The Coal Mining Industry (Pneumoconiosis) Compensation 
Scheme in 1943.   
 There was an important new scheme entitled the ‘Various 
Industries (Silicosis) Scheme’ introduced in 1928 because it meant the 
official recognition of pneumoconiosis. However, there were some 
problems with this scheme. Essentially miners were put through a 
complicated procedure in order to establish what benefits they were 
entitled to. For example, workers who were certified as suffering from 
silicosis were unable to secure benefits as they failed to prove that they 
had been working by what was deemed to be ‘the process’. Hundreds of 





condition of the scheme. Thus, such large restrictions did not bring many 
sufferers within the scope of benefits (Evans, 1963: 2). The scheme only 
covered pneumoconiosis caused by silicosis.    
 During World War II, working conditions in pits kept on 
worsening because of the speed and intensity required to dig the amount 
of coal needed for the war effort. Coal mined and the rate of injuries 
caused were both rising but disability benefits were not enough for people 
to survive on (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 196-197). In this context, there 
was an important development related to pneumoconiosis when the Coal 
Mining Industry (Pneumoconiosis) Compensation Scheme in 1943 was 
introduced. The introduction had two basic impacts on pneumoconiosis 
and compensation related to it; the recognition by the CWP that 
pneumoconiosis was an industrial disease and the inclusion of surface 
workers in compensation. In other words, the former effect extended the 
CWP’s remit beyond just silicosis while the latter widened coverage to 
surface as well as underground workers. In addition, in 1943 the 
Pneumoconiosis Benefit Scheme was introduced which applied to men 
who had been employed in or about any coal mine on or after the 22nd 
October, 1934 but not later than the 30th June, 1943. This allowed for the 
medical re-examination of men whose condition had worsened in that 
period (Evans, 1963: 6). 
 There were two complaints about the 1943 scheme from trade 
unions. Firstly, as an interpretation of the scheme, the South Wales 
Miners’ Federation maintained that the expression ‘caused’ by 
pneumoconiosis should read ‘caused and accelerated by’. Secondly, as an 
issue regarding the jurisdiction of pneumoconiosis, the NUM were also 
concerned about maintaining the system of certification through the state. 
That is to say, the NUM criticized the fact that the NCB’s Mines Medical 
Service’s intention to take over this responsibility. In fact, the union was 





and NCB Medical Advisors over assessments of fitness for disabled 








There were important nodes in introducing the IIA (1946); (1) The 
Beveridge Report submitted in December 1942, (2) the White Paper of 
Coalition Government in September 1944, the Churchill’s Caretaker 
Government Bill titled the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Bill in 
June 1945, (3) the Labour Government Bill in August 1945, the 
legislation of IIA in July 1946 and its effectuation in July 1948 (refer to 
Colwill, 1986: 7; Brown, 1982: 25-33; Bartrip, 1987: 168-213; Young, 
1964: 87-107). In this section of the thesis, events pertaining to the 
perspectives of the government, employers and trade unions will be 
explored as well as compensation policies for injured workers focusing on 
points of issue regarding the introduction of IIA in 1946. But firstly the 
background of the introduction of IIA must be examined.  
 
 
Post-war Consensus, Beveridge Report and Advent of the Labour 
Government 
 
By and large, there are three factors to consider vis a vis the context of the 
IIA introduction: the post-war social consensus, the Beveridge Report and 





contributed to the introduction of the law in their own ways. The 
Beveridge Report was based on the substantial content and direction of 
the Act, the socio-political support for a social security system stemming 
from the post-war social consensus. The Act could find the impetus to be 
realized when the Labour Party was elected to government.    
The wartime consensus and the post-war consensus basically 
demonstrate the fact that there were similarities and resemblances in 
policies between the Labour and Conservative Parties. There was much 
overlap between both sides in the economic, social and foreign policies 
pursued during the Second World War and the post-war period until the 
breakdown of this consensus in the 1970s (Seldon, 1991:41). 
 The post-war consensus was largely consolidated by the Labour 
Government of 1945-51, but its genesis was in the war years, 1939-45. 
Six years of war united the country against a common enemy while the 
privations that were a concomitant of it instilled a widespread desire for a 
new start and a better tomorrow. The comradeship of the war had also 
helped blunt some of the sharper edges of British class differences. 
Meanwhile, the coalition government (1940-45) fostered social and 
intellectual links between socialists and conservatives. The common daily 
effort to defeat Hitler had taken a big bite out of the ideological 
differences between the two main British political parties (Seldon, 
1991:41). The consensus can be understood in the context of how 
economic and social policies crossed over between both parties. In terms 
of economic policy, there was a general acceptance of Keynesianism 
which was characterized as being for a mixed economy and full 
employment. Regarding social policy, the Beveridge Report which 
provided united social security was agreed to be the best move forward.  
 This hybridizing of Keynesianism and Beveridgism, was 
implemented under the Labour government of 1945-51. Looked at in 





National Health Service and an ambitious social security programme, 
placed the utilities of gas, electricity, rail, coal and steel under public 
ownership and began the process of granting the colonies independence 
which would continue over the next thirty years. When the Conservative 
Party was returned to office in 1951 it kept many of these policies on 
(Kavanagh, 1996: 11). The political consensus can be presented in the 
term, ‘Butskelism’ which symbolized convergence of policies between 
the Chancellor of the Conservative Party, Butler, and the Chancellor of 
the Labour Party, Gaitskell.   
 On the other hand, the Beveridge Committee alternately titled 
‘The Inter-departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services’ was established in June 1941 to inquire into the wide range of 
anomalies that had arisen as a result of the haphazard and piecemeal 
growth of the social security system over the previous fifty years (Harris, 
1977: 378).  
 The Committee came about as a result of broad public demand, 
especially during the Second World War. It investigated basic problems 
that had long been argued about until finally submitting a  plan for social 
security. The main intention was to abolish Want but it could only 
succeed if other ‘giant’ problems were addressed at the same time. Sir 
William Beveridge listed three assumptions underlying his proposals: 
provision would be made for allowances for dependent children, for 
comprehensive health and rehabilitation services and for the maintenance 
of employment. And he might have added, with an eye to the two giants 
of Ignorance and Squalor, education and houses for the people (Marshall, 
1975: 84; Beveridge, 1942: 8, para. 14). 
 On the other hand, there was a duality and complexity in the 
organizations and administration of the insurances and assistance 
(Schweinitz, 1943: 227-228). These inefficient and overlapping 





the British welfare system. Therefore, the Beveridge Committee defined 
its mission as follows: “to undertake, with special reference to the inter-
relation of the schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of 
social insurance and allied services, including workmen’s compensation 
and to make recommendations” (Beveridge, 1942: 1).     
 The conclusion of the Beveridge Report also resulted in 
fundamental reform to workmen’s compensation by incorporating it into 
social insurance:   
 
“Sir William Beveridge is a great enthusiast for social insurance and it 
was, therefore, very helpful to receive from him a very cogent statement 
of the reasons for converting workmen’s compensation into a social 
insurance plan” (Mr James Griffiths, Hansard 414, 1945: 288).  
 
In addition, it is commonly believed that the report played a key role in 
bridging the past and future for workmen’s compensation. After critical 
examination of the existing WCA, the Report approached the question 
from a different standpoint to that of the Royal Commission, but taking 
into account both the printed evidence before the Commission and further 
evidence tendered to the Committee (Beveridge, 1942, par. 38).  
 After its publication, the Beveridge Report was recognized as the 
criteria for establishing a broad consensus about the assumptions that 
were to govern the new scheme. It therefore represented a closure of the 
dispute which had hitherto characterized all earlier attempts to change 
workmen’s compensation law (Colwill, 1986: 146).  
The crucial factor in the realization of the Beveridge Report was 
the  efforts of the Labour Party government in power. The 1945 general 
election yielded an overwhelming victory for Labour, led by Clement 
Attlee. There are several reasons for their comprehensive electoral 
success but the important element was the support of voters which 





state. At that time, just after the end of war, most voters were concerned 
about jobs, houses and poverty etc., and tended to view the Labour Party 
as more reliable on these issues. On the contrary, there was a widespread 
feeling that “the Conservatives were out-of-date, the ‘old gang’, who had 
failed to deal with the inter-war problem while Labour a tried and trusted 
team of varied talents, speaking in the varied and authentic accents of the 
people and responsive to their needs” (Childs, 1986: 13-14). Labour’s 




Points in Dispute: Consensus and Confrontation  
 
The WCA had been criticized for serious defects (refer to Beveridge, 
1942, para. 79; OMR, 1944: 5, 9, 12; George, 1968: 170).  Therefore, 
the scheme had involved long and complex court litigation between 
employers, trade unions and insurance companies. Workers had 
complained thus: 
 
Under the old system, disputed claims were dealt with in the ordinary 
Court of Law, and we have often witnessed the costly spectacle of a case 
involving important questions of principle being fought out first in the 
County Court, then in the Court of Appeal and finally in the House of 
Lords. Often the amount involved in the case was small, but the long 
legal battle had nevertheless to be fought remorselessly to its finish, at 
whatever cost and delay (TUC, 1949: 4-5). 
 
The conflicts in litigation created big burdens for all concerned and 
adversely affected industrial relations. In addition, there were also many 
flaws in the level of compensation because of the lack of complete 
security for payment of compensation and the ineffectuality of lump sum 





source of income. In particular, the WCA made no provision for the 
medical and industrial rehabilitation of injured workers. 
 Before these problems of the WCA, there had been many 
government and trade union-conducted trials and much evidence 
presented indicating the need for reforms to the WCA. According to a 
TUC paper submitted to the Royal Commission, trade unions had made 
many efforts to improve the existing law:  
 
We have maintained this view consistently for a considerable period. As 
long ago as 1925 we decided to draft a Bill, embodying the full demands 
of the Movement. In February, 1933, a Bill drafted by us was introduced 
as a Private Member’s Bill in the House of Commons, but failed to 
obtain a second reading. Two similar Bills met with a similar fate in 
May and November respectively of 1936. .. In our opinion the necessary 
changes can only be brought about by repealing, inter alia, the whole of 
the Workmen’s compensation Act of 1925, which are set out in this 
evidence (TUC, 1939: 3).     
 
In this regard, it was natural to revise the WCA. Therefore discussions on 
the reform had been going on within the Royal Commission since 1939 
and the Beveridge Report suggested a plan for workmen’s compensation 
based on previous research and experience. As a result, the White Paper 
of the Coalition Government in 1944 made many agreements but there 
were still plenty of points at issue as can be seen in the following 
statement by the Minister of National Insurance Mr James Griffiths in the 
Second Reading of Parliament (10 October 1945):  
 
“The broad principles on which the scheme of industrial injuries 
insurance is based were decided first by the Coalition Government, and 
were outlined in Part   of the White Paper to which I have already 
referred. When the White Paper came up for discussion in the House 
there was general agreement upon the new structure and upon the 
principles embodied in the White Paper. However, many of the detailed 
points in the scheme were criticised in the debates which then took place, 
and in the light of the views expressed at that time and of various 
representations made by both sides in industry since those debates 
certain modifications were introduced by the late Government” 






Generally speaking, there were points in dispute in four areas regarding 
legislation of workmen’s compensation: incorporation of the act into 
social insurance; management of the insurance; contribution of funds; 
compensation. However it should be highlighted that the first subject area 
covered others. In other words, if the system could be changed into a 
social insurance system, administration of institution, type of 
compensation and contribution would have to change in tandem with a 
principle of public insurance.      
 As a rule, employers tend to dislike the intervention of the state 
in the issue of industrial injuries. In actual fact, Peake, who had been the 
Home Office Minister responsible for the reform of workmen’s 
compensation in the pre-election Coalition Government, found employers 
to be generally hostile to the Beveridge’s workmen’s compensation 
proposals. Indeed, their views expressed within the Beveridge committee 
asserted that the existing system should not be changed. They preferred 
the retention of that system even if it were to be more costly than an 
alternative. This was because they feared the consequences of reforms 
which could impose hitherto unsuspected financial obligations (Bartip, 
1987: 195) although all the employers’ attitudes in the change of WCA 
were not the same (refer to Beveridge, 1942, para 94).    However, 
while employers could not but accept the change they refused to give up 
their interests. In this context, employers tried to institute the reform by 
pooling their resources with workers and the Government:  
    
The British Employers Confederation … desired … to make it clear that 
‘notwithstanding this divergence of opinion, the employers in all 
industries are unanimous on the principle that, so long as workmen’s 
compensation is paid for entirely by employers, the administration of 
that service should continue to remain in the hands of the employers’” 






On other hand, trade unions had agreed to the plan of social insurance 
although the change resulted in the financial burden for pooling. In other 
words, they had well known that the social insurance meant the 
conversion of workmen’s compensation only by liability of employers 
into a tripartite contributory scheme. Nevertheless, “the unions intimated 
willingness for workmen’s compensation to be organised as a 
contributory social insurance scheme although they had been adamant 
that employers should bear sole responsibility for finance” (Bartip, 1987: 
196). Why did trade unions demand the reform of the CWA?     
 Firstly, it was expected that the level of compensation would be 
raised. W.P. Allen, General Council of TUC, agreed that “some 
employers would pay more and others less, but if the Scheme were to be 
accepted in the spirit the Government desired, the benefits would have to 
be improved. For example 35/-a week for a single man would not be 
adequate if the workers were contributing to the Scheme” (PIN 21/1, 22 
December 1944: 2). 
 
Although this proposal involves acceptance by the worker of a 
substantial part of the liability which now belongs exclusively to the 
employer, we think it ought to be agreed to provided that these is a fair 
return to the workman for the additional liability which he is accepting 
(PIN 21/1, 7 November, 1944: 1) 
 
Secondly, what they had long wanted to see terminated was for their 
control over the administration of the WCA and accordingly the extension 
of their rights. 
 
Employers and workmen will pay the same weekly contributions … from 
the workman’s point of view it would seem desirable that he should be 
on an equality in this respect with the employer. Moreover, it is 
proposed that workers and employer should share equality in the 
development and administration of the Scheme, being equally 
represented on the Advisory Committee or Council and on the local 
appeal tribunals, and equal contributions are a natural, if not necessary 






On the other hand, in light of the government’s attitude, the reform 
needed seemed to be “because of the adverse effect which such a system 
had upon industrial relations, and also because establishment of the 
principle of employee contribution would inhibit pressures continually to 
raise benefit levels regardless of the scales applying under other schemes” 
(Bartrip, 1987: 194). 
 As discussed above, once workmen’s compensation was aligned 
with social insurance, the other points at issue - tripartite contribution and 
administration - would naturally be accepted. However, all the points in 
dispute were not resolved. Trade unions aimed to lower their 
contributions, increase compensation and add rights on administration, 
while employers wanted the reverse:  
 
The proper method is to consider what are the right rates of benefit to 
fix under a Social Insurance Scheme and once they are settled, to 
consider in what proportions the cost should be shared between 
employers, insured persons, and the Exchequer. In arriving at a division 
as between employers and insured persons it might be reasonable to 
take into account the fact that the employers have borne the whole 
liability in the past and call on the employers to make a greater 
contribution that the insured persons, but there are weighty 
considerations against this – an equal division is the principle adopted 
in National Health and Unemployment Insurance and an equal division 
is a natural corollary to giving insured persons and equal voice in the 
administration and development of the Scheme(PIN 21/1, TUC, 7 
November 1944: 1-2).  
 
In this context, the General Council of the TUC recommended less 
contributions by workers than employers. More specifically, the General 
Council proposed 6d. from the employer and 3d. from the worker (TUC, 
1946: 93).  
 With regard to contributions there had been a difference of 
opinion between the TUC and the MFGB, which became the NUM in 





social service separate from all other services, with compensation related 
to earnings in all cases and financed by a direct levy on all employers 
varying with the degree of risk. On the other hand, MFGB opposed the 
suggestion of making each industry contribute according to its risk while 
agreeing in other respects with the TUC. It urged that the cost of all 
accidents wherever occurring should be borne by all employers’ equally 
(Beveridge, 1942, para 93, 25).  
This difference over the financial liability of employers had 
existed as far back as the Royal Commission in 1938. The MFGB 
proposed a complete pooling of the cost across industry on an equal basis 
without considering the risks to any particular industry sector. It was 
expected that this approach could relieve the substantial financial burden 
from the mining industry. The TUC, on the other hand, maintained a 
pooling of the cost among all employers, with an additional special levy 
on hazardous industries. This meant that the contribution would be 
different according to each industry’s risks. From this point of view, the 
mining industry with high occupational risks should take a big burden” 
(Colwill, 1986: 76-77). This issue was dealt with in the Beveridge Report 
and after that in terms of whether or not the principle of social insurance 
would be retained.  
As can be seen above, there were points in dispute not related so 
much to principles such as introduction of social insurance in the 
workmen’s compensation scheme, participation of trade unions in 
administration and contribution of trade unions for pooling, but around 
how much payment should be made for pooling, how much responsibility 
involved in the government and how much benefit payments should be 
available for compensation.  
 With regard to compensation, there was a clear difference 
between employers and trade unions. While trade unions wanted to take 





paid at a lower level in smaller items. Employers worried that the high 
compensation would lead to a financial burden and finally result in an 
economic crisis:  
 
He [Mr. Boyd, Chairman of Confederation Committee in British 
Employers’ Confederation] had not come to discuss the Bill in detail but 
wished to make a few general observations on the principles of it. He 
referred to their previous talk with the Minister’s predecessor, Lord 
(then Sir William) Jowitt, and reiterated that though they did not like the 
provisions of the Bill, they accepted it. He understood and sympathised 
with the workmen’s desire for security but he was alarmed at the 
increase in benefits. It was doubtful whether a Bill conferring such high 
benefits could be carried by the country without economic disaster (PIN 
21/68, BEC, 31 August 1945: 2).  
 
Based on these concerns, employers asserted that the level of benefits for 
workers should be similar to the level of social insurance:  
  
Mr. Boyd [Chairman of Confederation Committee] had hoped that the 
Government would propose that same rates under the benefit for both 
industrial and non-industrial cases. The acceptance of differential rates 
was an inducement to a disabled person to claim that his disablement 
had been caused through his employment. The Government had come to 
a different conclusion and he recognised that the background and 
history of Workmen’s compensation provided some justification for 
giving special terms to industrial casualties. Nevertheless the 
Deputation [of British Employers’ Confederation] thought that to 
further widen the difference in rates of benefit between the two schemes 
would be a great mistake (PIN 21/1, BEC, 14 February 1945: 1).  
 
On the contrary, trade unions and Labour’s Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Herbert Morrison, maintained that workers deserved 
higher benefits than pensioners in social insurance. Morrison said:  
 
“These are at a higher rate than those proposed under Part I of the 
social insurance scheme. One justification for that is history. 
Workmen’s compensation has always had special treatment. If the 
workman is injured in the course of his employment he should, I think-
because the nation needs him for its economic well-being- be entitled to 
more consideration than the ordinary citizen who has bad luck in the 






In addition, the unionists in the General Council stressed that “an 
adequate rate of benefit was dependent upon the amount of the 
contributions paid into the Industrial Injuries Fund” (TUC, 1946: 93). 
This assertion was based on converting the old compensation system 
through the financing of employers into a social insurance scheme 
supported by tripartite contributions including trade unions. Therefore 
unionists maintained that their higher benefits were a right.      
There were many items included in the compensation benefits 
scheme but there were essentially three types of benefits to be drawn from 
an insurance fund financed by contributions from employers, employees 
and the State: “industrial injury benefit, payable, for a limited period, 
when an insured person was incapable of work owing to work injury; 
industrial disablement benefit, payable for loss of physical or mental 
faculty regardless of ability to work; and industrial death benefit payable 
to any of a range of possible beneficiaries in the event of the death of the 
insured person” (Bartrip, 1987: 212). The biggest point at issue was the 
rate of benefits vis a vis industrial injury. The General Council of the 
TUC was demanding an increase from 40s. to 55s. per week for the basic 
injury benefit, and from 40s. to 60s. for 100% disablement for the 
disablement pension: “We think that the rate of the allowance should be 
initially 55s. a week to be raised at the end of the fourth week to the 
pension rate for 100 per cent disablement and that the allowance should 
be payable from the first day of incapacity in place of after three days as 
proposed in the White Paper. The children’s allowances should be 7s. 6d. 
for each child and not only for the first child as proposed in the White 
paper” (PIN 21/1, 7 November, 1944: 2; TUC, 1946: 93). There was a big 






Sir John Forbes Watson [Director of Confederation Committee] said 
that they had experienced some surprised at finding the 35s, rate fixed in 
the industrial scheme for the initial period of disablement since they had 
made the point in connection with the Temporary Increase Bill which 
had raised the compensation payment for total incapacity to 35s. that as 
recommended in the Beveridge Report to be later reduced to 24s., the 
rate proposed for sickness benefit under the general scheme (BEC, 14 
February 1945: 1). 
 
As has been discussed, there were confrontations around incorporation of 
the old compensation scheme, WCA, into social insurance, IIA. The basic 
agreement made about workmen’s compensation was to change it 
towards social insurance:  
 
“The main and truly revolutionary feature of the new scheme is that, for 
the first time, it transfers to the community as a whole the responsibility 
for the casualties of industry, and I think and hope that the House will 
agree that it is right that the responsibility for the casualties of industry 
should rest broadly and firmly upon the community as a whole. It is a 
complete change of conception, and workmen’s compensation under its 
new title of “industrial injury insurance” will become, for the first time 
a social service administered for the community by the new Ministry of 
Social Insurance if the Bill now before the House is, in due course, 
passed” (Mr Herbert Morrison, Hansard 404, 1944: 1393-1394) 
 
To sum up, the transformation had many meanings because this was 
based on the types of contribution, compensation and administration of 
related scheme as well as the acceptance of changes resulting from the 
social consensus. However, this did not mean a complete agreement. 
Confrontation arose mainly around the level of benefits and contributions. 
The following will examine compensation politics focusing on these 







Compensation Politics: Beveridge Report, White Paper and IIA 
(1946) 
 
The origins of the IIA (1946) can be traced to the Beveridge Report. 
Many of the original Beveridge proposals, as modified by the White 
Paper of 1944, remained intact, although were elaborated in detail after 
the formation of the report (Brown, 1982: 32). Nevertheless, there had 
been important changes throughout the discussion and compromises made 
by the White Paper to the IIA (1946). Therefore, it is at first necessary to 
scrutinize the formation and proposals of the Beveridge Report to fully 
understand the IIA (1946). Next, since the publication of Beveridge 
Report, the events leading up to the enactment of the IIA in 1946 should 
be described. During the period from the Beveridge Report to the IIA, 
there was a White Paper, the Churchill’s Caretaker Government Bill and 
the Labour Government Bill.    
 
Beveridge Report: Establishment of Principles    
 
The Beveridge Report covered all the areas of workmen’s compensation 
through discussion and reached a comprehensive conclusion for injured 
workers.77 The most important proposal in the Report was to bring 
“workmen’s compensation (or industrial injury) within the scope of social 
insurance so that compensation would be received as a benefit instead of 
having to be claimed from the employer, if necessary in a court of law” 
(Marshall, 1975: 84). This meant “converting workmen’s compensation 
from a lawyers’ paradise into a ‘social service’” (Harris, 1977: 399-400) 
                                                 
77 The main passages in the Beveridge Report dealing with workmen’s compensation 
are paragraphs nos. 77-105, 258-264, 289-291, 323, 331-336, 353, 360, 366, 393-395 
and 401 plus Appendix A (Memorandum by the Government Actuary) paras. 30 and 36-
46 and Appendix E (Administrative Costs of Various Forms of Insurance) (OMR, 1944: 





and “representing a logical and inevitable progress from the principal of 
indemnity and individual-employer liability to that of social 
responsibility” (Schweinitz, 1943: 236).  
 Six fundamental principles for social insurance of Beveridge78 
were applied to workmen’s compensation:   
           
Provision for industrial disability should be made as part of a unified 
scheme of social insurance of a contributory character-the benefits 
being paid out of a central fund which would be maintained by 
contributions payable by the employers and workmen and the State, and 
would be administered by a Ministry of Social Security (OMR, 1944: 9). 
 
As with social insurance, the new scheme would apply to everyone under 
a contract of service, with no income limits (Bartrip, 1987: 201). 
Beveridge referred to this thus: “If a workman loses a leg in an accident, 
his needs are the same whether that accident occurred in a factory or in 
the street; if he is killed, the needs of his widow and other dependants are 
the same, however the death occurred” (Beveridge, 1942, para 80).  
 However, the Beveridge Report departed from the general 
principles of social insurance indicated by Beveridge himself with regard 
to flat rates of benefit and flat rate of contribution. Firstly, he was 
prepared to depart from the principle of flat rate benefits in return for 
uniform contributions, and to build into the new workmen’s 
compensation scheme an element of earnings-related benefit in the form 
of an industrial pension which would only become payable should 
incapacity continue beyond 13 weeks, but the amount of which would, 
unlike the disability benefit payable during the first 13 weeks, be 
earnings-related. Secondly, Beveridge was prepared to depart from the 
normal financing of such a scheme by recommending that a special levy 
                                                 
78 The total scheme for social security was to embody six fundamental principles: flat 
rate of subsistence benefit, flat rate of contribution, unification of administrative 
responsibility, adequacy of benefit, comprehensiveness and classification (Beveridge, 





be imposed on employers in hazardous industries, thus, in effect 
depressing the amount of the workers’ contributions (Colwill, 1986: 148). 
 Why then did Beveridge think that “a separate and superior 
scheme for industrial injuries was necessary” (George, 1968: 171) and 
accordingly injured workers should receive higher rate of benefits? 
Because it was a strong case for providing special benefits for industrial 
casualties, both on historical and on other grounds.  
 
In the industries where most of the industrial accidents occur workmen 
are exposed to far greater risks than citizens in the ordinary walks of 
life. In coal mining, for example, in every year one workman out of 
every six engaged in the industry meets with an accident. The 
Government think it reasonable therefore to make special provision for 
industrial casualties, both in disablement and in fatal cases. Further, 
they agree that benefits should not be conditional on payment of a 
minimum number of contributions (OMR, 1944: 13).    
 
From this point of view, this scheme could not be unified with the general 
scheme of social insurance. Rather, it was to be treated as a separate 
branch of social insurance (OMR, 1944, 13). In addition, there was above 
all a long tradition behind a separate scheme for industrial injuries 
(George, 1968: 171) and this historical fact also became a cause of the 
foundation of a separate scheme.  
 With regard to the acquisition of funds for an industrial injuries 
scheme, why did the Report leave out the flat rate of contribution? In 
other words did it receive the pooling of risks with a special levy? 79 
Because outside of the dispute over pooling between the TUC and the 
MFGB, Beveridge took “a middle line”:  
 
                                                 
79 “Nor do I think there would have been much support for Sir William Beveridge’s 
recommendation for a special levy on the hazardous industries. A special levy of that 
kind cuts right across that main idea of a social insurance scheme, which is a pooling of 






It accepts the argument of the MFGB for the pooling of the cost of 
industrial accident and disease. It accepts, as limiting the application of 
this argument, the view of TUC that these risks should remain, in part at 
least, a charge on particular industries or particular employment. In 
detail, ninety per cent, of all cases of industrial accident and disease, 
those causing disability for less than thirteen weeks, will be dealt with in 
exactly the same way as other disability, by a flat rate of benefit. For 
most industries the cost will be met wholly and for the other industries 
to some extent as part of the single security contribution (Beveridge, 
1942, para 95). 
 
As can be seen, the Beveridge Report tried to make compromises between 
trade unions and employers. This shows that the scheme was amenable to 
the politics of compensation.  
 Rather than public acclamation, “there was the almost complete 
absence of any parliamentary contribution in the formulation of social 
policy in the period following the publication of the Beveridge Report” 
(Colwill, 1986: 190).  In parliamentary debates in February 1943 the 
proposals for workmen’s compensation received very little attention. 
Because this issue was part of a grand plan for social security, it was 
carried along with the rest (Brown, 1982: 22). Thus the Report drew up 
an outline of principles, directions and categories of social insurance 
including workmen’s compensation but the substantial contents needed 
time: 
 
“The detailed recommendations of Sir William Beveridge so far as 
workmen’s compensation was concerned were devastatingly 
disappointing. I shall never forget the look of gloom on the face of the 
present Minister of Labour [George Isaacs] when he came to see me 
and discovered that Sir William Beveridge had suggested that the 
industrially injured, for the first 13weeks should be reduced to 24s. a 
week. Nor could I have stood for Sir William Beveridge’s 
recommendation that lump sums [i.e. industrial grants payable on death 
from industrial accident or disease to dependants] should continue to be 
paid in fatal cases. Nor could I have tolerated a retention of the system 
under which compensation is related to earnings. …” (Osbert Peake, 






In terms of the incompleteness of substantial items as well as 
establishment of basic principles, the following processed to introduce 
workmen’s compensation scheme stemmed from the assessment and 
discussion of the Beveridge Report.  
 
White Paper and the Government’s Bill: Substantial Enactment 
 
After the publication of the Beveridge Report, there were many 
committees related to the enactment of workmen’s compensation. For 
example, the following institutions handled the scheme under the 
Coalition Government: the War Cabinet’s Committee on Reconstruction 
Problems, the Official Committee on the Beveridge Report, the 
Committee on Reconstruction Priorities and the Workmen’s 
Compensation Advisory Committee.  
 To get into more detail, as a first concrete response to Beveridge, 
the War Cabinet’s Committee on Reconstruction Problems compiled a list 
of questions for consideration by the senior officials of the relevant 
departments. The officials, sitting as the Official Committee on the 
Beveridge Report, worked with high efficiency between 3 December 
1942 and 9 January 1943. The official analysis of the Beveridge Report 
was laid before the War Cabinet on 14 January 1943. The Cabinet 
decided that “consideration of the Beveridge plan, together with the 
general review of other substantial claims to financial assistance….should 
be remitted” to the Committee on Reconstruction Priorities. The  
Committee on Reconstruction Priorities at their twelfth meeting had 
accepted the scheme in principle, subject to further consideration by the 
Treasury, and had asked that a detailed scheme be submitted. Mr. Hale 
said the Treasury’s view was that this further consideration should be part 
of the work of the present Committee. On 11 February the Committee on 





respects, established the Government’s approach to Beveridge. On 
workmen’s compensation, however, the report observed merely that 
further examination was required (Bartrip, 1987: 194-195) The Home 
Secretary was asked to liaise with the Ministry of Pensions and other 
officials in order to draw up a detailed plan. As a result Workmen’s 
Compensation Advisory Committee was established under the 
chairmanship of Osbert Peake (Bartrip, 1987: 194-198; PIN 8/18, 25 June 
1943: 1).80 
 The Workmen’s Compensation Advisory Committee met for the 
first time on 25 June 1943. 81 During the next few months this part-time 
committee substantially revised the proposals laid before the Committee 
on Reconstruction Priorities by Herbert Morrison. It planned in detail, 
without taking external evidence, what was to become the industrial 
injuries scheme. The committee began its deliberations from the starting 
points of the Beveridge Report and official reactions to it, culminating 
with the Committee on Reconstruction Priorities meeting of 4 June. The 
committee soon accepted the basic Beveridge framework of a 
contributory scheme fully integrated with other social insurance schemes 
but disagreed with his proposals for assessing benefits. In September the 
Home Office drew up a memorandum, based on the Workmen’s 
Compensation Advisory Committee proposals, for submission to the CRP. 
The Home Office accepted that there were certain weaknesses in its plans, 
but expressed a willingness to tolerate these given its advantages. It was 
discussed at the Committee on Reconstruction Priorities meeting on 5 
November. With this proviso the Home Office scheme was accepted.   
                                                 
80 Meanwhile, there were parliamentary debates in February 1943 but little was said 
about workmen’s compensation. Most speakers contented themselves with criticism of 
the Coalition for failing to promise immediate implementation of the Beveridge Report 
(reference to Hansard 386 (16-18 February 1943): 1613-94; 1765-1916; 1964-2054).  
81 Refer to six minutes about internal discussion in WACA: 25 June, 2 July, 9 July, 29 





 The Home Secretary was then requested to put his department to 
work in drawing up a White Paper. A draft was placed before the recently 
created Reconstruction Committee on 16 March 1944 and discussed at the 
meeting of 13 April. After further discussion and revision it was 
submitted to the War Cabinet on 30 June 1944. The White Paper was 
published in late September (Bartrip, 1987: 198-201). 
 As seen in the long–running discussions around workmen’s 
compensation, substantial results were achieved. Therefore, the Paper 
provided a comprehensive solution to the problem of workmen’s 
compensation after the Beveridge Report and the IIA contributed to the 
paper. The White Paper for Social Insurance was separated into two parts.  
Part 1 dealt with the broad plan and Part 2 with a proposed new Industrial 
Injuries Scheme. The Government made it clear that, though it generally 
agreed with the Beveridge Report, it was however, unable to accept some 
of its recommendations (Choudhuri, 1962: 159). 
This Paper confirmed the principle of social insurance based on 
the recommendations of the Beveridge Report: “The general conclusion 
reached by the Government is that the time has come when the present 
system should be replaced by a new scheme, the general structure of 
which should be based on the accepted principles of social insurance” 
(OMR, 1944: 12). In this context, the Government proposed that 
provision for disablement or loss of life from industrial injury should 
become a social service, administered as a separate scheme but under a 
Minister of Social Insurance. Benefits at special rates would be paid from 
a separate insurance fund, to which the employer, workmen and 
Exchequer would be contributors (OMR, 1944: 5).  
 With respect to individual items, for each insured person, rates of 
contribution would be 6d. per week for adult men and 4d. for women, 
shared equally between employers and employees. Contribution from 





contributions would provide five-sixths of the income of the fund, leaving 
one-sixth to be contributed by the Exchequer. Under this arrangement, 
employers and workmen would each contribute five-twelfths of the cost 
and the Exchequer would contribute one-sixth (OMR, 1944: 19-20; 
Bartrip, 1987: 201-201). In regard to industrial injury allowance, the rate 
of allowance was initially 35s. weekly, but if the workman had not 
previously been assessed for pension it would be raised at the end of the 
thirteenth week to the industrial pension rate for 100 per cent disablement 
(OMR, 1944: 22).  
 On the other hand, the hazardous industries levy in the Official 
Committee on the Beveridge Report was rejected on the grounds that it 
would involve administrative complexity and inflict economic harm upon 
weak industries. Thus any possible gains in safety would be outweighed. 
The idea of perpetuating employers’ exclusive financial liability in 
permanent disability cases was rejected since this would conserve aspects 
of the existing system and would, therefore, be unacceptable to organised 
labour (Bartip, 1987: 196): 
 
“We rejected the proposal in the Beveridge Report for a special levy on 
the hazardous industries for two reasons, …. First of all, the more I 
thought about it, the more I came to the conclusion that it was wrong to 
put an additional, special burden on the hazardous industries. Some of 
them, including mining, are not easy industries, and to place an 
additional burden on them would be wrong … They are hazardous 
because of the nature of the industry, and not necessarily because of the 
particular carelessness of the people engaged in them. Secondly, I 
thought it right to have a complete pooling of risks, and that is why we 
have widened the scope of the people covered. The scheme is 
comprehensive; it applies to everybody over school-leaving age working 
under a concentrate of service or apprenticeship, and that should be 
remembered in relation to the financial basis of the scheme. It will 
provide sources of income which are much wider, and cover many more 
people, than before. That will improve the financial basis of the 






In summary the White Paper on workmen’s compensation was basically 
in line with the Beveridge Report: “the Government agree with the 
proposals in the Report that the new scheme should be comprehensive in 
scope-that is, that broadly speaking it should apply to all persons working 
under a contract of service including non-manual workers without any 
income limit; that the cost should be borne by a central fund maintained 
by contributions from employers and workmen, with a contribution from 
the Exchequer; that claims should be dealt with by administrative rather 
than legal procedure; and that the responsibility for the general 
administration and supervision of the working of the scheme should rest 
on the authority responsible for the general scheme of social insurance” 
(OMR, 1944: 13).    
 However, despite a general adherence to Beveridge’s analysis 
and recommendations, four of his main proposals were excluded from the 
White Paper because they constituted ‘unwarranted departures from the 
generally accepted principles of social insurance’, or because they 
threatened to perpetuate unsatisfactory features of the existing system, or 
because they would give rise to new difficulties. The rejected ideas were: 
“Limitation of special rates of benefit to cases lasting more than thirteen 
weeks; Earnings related benefits; Lump sum payments in fatal cases; a 
special levy on employers in hazardous industries (Bartrip, 1987, 202; 
OMR, 1944: 13).            
 The White Paper’s publication was greeted with a chorus of 
approval. Home Secretary Morrison, when introducing the White Paper in 
the House of Commons, pointed out that “the main and truly 
revolutionary feature of the new scheme is that, for the first time, it 
transfers to the community as a whole the responsibility for the casualties 
of industry” (Hansard 404, 1944: 1393). The newspapers also supported 






By creating a new social service, by removing it from court 
administration, by putting an end to lump sum settlements, by 
abandoning the relation of compensation to loss of earnings, the 
Government are making a clean sweep of a system which has served its 
time and has become a source of perpetual friction between employers 
and workers. The new system will cut away an immense undergrowth of 
anxieties, temptations, and causes of needless dispute, and will clear the 
ground for a new and constructive approach in the treatment of 
industrial casualties. In future it will be possible as never in the past to 
free the injured worker’s mind from obsession with ill-health, grievance 
and financial insecurity for the more helpful task of getting well for 
useful work (The Times 28 September).  
 
The Labour Party of course welcomed “the Government’s acceptance of 
the need for a completely new basis for Workmen’s compensation, and 
the proposal for eliminating legal processes and business insurance 
interests with now exist” (Labour Party, 1944: 6; (PIN 21/1, 7 November, 
1944: 1). The TUC was of this position: “Mr Allen said the Trade Union 
Movement was thinking in terms of the whole Scheme and much would 
depend on the form of the Bill” (PIN 21/1, 22 December 1944: 1).  
 However, both parties did not hide their antipathies. First of all, 
the rate of benefit (35s. weekly for the first 13 weeks) was criticized: “we 
are seriously concerned about the inadequacy of the benefits and are 
convinced (a) that the general level of benefits should be raised, (b) that 
they should be payable from the first day, and (c) that adequate medical 
services should be provided for the injured workman with all necessary 
treatment, rehabilitation, training, and resettlement” (Labour Party, 1944: 
6). Also, the TUC was not satisfied with the rate of contribution as 
compared to the rate of benefit: “Noting that it was financially no more 
generous that workmen’s compensation, the TUC stated that tripartite 
funding would only be acceptable to the movement if it yielded 
substantially improved benefits payable after less delay … we think it 
ought to be agreed to provide a fair return to the workman for the 





it was suggested that the employer’s contributions should be doubled to 
6d. per week” (Bartrip, 1987: 204).  
After the publication of the , there were parliamentary debates 
about workmen’s compensation (24 October 1944 - 28 November 1944). 
Peake said that Parliament had generally been favourable to the Scheme 
in Part II (PIN 21/1, 22 December 1944: 1). Likewise, despite some 
criticism, the debate was almost unanimous in its desire to set workmen’s 
compensation on an entirely new footing and to get reforming legislation 
on the statute book, together with the decision to link the new Industrial 
Injuries Scheme with the much larger general Social Insurance Scheme 
which commanded widespread support (Brown, 1982: 24). 
 Through discussion Churchill’s Caretaker Government 
transformed the White Paper into its National Insurance (Industrial 
Injuries) Bill on 6 June 1945. Two minor concessions in the Bill were 
conducted: industrial injury allowance was increased from 35s. to 40s. per 
week, and the dependant’s allowance was increased from 8/9d to 16/- to 
bring it into line with allowances under the general social security scheme 
(Colwill, 1986: 229). As seen, the Bill diverged little from the principles 
laid down in the White Paper. However, the Bill was at once halted by the 
announcement of the general election and dissolution of parliament.  
 
Legislation under the Labour Government 
 
The final examination of IIA (1946) was conducted after the 1945 general 
election which the Labour government won with a landslide 
parliamentary majority by gaining 393 of the 640 parliamentary seats. 
Shortly after taking power, the government began its own deliberations 
on the question of the reform of workmen’s compensation, referring it to 
the newly established Social Services Committee, a sub-committee of the 





where a decision in principle was taken to enact the Bill inherited from 
the Coalition Government “substantially as it was”. On 23 August, 
Labour Government introduced its own proposal, the IIB, with some 
minor modifications. This was, therefore, one of the first major legislative 
efforts of the first Labour Government ever to assume office with a clear 
mandate (Bartrip, 1987: 209; Choudhuri, 1962: 160). On 22 February 
1946, the Bill completed its passage through the Commons and finally 
received the Royal Assent. The Act took effect in 5 July 1948.  
 Meanwhile, the Second Reading debate on the National 
Insurance (II) Bill took place in the House of Commons on 10 and 11 
October 1945, and there were discussions in the Standing Committee 
from 30 October to 13 December 1945.  
 During these processes, there was an interesting event82 - the rate 
of benefit in industrial injury was raised from the 40s. originally proposed 
in the Labour Government Bill to 45s. How was the change explained? A 
clue lay in the statement of Osbert Peake (Leeds, North): 
  
“The original Bill published by the Coalition Government provided a 
basic rate of benefit of 40s. On 12
th
 September the TUC met at 
Blackpool and the Prime Minister made the journey there to address it. 
Before he arrived on the scene, as I understand it, there was a 
discussion on the IIB and strong views were expressed that the basic 
benefits ought to be increased. Nevertheless, when the Bill was printed 
on, I think, 19
th
 September, the previous rates were incorporated in it, 
and now on the Second Reading, rather to my surprise, the Minister 
announced that the basic rate of benefit was to be increased from 40s. to 
45s.” (Hansard 414, 1945: 291).  
 
                                                 
82 In the moving that the Bill be read a second time, Griffiths proposed two 
significant changes to his original measure, both of which were aimed at 
appeasing the trade unions. One was for increases in the basic rates of injury 
benefit and disablement pension; the other was to allow the worker to claim a 25 
per cent addition to his medical board assessment (providing the overall 
assessment did not thereby exceed 100 per cent) if he could demonstrate 
inability to follow his previous occupation or to be retrained to follow an 





In actual, the testimony of the Member of Pariament was found to be true 
with the description of Pelling (1984, 99-100):  
 
Greenwood promised to meet a TUC deputation and ‘explain to them 
the position’. When he did so, however, he was bluntly told that ‘if the 
Bill were not to meet substantial opposition from the Government side, 
some concessions would have to be made’. He persuaded them to 
compromise on the basis of an increase of the maximum to 45s. per 
week, instead of the 55s. which they had been demanding. Greenwood 
was also obliged to recognise the need for special concessions for the 
‘partially incapacitated persons whose injuries made it impossible for 
them to resume their former employment’. Here the extreme case was 
that of the ‘compositor’s finger’, which would prevent a printer from 
following his accustomed occupation. It was agreed that a concession 
should be made to the extent of 25 per cent of the flat rate, that is, to 
begin with, 11s. 3d. Greenwood referred to these two changes in his 
speech winding up the Second reading debate on 11 October (Pelling, 
1984: 99-100). 
 
As mentioned above, there were some changes83 including rate of benefit 
but the Labour Party bill was, in all major respects, identical to that 
introduced two months earlier, as Boyd who was a deputation from the 
British Employers’ Confederation stated:  
 
“New Bill relating to Industrial Injuries, which was to be read a second 
time in the House of Commons next October, would be on the same lines 
as the one introduced by The Coalition Government” (PIN 21/68, BEC, 
31 August 1945: 2). 
 
In certain respects, however, the bill was somewhat more liberal and 
generous to the beneficiaries than its predecessor. Thus, the serious and 
wilful misconduct clause had been watered down, pensions were to be 
higher and artificial limbs and other appliances were to be supplied to the 
injured free of charge or at much reduced prices (Bartrip, 1987: 209).  
                                                 
83 In course of the consideration of the Bill, a few other important amendments were 
also made raising the rates of basic benefits and introducing a new allowance, a Special 
Hardship allowance, and it received Royal Assent on 26th July, 1946, in the form of the 
National Insurance (II) Act of 1946 which came into effect on the 5th of July, 1948 





 In regard to individual points at issue, the proposed contribution 
figure contained in the Bill was 4d. from the employer and 4d. from the 
worker. It was far removed from the hope that “the contribution should be 
6d. from the employer and 3d. from the employee” (NUM, 1945: 620; 
TUC, “National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Bill”, 1). On the other 
hand, 45s, rate of industrial injury, also did not meet the demand of trade 
unions: 55s.   
 When the Bill was published in August 1945, trade unions stated 
that “it was substantially the same as the Bill with the same title 
introduced in June, 1945” (NUM, 1945: 648). Nevertheless, the TUC 
assessed IIA (1946) from a very positive perspective: “the new system 
embodies a number of the fundamental changes advocated by the trade 
union movement for many years” (TUC, 1949: 1). 84 On the other hand, 
the welcome given to the Bill was echoed throughout the Conservative 
benches and was expressed in very much the same terms. 
 
 
                                                 
84 According to the evaluations of the TUC, there were six big changes in the act as 
compared with the old system of workmen’s compensation (TUC, 1949: 4-7) 
summarized thusly: a state fund, employees now contribute, no more court cases, equal 









‘In 1970, the NUM was considerably embarrassed when another trade 
union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, successfully fought a case 
for damages for a pneumoconiotic ex-miner, obtaining an out-of-court 
settlement of £7,500. Stanley Pickles had worked at an NCB pit in 
Durham from 1947 to 1960, then left and became a lathe operator. In 
1966 he was certified as suffering from pneumoconiosis (actually silicosis 
and tuberculosis), and the Amalgamated Engineering Union supported his 
common law case for damages against the NCB. The pit where he had 
worked had subsequently closed and the records had been lost, a situation 
which somewhat undermined the defence of the NCB in the case. The 
settlement in February 1970 was widely publicized in the press and 
created a furore within the NUM, with some members bitterly criticizing 
the union for not pursuing similar claims earlier. Albeit belatedly, the 
NUM encouraged and approved the fighting of such cases by the Areas’ 
(McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 225-226). Since the case of Stanley Pickles, 
trade unions had actively backed up litigation of miners with 
pneumoconiosis based on common law. However, this resulted in a major 
responsibility to everyone in this area.  
 In the case of pneumoconiosis patients, “if individuals have to 
take their cases through the courts the legal expenses will be heavy and 
                                                 
85 There are different names for the scheme which was established in 1974 for resolving 
the pneumoconiosis problem, for example, “the 1974 Pneumoconiosis Benefit Scheme” 
(McIvor and Johnston, 2007), “NCB Pneumoconiosis Compensation Scheme” (NCB, 
1975), “Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis Scheme” (NUM, 2005), “Pneumoconiosis 
Compensation Scheme 1974” (Lewis, 2005), “Pneumoconiosis Compensation Scheme” 
(Hansard Vol. 872). This paper will use the term, “CWPS 1974” or just “CWPS” for the 
scheme because it is thought that the term relatively presents sufferers or beneficiaries 
and objects of the scheme, as can be imagined in the term as ‘a scheme for 





the time taken will be long. Some of the present sufferers may not be able 
to mount all the evidence required and some may not survive to hear the 
result of their cases” (DOE, 1974b: 13-14). NUM had this to say about 
individual difficulties:  
 
Because litigation was costly and protracted many of the 39,000 
pneumoconiotics may well have died before their cases were heard 
(COAL 31/167, Milles and Grant, pp. 2-3); Another aspect we are 
concerned about is the mental and physical effect of prolonged court 
cases on claimants and witnesses particularly where they are in the 
older age groups and suffering from a high degree of disablement 
(COAL 96/19, NUM, IRF (CIE) 8: 1). 
 
In the case of trade unions which had supported plaintiffs’ court costs, a 
large litigation burden was felt: ‘In the North West Division alone, the 
estimated expenditure by January 1971 had reached £41,000. By mid-
1971, around a thousand cases had been submitted or were in the process 
of submission to the solicitors. The union agreed to pursue 134 of these 
cases in which certification was after 1 January 1960, in order to 
maximize the chances of success and build up favourable legal precedent. 
As the volume of claims grew to reach 4,000, the NUM changed tack and 
approached the government to lobby for a universal lump sum 
compensation scheme for pneumoconiotics in lieu of legal action’ 
(McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 226-227). As a result, a new level of CWP 
compensation occurred with the social contract in 1974. 
 The CWPS in 1974 has been recognized as ‘a product of the 
social contract in the mining industry. The social contract was conducted 
on an industrial level and the relevant actors within this were the trade 
unions concerned, especially the NUM, the government and the NCB. In 
other words, the contract was different from a social contract at national 
level between the government, TUC and the Confederation of British 
Industry. From the title of the scheme, it can also be inferred that the 





pneumoconiosis, and the political debate surrounding it can accordingly 
be characterized as compensation politics.     
 The official body overseeing this social contract and the 
compensation politics was the Steering Committee and Working Group 
on Industrial Relations Framework under a tripartite committee named 
the Coal Industrial Examination (CIE). Therefore, in this section, the 
political and economic background of the CIE will first of all be 
discussed and then the compensation politics around pneumoconiosis in 
the CIE will be described. The work of the Examination can be traced in 
official paper now released by the National Archives. 
 
 
Coal Industry Examination and Social Contract in Mining Industry 
 
Coal Industry Examination: Formation, Activity and Identification 
 
Due to the ambiguity of the name CIE86, the body more often tends to be 
called the Tripartite Examination. The purpose and characteristics of the 
body in both titles can be inferred as ‘the tripartite body for examination 
and settlement of problems existing in the mining industry’.  
 Regarding the structure of organization, the CIE was designed to 
comprise two levels of the Steering Committee on a plenary basis and 
three agenda sub-committees named Working Groups. While the Steering 
Committee, as the most important unit within the CIE, was responsible 
for final discussions and compromises, the Working Groups covered 
specific subjects such as the coal industry in line with their own purpose 
of discussing each different topic. More specifically, the Working Group 
                                                 
86 Gormley, who was a participant on behalf of miners as the president of NUM, told as 
follows: “It was called ‘The Coal Industry Examination’, a stuffy name and quite a 






on Supply and Demand concentrated on subjects such as energy supply, 
coal demand, coal output, future programme etc. (DOE, 1974b, 6-13; 
1974a, 7-18); the Working Group on Industrial Relations Framework 
tried to discuss pneumoconiosis, pensions, industrial democracy, 
productivity (DOE, 1974b: 17-18; 1974a: 17-18); and the Working Group 
on Research and Development researched two fields of coal production 
and utilization (DOE, 1974b: 15-16; 1974a: 19-23). Of these sub-
committees under the CIE, in particular, the Working Group on Industrial 
Relations Framework (WGIRF) 87 is a main object of interest for this 
thesis. This is because, as can be supposed in the title of the body, the 
WGIRF had tried to directly handle the pneumoconiosis issue.  
 The Tripartite Examination was set up by the Labour government 
after it won the election in February 1974. In March, the new Secretary of 
State for Energy, Eric Varley, announced in Parliament that he intended 
to invite the NCB and the unions concerned to join with the government 
in a comprehensive examination of the coal industry (COAL 30/250). As 
a result the first meeting of the Steering Committee was held on 10 April 
and the body agreed that working groups should be set up to deal with 
particular subjects. At the second meeting of the Steering Committee (30 
April 1974) the plan of the first meeting about establishment of sub-
committees was confirmed and realized.  
 The CIE worked for about six months up to September 1974. In 
that period, the Steering Committee held five meetings, on the 10th and 
30th of April, the 5th and 14th of June and 9th of September while the 
working groups organized several meetings each. As a result of various 
discussions, and the Interim Report and Final Report were produced. The 
                                                 
87 The committee was called the Working Group on Industrial Relations or the Working 
Group on Industrial Relation Framework. This paper will use the latter as an official title 
and WGIRF as an abbreviation of the committee because papers which were published 
by this committee had been transcribed as IRF and minutes of this committee were 





Interim Report was published in June 1974 and welcomed by all sides. It 
revealed that there was already a principal agreement between 
participants. On the other hand, the CIE continued its activities and came 
up with the Final Report which was published just three months after the 
Interim Report. “The Final Report records the progress of this work and 
deals in greater detail with some of the matters which could be handled in 
the Interim Report only in a rather cursory fashion” (DOE, 1974b, 7). 
 As can be deduced from its name, ‘Coal Industry Examination, 
the main purpose of the body was to examine the utility of coal as an 
energy source and the overall mining industry in light of “the first of the 
so-called ‘oil shocks’ in 1973-4, with the price of oil rising roughly 
eightfold between 1973 and 1979” (Bromley, 1992: 105):  
 
Our terms of reference are: To consider and advise on the contribution 
which coal can best make to the country’s energy requirements and the 
steps needed to secure that contribution”(DOE, 1974b: 5; 1974a: 3).  
 
Likewise, there is no doubt that it was a main objective of the committee 
“to join with the Department in a study of the contribution which coal 
could make to the country’s energy requirements” (FV 38/297, 1974). In 
other words, the main objective of the tripartite talks was to solve the 
energy issue rather than those related to employment, wages or the 
welfare of miners. Varley had repeatedly stressed this point in 
parliamentary debates:  
 
“The tripartite examination will not be examining future wage levels 
within the mining industry (Hansard 872, 1974: 754); We should talk 
about the economic contribution that coal can make to overall energy 
resources rather than get down to detailed wage negotiations. That is 
not the role of this examination” (Hansard 872, 1974: 755). 
 
It can be supposed that the main issue was the energy, as can be seen in 
the fact that the Minister for Energy chaired the CIE. This does not, of 





agenda examined issues at national level, as Varley informs us: 
“Opposition Members will have noted the work that is being undertaken 
by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment and the 
consultations he is having with the TUC” (Hansard 872: 1974).    
 As can be understood in the title of ’the Tripartite Examination’, 
without doubt, the CIE was recognized as a body of social dialogue in the 
industrial relations of the mining industry. This means that there were 
three representatives in the body from the government, the trade unions 
and employers. 88 In the case of the government, there were officials 
from government ministries such as the Treasury, the Department of 
Employment and the Department Of Energy. Eric Varley chaired the 
Tripartite Examination. He was also an MP sponsored by the NUM. He 
was born in a mining town and he, his brother and sister followed their 
father and grandfather into the mining profession (Eric Graham Varley, 
Interview AUD/58)). In this respect, he seemed to understand the NUM 
and mining problems and, accordingly, be a well suited man to supervise 
the social contract.  
                                                 
88 The members of Steering Committee in CIE from the government, NCB and the 
Trade Unions were as follows(DOE, 1974b: 5): 
government-three members 
  Mr. Joel Barnett, MP: Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
  Mr. Albert Booth, MP: Minister of State, Department of Employment 
  Mr. Alex Eadie, MP: Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Energy 
National Coal Board-three members 
Mr. D. J. Ezra: Chairman 
  Mr. L. Siddall: Deputy Chairman 
  Mr. D. M. Clement: Finance member 
National Union of Mineworkers-three members 
  Mr. J. Gormley: President 
  Mr. L. Daly: General Secretary 
  Mr. M. McGahey: Vice-President 
National Association of Colliery Overmen Deputies and Shotfires-two members 
  Mr. L. Wormald: President 
  Mr. A. E. Simpson: General Secretary 
British Association of Colliery Management-two members 
  Mr. N. Schofield: President 





 Meanwhile, there were three unions working on behalf of 
different strata of mineworkers: the NUM for rank and file workers, the 
National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers 
(hereafter NACODS) who represented colliery deputies and under-
officials and the British Association of Colliery Management (BACM) 
who represented colliery officials and staff. However, the NUM was 
preferred by the government because its numbers and influence were 
greater than the other unions and the majority of the sufferers from 
pneumoconiosis were also members of the NUM.  
 An organization representing the interests of employers was the 
NCB. However, it should be noted that the NCB was owned by the 
government as a statutory corporation after nationalisation in 1947. 
Therefore, it is natural to recognize that the final decision was made by 
the government rather than the NCB independently. To sum up, the 
government and the NUM were the main actors sitting down at the 
negotiating table. 
 As has been discussed above, the CIE can mainly be 
characterized as an organization standing for dialogue which assists the 
smooth operation of the social contract. Meanwhile, the social contract, 
that is a compromise or policy-making, seems to be reached not by 
majority rule but by mutual consent. As can be recognized in the 
composition of the members in the Steering Committee (refer to footnote 
4), there was an imbalance in the ratio of committee members among the 
government, the NCB and the unions (government: NCB: Unions = 3: 3: 
7). What this means is basically that the CIE was a joint consulting body 
rather than a decision-making body but if there was any decision, it 
should have been made unanimously.  
From the structure of the body, what is noted is that the CIE was a 
kind of pan-government task force. This can be proved in the light of the 





bodies under the CIE: the Steering Committee under Varley’s 
chairmanship and Working Groups under the chairmen from the 
government: Research and Development (Alex Eadie, Secretary of State, 
Department Of Energy); Industrial Relations Framework (Albert Booth, 
Minister of State for Employment); and Supply and Demand (B. G. 
Tucker, Deputy Secretary of State for Energy). Furthermore, the 
government led compromises at the head and regulated different interests 
in the background by taking charge of administration, acting for the NCB 
and conducting direct negotiation. Varley states: 
 
“[My task was] Setting up the tripartite organization, everybody was 
willing to do it. I remember having separate meetings with NUM, 
NACODS, BACM, NCB, themselves, bringing them all together in a 
massive conference room in the Department of Energy and deciding 
how we were going to restore confidence in this industry” (Eric Graham 
Varley, Interview AUD/58). 
 
Meanwhile, it would seem strange if just the unions and the NCB 
intended to reach an agreement in establishing a scheme for 
pneumoconiosis. Alex Eadie, the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, 
said:  
 
“The Pneumoconiosis Compensation Scheme is a coal industry scheme 
which has been negotiated between the mining unions and the NCB. It is 
not for the Government to amend it. As I and my right hon. Friend 
emphasized in the debate on the Second Reading of the Coal Industry 
Bill last week, what the Government are doing is to provide a grant of 
up to £100 million towards the costs of the scheme” (Hansard 887, 
1975: 6-7).  
 
Despite several statements made during the parliamentary debate, it is 
difficult to accept the views of ministers such as Eadie and Varley. This is 
because the government was always operating from behind the NCB. For 
instance, “the government has authorized the board to enter into talks 





the government, £100 million, was ‘a most generous donation towards the 
scheme’ which enabled the unions and the NCB to make an agreement 
(Hansard 887, 1975: 7). In particular, most of the discussion had 
happened not outside but inside the CIE.  
 Although seemingly the CWPS was a creation of the unions and 
the NCB without the government’s influence, it was in fact an agreement 
between both partners under pressure from the government, and it is more 
accurate to say that the scheme was a compromise between the 
government and the unions. Nevertheless, why had the government 
asserted that “the pneumoconiosis compensation scheme was not a 
statutory scheme but was agreed between the NCB and the mining 
unions” (Hansard 894, 1975: 999)?  This could be explained in the 
context of expenses and equality. If the CWPS became a statutory scheme 
it might raise the question of equality with other industry sectors and put 
the government to huge expense, so it seems that the government stressed 
the position of CWPS.    
 
Social Contract in Mining Industry 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the reports of the CIE were a symbol of 
the social contract in the mining industry while ‘the Economic Policy and 
the Cost of Living’ in 1973 and ‘the Labour Manifesto for the October 
1974 Election’89 were social agreements at national level. This part tries 
to answer the following questions: What is then the reason that the work 
of CIE can be understood as a social contract in the mining industry? 
Why was the social contract, especially in the mining industry, ‘actively’ 
and ‘quickly’ concluded?  
                                                 
89 The manifesto declared that “at the heart of this manifesto and our programme to save 
the nation lies the Social Contract between the Labour party and the trade unions” 





 To answer the first question, the social contract operating on a 
national level must first of all be examined. Political power turned from 
the Conservative Party to Labour in the general election of February 1974. 
The former ruling party, the Conservatives, did not intend to make any 
compromises with the trade unions. 90 Rather, the government stood firm 
in its opposition to trade unions and this attitude  led to the 
Conservatives declaring a war on the unions as is evidenced by its 
election slogan, ‘Who governs?’ 91 On the contrary, Labour had worked 
with the unions before the 1974 general election and had created a social 
contract before taking political power. “The basis for this Social Contract 
was set out in the TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee Report on 
‘Economic Policy and the Cost of Living’ which was published in 
February 1973. This report promised action by a Labour Government on a 
wide range of issues including food subsidies, stricter control of prices 
and rents, improvements in pensions, the redistribution of income and 
wealth and the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act” (COAL 96/19, 
Milles, IRF (CIE) 2): 1). 92 Labour also applied this attitude to the 
mining industry: “The Labour Party appealed to the government of the 
Conservative to carry out a tripartite enquiry of Government, unions and 
                                                 
90 In terms of CWPS, “the Conservative government also refused to countenance any 
such scheme unless the NUM accepted its wages policy. This delayed settlement 
somewhat, until the Conservatives lost the election in February 1974. The new Labour 
government was much more sympathetic, and a quite unique pneumoconiosis 
compensation scheme was thrashed out in 1974” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 226-227). 
91 “The electorate’s answer was ambiguous. The Labour Party won 301 seats with 
11,646,391 votes, whilst 11,872,180 votes yielded the Conservative Party 297 seats. In 
other words, Labour won four more seats than the Conservatives, yet polled almost 
million fewer votes” (Dorey, 1995: 126).  
92 Actually, the appointment of the government was fulfilled soon after coming into 
power.  “In full consultation with the TUC and others concerned the Government has 
now taken or announced measures on all these issues: subsidies on basic foods, stricter 
price controls, a freeze on all rents, pensions of £10 a week for a single person and £16 
for a married couple with future increases linked to wage increases, redistribution of the 
tax burden and plans for a wealth tax, and the repeal of the IR Act”( COAL 96/19, 





NCB, into the industry and the attitude repeat in the 1974 Election 
Manifesto” (Varley, ‘Forward’, in DOE, 1974b: 1).  
 Against this background, soon after Labour attained power, the 
social contract was tried at an industrial level as well as at a national 
level: 
 
After the return of the Labour government to office, one of my first 
actions as Secretary of State was to hold meetings with the NCB, the 
NUM, NACODS and BACM and invite them to join in a full-scale 
Examination of the industry. All these bodies welcomed the proposal 
and readily agreed to take full part in such an Examination under my 
chairmanship (Varley Secretary, ‘Forward’, in DOE, 1974b: 1). 
 
The CIE can be seen as the realization at an industrial level of the social 
contract at a national level. Therefore, the processes and results of the 
social contract at both levels impacted upon one another. The government 
submitted at the first meeting of the WGIRF a paper, ‘Industrial Relations 
Framework (CIE) 2: Industrial Relations Framework - The National 
Context’, which summarized the social contract at the national level 
between the government, the TUC and the CIB. The discussion within the 
CIE had proceeded with the paper in mind. The CIE came to be a version 
of the social contract at a national level except specifically for the mining 
industry. Regarding this, Booth, the chairman of the WGIRF, stated:   
 
The government’s talks with the TUC and the Confederation of British 
Industry about a voluntary incomes policy would be going on in parallel 
with the Examination. It would be helpful to feed the experience of the 
coal industry into the general discussions so that there would be no 
serious conflict or overlapping (LAB 112/73/1, Coal Division of DOE: 
8). 
 
As discussed above, the CIE actually started this discussion of the 
national social contract: “The Examination had necessarily to take into 
account the talks which were currently taking place between the 





a wide range of subjects including a number relevant to the social contract 
between the government and the TUC” (CIE, 1974b, 13). The NUM also 
started discussions about the accepting the TUC’s outlook. More 
specifically, “while the NUM accepted the TUC’s views that real incomes 
should be protected against rises in the cost of living and that regard 
should be paid to remit costs they wished to place on record their concern 
to advance their position, not merely to protect it. They also wish to place 
on record the unions’ aim to return to a 1 November operative date” 
(LAB 112/73/1 NUM: 2). 
 Likewise, the social contract with the mining industry was 
conducted in accordance with the social contract at a national level. Then, 
what was the reason for the social contract to be developed across the 
whole of the mining industry? There were three dimensions to the 
answer: economic, political and industrial relations-based. 
 The oil crisis of 1973-4 led to a rethink of the role of coal in the 
national economy. In that period, “the recent sharp increase in oil prices 
has significantly changed the situation. On a basis of commercial pricing 
the coal industry has now the capability for the first time for many years 
to bear its full current production costs and still compete overall with oil” 
(DOE, 1974b, 6). The reassessment of coal during the energy crisis led to 
seeking a social contract:   
 
Despite the uncertainties of the future the Examination is trying to reach 
some clear views about the appropriate role for the United Kingdom 
coal industry in the country’s energy economy, assess the means by 
which coal can hold its competitive position in the longer term, and 
establish how the industry’s development can best be planned so as to 
contribute to the greatest and most equitable extent to the needs and 
welfare of consumers, coal miners and the coal industry, and the nation 






The 1974 general election was also a reason why a social contract with 
the NUM was considered. 93  Labour  recognized the contribution of 
trade unions to the election victory and the necessity of their support in 
the coming election in October in order to overcome “a minority 
administration which was 34 seats short of an overall majority in the 
House of Commons” (Dorey, 1995: 127). For this, it was necessary to 
gain support from the NUM which was one of the biggest unions and 
certainly the most militant. Taylor (2005) identified the NUM as “the 
trade union that ‘could bring down governments’” (111) and asserts that 
“the government’s objective was to keep the materially and symbolically 
important NUM supporting its pay policy and the mineworkers digging 
coal …  in order to be successful in Labour’s Social Contract” (112).     
 More evidence that the social contract was made because 
electoral considerations lies with the timing of publication of the Final 
Report. One of objectives of the social contract was to offer full support 
to miners in the coming election. Therefore, it is natural that the 
government took into consideration whether the publication of the Report 
was more favourable to the government in the election when the Final 
Report was completed in September:    
 
We have now completed the work of the CIE and a draft Final Report, of 
which I attach a copy, has been circulated to the other members of the 
Examination and to interested Departments, with a ready for 
publication on September 26
th
. … We must now decide on the timing of 
publication in relation to the Election. … If this looks favourable, we 
should then publish in the week beginning September 30; if it looks 
unfavourable, I believe we should delay publication until after the 
Election and I am sure I could get Joe Gormley and Derek Ezra to agree 
(LAB 112/73/2, Secretary of State for Energy:1, 1, 4). 
 
                                                 
93 “Labour Party tried to trade off between an improved ‘social wage’ and the 
concomitant exercise of voluntary pay restraint by the unions and this became to 
be the very basis of the Social Contract. This was supposed to prove to the 
electorate that only a Labour government could work constructively and co-





On the other hand, industrial relations in the mining industry at that time 
should also be considered when trying to understand the introduction of 
CIE. That is to say, miners had been striking over Conservative policies 
in the early 1970s and the Labour Party had promised trade unions “as 
part of the settlement of the strike – a wide-ranging and long-term review 
of the Coal Industry.” In reply to this, Gormley, president of NUM held 
that: “It [fulfilment of the promise] was decidedly overdue, and 
something for which we had pressed for years” (Gormley, 1982: 146). 
As has been examined, the new Labour government could not 
help rushing to install a social contract with the unions because of reasons 
of political expediency, economics and industrial relations. In particular, 
the oil crisis and the coming general election make were factors 
contributing to the government ‘actively and ‘quickly’ trying to make an 
agreement with the unions.   
 
 
Pneumoconiosis Issue: Advent, Position and Points at issue 
 
As previously discussed, because the CIE was basically an organization 
set up to cope with the energy crisis, pneumoconiosis never became a 
main issue of discussion. Pneumoconiosis was just one of many agenda 
items even at the relevant sub-committee. 94  However, unlike the 
outward appearance, the issue was relatively very important to the 
Tripartite Examination as well as to the WGIRF. The chairman of the 
body, Varley, bore testimony as follows: 
 
                                                 
94 In addition to the pneumoconiosis issue, the point at issue in the NUM was whether a 
national incentive scheme would be introduced. Accordingly, Gormley expressed it as 
the “battle over a national incentive scheme” and most of his autobiography gave a lot of 





“There were two tasks [in the CIE]. First of all, [it is] getting the 
investment going again in this industry. Fortunately, the Coal Board 
had done and worked for them themselves. Derek Ezra and the staff of 
the Coal Board had brought forward their plan for coal. … There are 
the other things which give me the most pride that was establishment of 
the pneumoconiosis compensation scheme. I told during the tripartite 
examinations’ discussions there were 34,000 ex-serving miners who 
suffering from the pneumoconiosis, [and] they had no chance of getting 
compensation through the court” (Eric Graham Varley, Interview 
AUD/58). 
 
As mentioned above, participants had actually put pneumoconiosis at the 
centre of discussion in the CIE. Why was pneumoconiosis such a hot 
issue? The interest in and efforts made by trade unions on the issue is the 
main reason. Trade unions had fought for compensation for occupational 
diseases as well as for occupational safety. In this context, 
pneumoconiosis compensation had been demanded by trade unions for a 
long time. In particular, the NUM tended to concentrate on the prevention 
of and compensation for occupational diseases due to causes such as dust-
related working conditions, and underground work.95: “The NUM is still a 
proud union and has successfully recovered billions of pounds in damages 
for the injuries and ill health suffered by mineworkers over the years. As 
well as for injuries sustained at work, compensation has been recovered 
for industrial diseases such Bronchitis and emphysema, Industrial 
Deafness and Vibration White Finger. The NUM organisation in mining 
communities throughout the country has continued to provide a first class 
service long after the local coalmines have gone” (NUM, 2007).  
A more powerful reason is that the institution had placed a big 
burden on the actors concerned. The government and the NCB had also 
                                                 
95 It is also true that there are controversies in the role of NUM in activities of 
occupational safety and health. Some scholars maintained that “the reluctance of miners’ 
trade unions to take industrial action over dangerous and unhealthy working conditions 
is reflected in the almost invisibility of the topic in labour history and trade union history 
texts” (McIver and Johnston, 2007, 24). On the contrary, some scholars and trade unions 





felt the same problem with the trade unions and sufferers. The concerns 
of the government are discussed by Varley:  
 
“On the question of pneumoconiosis, our top priority will be given to 
existing sufferers. This is right. If we were to do nothing, we should have 
the spectacle of the NUM and the other mining unions trying to fight 
claims through the courts. The union has plans to take four cases to the 
courts later this year. They could probably get about 3,000 cases 
through the courts in the next few years, but many of the 39,000 would 
receive no benefit at all, and top priority must be given to them” 
(Hansard 875, 1974: 230). 
“Fortunately the incidence of new cases of pneumoconiosis has greatly 
diminished over the years, but there is a tragic legacy from the past of 
some 39,000 registered sufferers from the disease. A small number of 
cases are being pursued at common law against the National Coal 
Board” (DOE, 1974b: 13).  
 
The ‘small number of cases’ above refers to the four test cases from the 
Durham area heard on the 7th October 1974. Common law damages for 
pneumoconiosis were being sought. However, there are still 39,000 
sufferers and the NCB might accordingly anticipate that the litigations 
will continue ceaselessly, as intimated in this the statement from the 
NUM: “We estimate that another 3000 cases are at present in various 
stages of the legal process eagerly awaiting the result of the test cases; it 
is also worth nothing that since the Pickles settlement in January 1970 we 
estimate that some 1500 have died from the disease and a further 2900 
new cases have been diagnosed as having the disease” (COAL 96/19, 
NUM, IRF (CIE) 8: 1).  
 As can be seen above, the current and coming litigation had been 
and would be a big burden to all the parties. 96 In other words, the 
introduction of the CWPS can be explained as a convergence of the 
interests and relations between participants. This can be elucidated in 
                                                 
96 The lawsuits also weighed down individual mineworkers and trade unions. According 
to all the actors concerned “the new deal on pneumoconiosis was aimed at cutting 
through expensive and time-consuming legal procedures and producing a speedy and 





accordance with the huge social expenses and the long-term period for 
litigation to all the actors. In addition, the biggest problem was in the 
wrong use of finance as the assertion of NUM would have it: “NCB could 
well be faced with spending large amounts of public funds on litigation, a 
large proportion of which would only benefit the legal profession, rather 
than our members [mineworkers]” (COAL 96/19, NUM, IRF (CIE) 8: 1).  
 Another reason for pneumoconiosis to have become such an issue 
can be traced to the formation of a social consensus on pneumoconiosis 
which can itself be examined from political and social perspectives. 
Regarding the political consensus, the enthusiasm of the government for 
settling pneumoconiosis is indicated by a statement of the present Prime 
Minister in 1974, Harold Wilson:  
 
“Pneumoconiosis has plagued the industry for a century but was 
scheduled only during the war. My hon. friend will be aware that my 
right hon. friend the Secretary of State for Energy has informed the 
mining industry that we are prepared now to reach a once-for-all 
solution of the problem, not only of those who may in future-a 
diminishing number we hope-be discharged from the industry with 
pneumoconiosis, but all past sufferers” (Hansard 877, 1974: 1289). 
  
The firm will of the government can be inferred from the career of the 
competent minister of the CIE, Eric Varley, who had been both a miner 
and an NUM branch secretary. 97 Actually, the following testimony of 
Varley indicated that his position and consciousness might influence the 
introduction of CWPS in 1974:  
 
                                                 
97 Accordingly, he seems to understand a kennel of the problems about miners with 
pneumoconiosis: “My most vivid childhood memory is of the slag heaps which 
dominated every exit from the pit village of Poolsbrook, where I was born. There rings 
in my ears today the sound of the rasping pneumoconiotic cough which has been my 
father’s keepsake for 50 years’ work in the coal mining industry… I could not hide a 
special emotion I felt at being given the responsibility for the industry which had 





“They [pneumoconiosis patients] were registered of course under the 
normal National Insurance compensation but with no chance of getting 
the Common law compensation. I decided that the Scheme had to be 
devised for that. … I remember … Denis, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
my cabinet colleague eventually say yes, 100 million pounds to set out 
the pneumoconiosis compensation scheme. And I would better declare 
the interests, because my father suffered from pneumoconiosis, he got 
30% assessment of the pneumoconiosis. He was one of the beneficiaries 
under the scheme. He was only one out of 34,000” (Eric Graham Varley, 
Interview AUD/58). 
 
In addition to the commitment of the government, Members of Parliament 
including those in opposition shared a common view on pneumoconiosis:  
“During our examination we have been constantly aware of the human 
costs of coal, and the legacy of chronic ill health. Outstanding among 
these is the problem of pneumoconiosis. All members of the House will 
recognize the shadow that this has cast over the industry. We have 
accepted that it would be tragic for the Coal Board and the unions to fight 
out in the courts claims for compensation in respect of 39,000 sufferers 
from this disease”(Hansard 875, 1974: 227).  
 In terms of the social context, there was a favourable atmosphere 
to a solution to the pneumoconiosis problem. The high rate of industrial 
injury, especially involving pneumoconiosis, was an issue in the first half 
of 1974. 98 “The late 1960s and early 1970s saw dust-induced respiratory 
disease hit the headlines with the spread of asbestos-related illness and 
the mesothelioma panic. There were also TV documentaries which 
exposed the culpability of the NCB for pneumoconiosis, including the 
Thames Television production This Week screened in July 1973” (McIvor 
and Johnston, 2007: 228-229). The testimony of Thomas Coulter who 
                                                 
98 “Bryan, who was a former Chief Inspector of Mines, explained that the introduction 
of the CWPS 1974 stemmed from the recommendation of Robens Committee which was 
created on 29th May 1970 for a general inquiry into the safety and health of persons at 
work and was a basis of the Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act, 1974: “Of special 
interest in relation to recommendation above was a decision reached in 1974 in respect 
of the scale of compensation payments to be made to miners certified as 
pneumoconiotics” (Bryan, 1975: 128). From the explanation, it is guessed that the 





worked for Branch Delegate in NUM from 1959 to 1978 helps us to 
understand the situation at that time:  
 
“There were a number of reasons why this [introduction of CWPS] 
happened. At that time the NUM had many cases of pneumoconiosis 
waiting to go into Courts of Law with a certainty of winning. Apart from 
paying out compensation legal costs would have been very high indeed. 
These cases would be headline news with very bad publicity for the 
Government. This was the main reason why the Government agreed to 
fund such a scheme” (Thomas Coulter, Interview).  
 
To sum up, pneumoconiosis becoming an issue and the introduction of 
CWPS can be explained in the context of the standing demand of trade 
unions and interest relations among the relevant actors as well as the 
formation of a social consensus in the political and social spheres.  
 
 
Politics of Compensation for Introduction of CWPS 1974 
 
Formation of WGIRF 
 
The CIE was separated into two levels of a Steering Committee as a 
plenary committee and three Working Groups. The establishment of the 
Working Groups was decided at the second meeting of the Steering 
Committee held on 30 April and the WGIRF, which was chaired by the 
Minister of State for Employment, became one of Working Groups. The 
proposed terms of reference indicated the purpose of the WGIRF as 
follows:  
 
To discuss matters which come within the general framework of 
industrial relations (but which are not normal and regular subjects for 
negotiations between the unions and the NCB) having regard to the 
discussions at national level between the Government, the TUC, the 





appropriate make recommendations, to the Steering Committee (COAL 
96/19, Milles).   
 
The WGIRF did not tend to cover a national or general agenda as can be 
seen in ‘The Terms of Reference’. This is because “the talks for the 
national agenda are now proceeding between the government, the TUC, 
the Confederation of British Industry and others on a wide range of 
subjects including a number relevant to the social contract between the 
Government and the TUC, e.g. a new conciliation and arbitration 
service, pensions, securing an orderly growth of incomes on a voluntary 
basis, industrial democracy” (LAB 112/73/1, ‘Memorandum by the 
Department of Employment’). In this context, Booth, the chairman of 
the WGIRF, hoped to read and be fully aware of the paper titled 
‘Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 2: Framework for pay 
negotiation: the National Context’ and proposed to avoid giving any 
undertaking which would enable the parties to use the Working Group 
as a negotiating forum for pay, or which would commit the government 
to approving any understandings on pay and conditions which may have 
been reached by the parties in discussions outside the Working Group 
(FV 38/299, Ministry of State: 1). This had been agreed and finally four 
issues were identified for consideration: future pay negotiations, 
conciliation and arbitration procedures, safety and health hazards and 
occupational pensions (FV 38/299, Booth; LAB 112/73/1, Coal 






Table 4- 1 Members of WGIRF 
Belonging to Name Position 
Government A. Booth 




G. C. Shepherd 
J. G. C. 
Milligan 
Deputy Chairman 
NUM L. Daly General Secretary 
NACODS 
L. Wormald 





C. E. Tyler 
President 
General Secretary 
L. Pliatzky Treasury 
D. J.Richardson Department of Employment 
J. R. Cross Department of Energy 
R. Windsor Department of Health and Social Security 
 
N. Milles 
Department of Employment, Secretary of 
WGIRF 
Source: COAL 96/19, Milles, IRF (CIE) 1. 
 
There is no doubt that the members of the WGIRF were from three 
organizations: the government, the unions and the NCB99 (refer to Table 
4-1). In light of participants in the body, the government, particularly the 
Department of Employment, took the initiative of the WGIRF. This was 
because the Minister of State, Department of Employment presided over 
the meeting and the official of Department of Energy, N. Milles, took 
charge of administrative duties even though other relevant government 
departments such as the Treasury, the Department of Employment and the 
Department of Health and Social Security also attended the WGIRF. 
Meanwhile, it is odd that just the General Secretary of the NUM attended, 
and no one else from that union. However, this is explained by the fact 
                                                 
99 When the members on behalf of their own organizations could not attend, others by 
proxy participated in meetings. For example, “In principle Mr Daly will represent the 
NUM on the Industrial Relations Working Group, Mr Gormley on the Supply and 
Demand Group and Mr McGahey on the Research and Development Group. But in 
practice the NUM will have to send whoever is available. … They have also nominated 
various substitutes for each of the Working Groups but this information is very tentative 
and in practice the Secretary of each Working Group will have to ask specifically who 





that the WGIRF was not a body for policy decision-making. This would 
be more the responsibility of the Steering Committee.     
 
Discussion at WGIRF and Steering Committee 
 
What came out of the discussions about the pneumoconiosis-related 
scheme were two reports: the Interim Report and the Final Report plus 
two phases in the introduction of CWPS 1974; the first covered the period 
from the establishment of the CIE in April to the publication of the 
Interim Report in July 1974, and the second from the Interim Report to 
the completion of the Final Report. Meanwhile, all the discussion on 
pneumoconiosis had been conducted in the Steering Committee and the 
WGIRF. While the Steering Committee submitted items which were 
discussed in the WGIRF and made decisions, the WGIRF discussed a 
more specific agenda and reported the results to the Steering Committee. 
In this section of the thesis, the discussions by the Steering Committee 
about pneumoconiosis will be described chronologically, focusing on the 
points at issue.  
 Over time occurred the first and second meetings of the Steering 
Committee (10 April; 30 April), the first and second meetings of the 
WGIRF (14 May; 22 May), and then the third, fourth and fifth meeting of 
the Steering Committee (10 June; 14 June; 9 September). The Interim 
Report was issued soon after the third meeting of the Steering Committee 
(18 June) and the Final Report was published after all the discussion. 
 The first meeting of the Steering Committee primarily discussed 
setting up the CIE. Therefore, there was little or no discussion about 
pneumoconiosis. The second meeting decided on the formation of three 
sub-committees and Booth was responsible for the WGIRF as chairman. 





necessity of the introduction of a scheme for ex-miners with 
pneumoconiosis:  
 
Mr Gormley referred to the problem of the claims for compensation in 
respect of pneumoconiosis. Processing such claims through the Courts 
(e.g. the Pickles case) was time-consuming and expensive for the NUM 
and the NCB and it would take a great load off the industry if the 
government could find some way of meeting the outstanding claims 
perhaps by making a lump sum available. This could create a new image 
and greatly improve future relations (LAB 112/73/1, Coal Division of 
DOE: 8). 
 
A lively discussion on the disease was carried out in the first meeting of 
WGIRF and in the second. Formal documents on100 were submitted: 
‘Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 7: Compensation for 
pneumoconiosis: Memoranda by the NCB’ and ‘Industrial Relations 
Framework (CIE) 8: Compensation for pneumoconiosis: Memoranda by 
the NUM’.  
 There was also discussion about various other subjects (refer to 
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 1, 2, 4, 5, 6) but pneumoconiosis 
was not a main issue at the meeting. Nevertheless, the internal consensus 
for the introduction of a pneumoconiosis-related scheme was created. The 
general secretary of the NUM, Daly, argued that “the present position was 
that 4 test cases would get to the Courts in October. At this rate it would 
take many years to process all the cases since there was no guarantee that 
                                                 
100 The papers submitted in the first meeting were as follows:  
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 1 Composition and Terms of Reference 
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 2 Framework for pay negotiations: the National 
Context  
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 4 Safety and Health in the Coal Industry 
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 5 Occupational Pensions 
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 6 Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures 
On May 22 further consideration was given to a number of matters which arose at the 
first meeting and the following papers were considered: 
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 7 Compensation for pneumoconiosis: Memoranda 
by the NCB   
Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 8 Compensation for pneumoconiosis: Memoranda 





the results of the test cases could be applied to the others without further 
litigation. He hoped to alleviate the mental as well as the physical 
suffering and if they could have something to report it would help those 
who feared they might contract the disease. He asked the Government to 
consider the possibility of setting aside a sum of money which would 
provide a lump sum payment to pneumoconiotics (either the same for all 
or related to degree of disability) and an improvement in weekly benefits. 
If there was legislation on this in time it would enable the union to 
withdraw the 4 cases going to the Courts” (COAL 31/167, Milles(a): 2-3; 
FV 38/299, Ministry of State: 2). 
 Given that Siddall, Deputy Chairman of the NCB, agreed to the 
assertion, it is understood that there was a consensus between the NCB 
and the NUM. He stated that “there were some 40,000 cases in total. On 
the present basis it would cost more in litigation than compensation and 
could take up to 10 years. This was not acceptable to the Board any more 
than it was to the unions. He supported Daly’s plea for the Government to 
provide a lump sum to clear the 40,000 cases and to provide an equitable 
scheme for the future” (COAL 31/167, Milles(b): 3). 
 The chairman of the WGIRF, Booth, asked the NUM and the 
NCB to submit their own views about the pneumoconiosis-related scheme 
in the first meeting (COAL 96/19, Milligan: 2) and the NCB started to 
draft its own proposal which was, it seems, finally made by May 1974, 
according to a letter which Clement and Siddall on behalf of the NCB, 
sent to the government: “In my letter to you of 9th May, I set out the 
outline of a possible scheme for compensating coal industry 
pneumoconiotics or their dependants. Since that document was sent, there 
have been some amendments and I attach our latest draft” (COAL 31/167, 
Clement). There was discussion between the NCB and the Treasury of the 





common agreements were reached. First of all, the government decided to 
support finance for the scheme related to pneumoconiosis:  
 
The Treasury accept that, one way or another, Government will find the 
money to compensate from pneumoconiosis” and “made it clear so far 
as they were concerned money could be made available (COAL 31/167, 
Milligan).  
 
This means that a controversial problem, the financial support of the 
government, had been solved. However, the Treasury stated very clearly 
that the government had no intention of actually managing the scheme. 
They stressed that the scheme should not be run by the government but by 
the NCB because of the question of equity to different industries (COAL 
31/167, Milligan). This showed the intention of the government that the 
proposed scheme should basically be established by a compromise 
between the NCB and the Unions:   
 
The Treasury said that in the government’s view the scheme should be 
one to be negotiated between the Board and the unions, administered by 
the Board and the cost met in the first place by the Board but 
reimbursed by government, e.g. making use of the regional grant. … 
[also] The Treasury suggested payments under the scheme should be 
treated as a compromise settlement of the claim for damages (COAL 
31/167, Milligan). 
 
In addition, the Treasury wanted to make sure of the responsibility of the 
unions with respect to rewards for the scheme. He suggested that the 
“unions should be asked in return for the scheme’s benefits being made 
available to their members, not to support claims for damages in 
pneumoconiosis cases” (COAL 31/167, Milligan). This represented a 
clear bargaining chip in the compensation politics. In addition, the 
Treasury seemed to debate finance with NCB for a long time. 101 
                                                 
101 For instance, after a lengthy discussion, the Treasury suggested that the cost of past 





 On the other hand, the position of the NUM was represented in 
the paper, ‘Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 8: Compensation for 
Pneumoconiosis’, which was submitted at the second meeting of the 
WGIRF. It consisted of 11 pages but only the first page was new – all the 
others had first been issued by the NUM in 1969 with the title “Industrial 
Injuries Advisory Council: Pneumoconiosis Review-Evidence of the 
NUM to the Industrial Diseases Sub-Committee of the Council”. What 
the paper means is that the NUM had kept its fixed view on 
pneumoconiosis at least since 1969.  
 As can be seen above, by the second meeting of the WGIRF, the 
actors concerned seemed to have prepared their own views. The second 
meeting of the WGIRF on pneumoconiosis was held. 102  The discussion 
covered ways of compensation, the attitude of trade unions to litigation, 
and the financial support of the government. The debate was conducted 
based on papers from the NCB and the NUM, but the proposal of the 
NCB, Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 7, was simply related to a 
general summary of pneumoconiosis rather than its position, 103 while 
the NUM paper, Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 8, contained some 
firm arguments. Therefore the discussion became centred on the 
suggestions of the NUM.  
 First of all, the NUM paper insisted on the introduction of a 
Pneumoconiosis Compensation Scheme with improvements in existing 
                                                                                                                        
balanced by an equivalent capital write-off. (Will this mean higher interest payments on 
the now loan than we have been paying on the capital to be written off?) The Treasury 
also asked that, in negotiation with the unions, the Board make every effort to spread the 
lump sum payments over 3 years (I asked for 2 years) (COAL 31/167, Milles and Grant, 
1974: 2-3). 
102 There were four Agenda(COAL 31/167, Department of Employer):  
1. Matters arising from the minutes of the previous meeting.  
2. Compensation for pneumoconiosis: Memoranda by the NCB (Industrial Relations 
Framework (CIE) 7) and by the NUM (Industrial Relations Framework (CIE) 8). 
3. A conciliation and arbitration service: consultative document 
4. Handling of future business  
103 Therefore, the paper of NUM was assessed that “The NCB “Memorandum on 





Disablement Benefits and Special Hardship Allowance, with the financial 
support of the government. In addition, it tried to lay down some detailed 
demands. 104 Daly made several suggestions at the second meeting of the 
WGIRF: “compensation should take the form of a lump sum payment 
supported by an improvement in weekly benefits to protect earnings. If 
the principle of a lump sum payment could be agreed, it could then be 
discussed whether it should be a flat rate or based on percentage of 
disability and what regard should be paid to age, cost of living and other 
criteria” (COAL 31/ 167, Milles and Grant: 2-3). In return for the scheme, 
Daly also said that the trade unions intended to withdraw the current 
litigation as well as to prohibit litigation in the future: 
  
Whilst individuals would retain the option to take their cases to court it 
would be the union’s objective to persuade members to accept the lump 
sum if the level of compensation was reasonable, by withholding 
financial assistance. If the Government could give a firm declaration of 
intention about a satisfactory level of compensation he thought the NUM 
Conference would withdraw the four test cases before the courts. Mr 
Simpson said that this would also apply to cases supported by NACODS 
(COAL 31/ 167, Milles and Grant: 2-3). 
 
In response to the suggestion of the NUM about the expense, “Booth 
emphasized that the government would need to look at the financial 
problem in a wider context to avoid repercussions and said that he would 
discuss the financial background with his colleagues in the light of the 
alternatives which had been put forward. Furthermore, Booth urged that 
                                                 
104 From a current date an occupational scheme financed by the government should 
provide for: (a) A lump sum according to age and percentage assessment with additional 
amounts payable on progression of the disease and should also include Category 1 cases. 
(b) In the absence of improvements in Special Hardship Allowance, provision should be 
made for: 1) A supplementary payment to protect against loss of earnings. At the present 
time the difference between the face rate and underground minimum is £9 and up to £13 
in the case of Face and Surface. A man with a 10% assessment therefore at present could 
lose up to £2.60 if he transferred to elsewhere underground. This is brought about due to 
S.H.A. being limited to £5.12 per week plus 10% disablement of £1.28 per week. (2) All 
men with 10% assessments who are advised to work in dust approved conditions who 
voluntarily give up work at the coal face should also qualify for protection against loss 





the NCB and the unions should give further consideration to the type of 
joint schemes they wanted to see” (COAL 31/167, Milles and Grant). 
 The two meetings of the WGIRF resulted in an agreement, at 
least in principle, about the content and direction of the scheme, as Booth 
reported:  
 
There has been a general desire that the Working Group should come 
forward with positive proposal so that this problem could be dealt with 
without the necessity for litigation. While it has been agreed that the 
industry should introduce its own scheme we have to look close at the 
financial implications (LAB 112/73/2, “CIE: Oral report by the 
chairman of the Working Group of IRF”).  
 
During the month following the second meeting of the WGIRF (22 May) 
up to the publication of the Interim Report (18 June), had unofficial and 
formal discussions between the government, the union and NCB had 
taken place. 105  First of all, the NCB tried to reach an agreement with 
the government through subsequent meetings with civil servants, and in 
particular there was the ‘Progress Meeting’ (28 May 1974) where both 
the government and the NCB seemed to reach consensus on many points. 
Above all, they agreed there should be an immediate decision and there 
were two good reasons for avoiding delay: first, the need to get something 
positive into the interim report and second, the fact that the pressure 
behind the common law claims was building up. As a strategy for action, 
the following plan of action was suggested: 
 
1. The board proposed to go ahead with technical discussions in the 
next few days on the assumption that the government would, as they had 
indicated, meet the financial costs;  
                                                 
105 The following statement showed there could be meetings: Mr Siddall said that the 
NUM had submitted a paper on similar lines to the Board’s own ideas [regarding 
pneumoconiosis]. Mr Daly had met Mr Varley privately before the meeting and so far as 





2. The board would continue to press for financial help for future cases 
(or at least those whose period of incubation could be said to have 
occurred before the scheme);  
3. The Board begins technical discussions with the NUM as soon as 
possible;  
4. The Board considers the merits of making the lump sum for pain and 
suffering and variable sum related to age and the degree of disability 
involved (COAL 30/251: 1-2).    
 
Meanwhile, the NUM tried to cope with pneumoconiosis through the 
Social Insurance Sub-Committee, the body in charge of pneumoconiosis 
in the NUM. According to the Annual Report of the NUM, a meeting of 
the Social Insurance Sub-Committee had been held on the 6th June, 1974 
and it seemed that a proposal was almost made at this meeting and 
decided through the National Executive Committee of the NUM held on 
13th June (NUM, Minutes of Meeting of the NEC on Thursday 13th June, 
1974: 1). 
 Depending on the results, it would be the union’s objective to 
persuade members to accept the lump sum if the level of compensation 
was reasonable by withholding financial assistance. This indicates that the 
NUM accepted the demands of the government and the NCB. On the 
other hand, the government representatives at the Annual Conference had 
shown sympathetic interest towards the points made by the union’s 
document and there were strong indications that the government were 
seriously considering financing a compensation scheme since the board 
and the unions had been asked to formulate the type of scheme they 
wanted to see applied to the industry. Therefore, it seems there was an 
agreement over financial support between the government and the NUM 
(NUM, “Minutes of Meeting of Social Insurance Sub-Committee held on 
Thursday 6th June”, 1974: 19). In addition, the NUM had stated that it 





intention about a satisfactory level of compensation106 in order for the 
NUM Annual Conference to decide to withdraw the four test cases before 
the court hearings began.  
 The third meeting of the Steering Committee (10 June) ahead of 
the deadline for the Interim Report, and all the key decisions seemed to 
have been made at the meeting. 107  Regarding the pneumoconiosis 
scheme, Booth urged the CIE to concentrate initially on the 
pneumoconiosis scheme and Ezra, the chairman of the NCB, agreed with 
this wholeheartedly. Their suggestion did not meet with opposition from 




The Interim Report,108was published on 18 June 1974. Regarding the 
CWPS, the Interim Report stated an intention to “bring immediate 
satisfaction and relief to this large number of unfortunate people and 
provide improved financial safeguards for those who contract the disease 
                                                 
106 Regarding the criteria of compensation, the national officials of the NUM had 
submitted a document containing suggestions on improving the present arrangements, 
together with ideas on a compensation scheme based on age and degree of disability 
(NUM, “Minutes of Meeting of Social Insurance Sub-Committee held on Thursday 6th 
June”, 1974: 19). 
107 “The fourth meeting of CIE (1974 June 14) discussed the final draft of Interim 
Report and there were just amendments of words and phrases (FV 38/297, Coal  
Division of DOE). 
108 The principal conclusions of the Interim Report can be summarised as follows:  
a) Confidence in a good long-term future for the coal industry provided that it remains 
competitive. 
b) General support for the NCB’s 10-year Plan for Coal, involving an additional 
investment of some £600 million and designed to maintain annual deep-mined 
production at least at its present level of about 120 million tons and if possible to 
increase it.  
c) The need to increase productivity and the importance of an effective incentive scheme. 
d) Expansion of opencast coal production.  
e) Substantial Government support for compensation for pneumoconiosis sufferers.  
f) Support for a programme of research and development with particular emphasis on 





in the future” (CIE, 1974b: 14) (refer to 3.4 in this paper regarding the 
content of compensation).  
 There are two characteristic aspects in the Interim Report. One is 
that the contribution of the government was obviously instituted in order 
to relieve the NCB’s finances:  
 
The government recognises that the whole costs of such a scheme cannot 
now be borne by the industry on its own, particularly as they relate to 
existing cases which arose in a period when the industry was much 
larger than it is today. Accordingly, provided a satisfactory scheme of 
settlement is negotiated, the government, subject to Parliamentary 
approval, will take measures to contribute towards relieving the Board’s 
finances of this burden of the past in respect of existing sufferers. So far 
as concerns the future, the industry itself should make adequate 
provision (DOE, 1974b: 14). 
 
The other is that the report clearly indicates the duties of the unions. That 
is to say, under the new scheme, the unions would not assist coal workers 
to take legal action:  
 
Although existing rights would not be extinguished, acceptance of 
benefits would be in full settlement of claims at law. If a satisfactory 
scheme can be worked out the unions would encourage acceptance by 
their members and would not help finance actions pursued in the courts 
(DOE, 1974b: 14). 
 
Although, as can be seen in the Interim Report, the main issues were 
solved, there were, however, still several points at issue because “any 
scheme of this sort will be complex. When the NCB have formulated 
their proposals they will be worked out in detail by the NCB and the 
unions. So far as existing cases are concerned we are agreed in principle 
that the best course would be to provide for payment of a sum in each 
case which would represent a fair settlement of the claim of the victim or 
his dependants, bearing in mind the possible sum which might be 
obtained in the courts but balancing against that the risk that the action 





the consequent anxiety. Moreover the claimant or his union would not 
face the risk of liability for legal costs. In order to work out a scheme that 
will achieve this result, the NCB and the unions will need to consider the 
amount of compensation in relation to the criteria the courts have 
normally taken into account, such as the percentage of disability and any 
loss of earnings because of the disease” (DOE, 1974b: 14). 
 As discussed above, the Interim Report represented an agreement 
between the government, the unions and the NCB. The government made 
an appointment for finance, the NCB gave its word for introducing and 
operating the scheme and the unions promised to drop suits and stop the 
litigation. Therefore, the report was widely welcomed, both in the 
industry and throughout the country. This is evident in the opening 
address by Varley to the fifth meeting of the Steering Committee. He 
“opened the meeting by saying how pleased he had been at the good 
reception given to the Interim Report in general and in particular at the 
NUM and NACODS Conference” (FV 38/297, Coal  Division of DOE, 
“CIE Minutes 5”: 2). The report even garnered support from the 
Conservatives: “It would help to confirm the good impression that the 
interim Report made both in the industry and generally. The bulk of the 
Report is not likely to be politically controversial as the Conservative 
Party manifesto has endorsed the strategy approved in the Interim Report” 
(LAB 112/73/2, Secretary of State for Energy: 1-2).  
 It took only two months to draw up a substantial bill from the 
Interim Report. How could the compromises and decisions be made in 
such a short time? 
 Regarding the problem of coal as an energy source, there had 
been a national consensus over the energy crisis. For example, John 
Hannam, Conservative Member of Parliament, said: “We welcome this 
short statement on the interim report, which we shall study carefully. The 





Coal Industry Act last year was proof of our support for the coal industry. 
We believe that every effort should be made to sustain coal output” 
(Hansard 875, 1974: 228). Likewise, the national consensus encouraged 
CIE to reach an agreement very quickly and publish its conclusions: “We 
all agreed that the country’s energy requirements demanded immediate 
action in the coal industry and we decided to publish the following 
Interim Report recording the consensus that had already been achieved” 
(Eric Varley, ‘Forward’, in DOE, 1974b: 2) 
 Regarding the problem of pneumoconiosis, there had been a good 
relationship between the NCB, the Unions and the government and there 
was no lack of sympathy about pneumoconiosis. Above all, it is noted 
that there had been a friendly atmosphere between the relationship of 
NUM and NCB and they sat together on “every kind of committee we can 
think of” (Gormley, 1982: 146):  
 
We [NUM and NCB] sit together on the regular meeting of the Coal 
Industry National Consultative Council, on Welfare committees, on 
Pensions committees, on Health committees. … We are always consulted 
when it comes to the appointment of a new Chairman of the Board, and 
in practice the post of Industrial Relations Director is virtually ours to 
nominate, and Cliff Shephard, who held that position during the period 
of the two strikes, was actually an ex-NUM man. On occasions, the 
Board have even lent us their private plane when we have needed to get 
somewhere in a hurry. So I would say that 90 percent of our dealings 
with the Board are conducted as by equal partners in trying to improve 
the Industry. But it’s that other 10 percent, when we negotiate wage 
claims, which inevitably catches the public eye (Gormley, 1982: 146-7).  
 
In particular, it is no exaggeration to state that the newly elected Labour 
government and the trade unions were ‘feeling’ significant progress had 
been made as suggested by an expression of Gormley’s; “it was totally 
amicable” (Gormley, 1982, 146). This is because Labour had 
sympathized with the necessity of mutual cooperation under the Heath 
administration in addition to a traditional partnership with the unions. 






“Two of the leading figures in the government’s team were Tony Benn, 
Energy Minister and Alex Eadie, an ex-miner who we named ‘Minister 
for Coal’, both of whom were sympathetic to the miners” (Thomas 
Coulter, Interview).    
  
In particular, it is generally acknowledged that there had already been 
internal consensus between the Labour Party and the NUM based on the 
social contract between Labour and the TUC during the Heath years. 
When Labour came into power, both actors had worked together to create 
a social contract for the mining industry through discussion and 
compromise.  
    As discussed above, sympathy towards the energy crisis and the 
pneumoconiosis problem, plus the friendly relationship of the relevant 
actors had enabled an agreement to be reached very quickly and easily. 
However, there were a few points at issue and, so, compensation politics 
went on.  
 




After the Interim Report in which the general principles and outlines of 
the scheme were drawn up, the participants tried officially or unofficially 
to make efforts for the completion of the scheme.   
 The NUM national officials and the Union’s Working Party on 
Pensions submitted ‘Heads of Terms of a possible Scheme for 
Compensating Coal Industry Pneumoconiotics and their dependents’ 
(‘Heads of Terms’, 20/6/74) (NUM, 1974: 15). ‘The Heads of Terms’ 
                                                 
109 The Labour Party should also make a social contract very quickly because of the 
coming election. The trade unions tried to help the Labour Party become the majority 
party because they agreed with the party in ideology and political purpose. Accordingly, 
the deadline of the report being short-term can be explained in this context: “Our aim is 
to complete the work as far as possible by the late summer or early autumn” (DOE, 





contained agreements reached between the NCB and the NUM, clearly 
making a duty of the NUM clear: 
 
2. The agreement would provide, inter-alia, that: 
a) the Unions would not support, financially or otherwise any claims for 
damages at Common Law;  
b) the Unions would withdraw all current claims for damages for 
pneumoconiosis;  
c) the Unions would undertake not to submit a claim for a similar 
Scheme for Industrial accidents or other industrial diseases, based on 
acceptance of this Scheme.  
3. The agreement or the Scheme would require any person accepting 
benefit under the Scheme to sign a statement that his acceptance of 
Scheme benefits would be in full discharge of his common law rights 
(NUM, 1974: 17-19).  
 
Despite the strict obligations of the NUM put forward in it, the proposal 
was accepted and approved by the Social Insurance Sub-Committee of the 
NUM on 21st June (NUM, 2 July 74b: 1). In addition, the NUM reported 
“The National Officials had pressed the Minister to arrange for the 
necessary legislation to be processed through Parliament as speedily as 
possible” (NUM, 1974: 1). 110 
 Meanwhile, “the NUM and NACODS have agreed to withdraw 
all current damages claims under the pneumoconiosis heading and have 
also agreed not to support any claims at Common Law for 
pneumoconiosis. These Unions have also agreed not to use the 
pneumoconiosis scheme as a springboard for any other scheme relating to 
industrial diseases and agreed also that any person accepting benefit 
under the scheme will be unable to make a claim for the disease at 
common law” (Coal New, August, 1974). 
                                                 
110 After June, there was just one record related to CWPS: it was reported that in 
keeping with the previous decision of the Committee (see NEC 11th July, 1974) the 
scheme had now been finalized and copies were before the Committee. It was agreed: 
“That the National Officials would approach the appropriate authorities with a view to 
seeing if some of the legal costs which the Union had already incurred could be 






 As discussed, the participants almost reached an agreement over 
the specific points at issue after the Interim Report. Thus the fifth meeting 
of the Steering Meeting (9 September 1974) simply confirmed the 
previous compromise and tried to settle a few disagreements. Regarding 
pneumoconiosis, “Mr Siddall explained that discussions had been taking 
place with the NUM and other Unions. The scheme had been accepted 
basically but there were still a few points to be resolved” (FV 38/297, 
Coal Division of DOE: 4). 111  On the other hand, Varley wanted to 
confirm identification of the scheme and financial support of the 
government: “Mr Varley confirmed that specific legislation would not be 
required to implement the scheme. All that would be necessary would be 
for the NCB and the Unions to agree the details of the scheme and the 
Government would meet the cost. The scheme could then be incorporated 
into any subsequent coal legislation” (FV 38/297, Coal Division of DOE: 
4). 
 The Final Report completed the Interim Report in two aspects. 
First of all, the Report presented the coverage and level of compensation 
for miners with pneumoconiosis and their dependants:  
 
We are glad now to report that the Board and the Unions have been 
able to work out a satisfactory scheme which covers past and future 
cases and, also, widows or other dependants. Details of compensation 
payable to different categories of sufferers are set out in Appendix A 
(DOE, 1974a: 17).   
 
Furthermore, the government made a £100 million promise for financial 
support. As a result, the report was accepted with satisfaction by all 
relevant parties and, in particular, the NUM warmly welcomed the 
agreement as is clear from the commentary of Gormley, president of 
                                                 
111 Of these points in dispute, for example, “Mr Varley said he hoped to be able to give 
a decision on the position of miners who had commuted their claims under the 





NUM: “It was accepted by the Board, by ourselves and our colleagues in 
the other two unions, and by the government” (1982, 148); In particular, 
the NUM seemed to be so welcoming toward the scheme that Mr 
Gormley identified the final report as his:  
 
“The final report of the CIE was published in the autumn of 1974, and it 
was such a vital document that I propose to repeat in full the nine points 
under its heading ‘General Conclusions’. That document, which I refer 
to as ‘my Bible’, could, and should, have fashioned thinking in the 
Industry from its publication up to the end of the century” (Gormley, 
1982: 147; 148).  
 
As previously mentioned, all the actors concerned agreed with the Final 
Report. In particular, the scheme was a great success in that the NUM, 
who represented the sufferers enthusiastically, welcomed the scheme. 
Therefore parliament unanimously passed it. In particular, the 
Conservatives also agreed with the scheme, although the party did not 
attend the CIE. The Conservatives were absent because of their concern 
for the oil crisis, their sympathies for pneumoconiosis sufferers, their 
recognition of public support for the scheme and unwillingness to 
antagonize the trade unions anymore before the coming election.  
 
 
4. Summary and Implication 
 
 
The IIA (1946) and the CWPS (1974) have been discussed in this chapter. 
Now, it is time to summarize this legislation and consider its implication 
in terms of welfare and compensation politics. 
 With regard to the IIA (1946), there were distinct proposals for 
its introduction but the Beveridge Report and the Conservative  Bill 





an historical momentum which helped convert the principles of social 
insurance into workmen’s compensation. The bill was a political 
realisation of the report. What is interesting is that the Bill was similar to 
the Labour Bill and the IIA (1946), as the Minister of National Insurance 
states: “The Bill which would now come before the House would be 
substantially the same as the one introduced by the Coalition 
government” (PIN 21/68, BEC, 31 August 1945: 2). The similarity helps 
us to understand the wartime and post-war consensus between the 
political parties.   
 What does the enactment of IIA (1946) mean to the (ex-) workers 
with pneumoconiosis? In fact, at the time, pneumoconiosis was not high 
on the agenda and there was no specific discussion relating to the 
implications of pneumoconiosis. Nevertheless, the Act was closely related 
to ex-miners with pneumoconiosis in terms of changes of benefits for 
incapacity by industrial disease. In addition, there were other benefits 
within the Act. For example, “prior to IIA being introduced every person 
who had been certified as suffering from pneumoconiosis or silicosis in 
any degree was suspended from working in the industry. With the 
introduction of the IIA, suspension from work in the industry is no longer 
compulsory” (Evans, 1963: 6).    
 The IIA (1946) helped to shape the path of an institution because 
the law helped to make underlying principles of social insurance tangible. 
The importance of the implications of this cannot be understated. “The 
government also concur in the recommendations that provision for 
medical treatment and post-hospital rehabilitation of industrial disability 
cases should be dealt with as part of the national schemes for these 
purposes” (OMR, 1944: 13). Injured workers under the social insurance 
system were secured for life by these benefits under a comprehensive 





 While the IIA (1946) was established as a form of National 
Insurance, the CWPS (1974) was the product of a compromise between 
workers and employers in the coal industry. The motivation for the 
establishment of the official body for the social contract and activities of 
compensation politics was the energy crisis in the early 1970s. Therefore, 
the main aim was to implement scheme not for compensation but for coal 
production. However, in this instance, the participants wanted to examine 
comprehensive problems which necessitated the establishment of the CIE. 
The benefits under CWPS (1974) included a tax-free lump sum 
based on the percentage of disability, posthumous benefit and progression 
payments if levels of disability increase after an award. Thus, the social 
contract had brought many benefits to ex-miners with pneumoconiosis 
(NUM, 1974). For relieving the NCB’s finances the government 
supported a total of £100 million (DOE, 1974 b: 17; NCB, Report and 
Accounts 1974/5: 7-8). By 31st March, 1980, 63,477 cases that had been 
outstanding at the inception of the scheme in 1974 had been settled. 2,614 
cases had arisen between 1974 and 1980 (Allen, 1981: 291). Therefore, 
the CWPS not only provided financial benefits to patients but also 
represented an implicit recognition of the failures of NCB policy, 
especially the inability to protect the workforce against damage caused by 
dust inhalation, to improve dust control standards and bring an end to the 
fallacy of ‘dust approved’ workplaces (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 229). 
 There is no doubt that the CWPS could be understood in line with 
the path-shaping of an institution because it established benefits for all the 
(ex-) miners without resorting to litigation by common law.  
 Welfare politics for the introduction of IIA and CWPS can be 
defined as ‘labour politics for compensation’ or the ‘politics of 
compensation’. From this point of view, firstly, what is noteworthy is that 
trade unions played a main role in the enactment of the schemes. In the 





government can fundamentally be explained by the alteration of the 
political and social position of the TUC after wartime. As has been 
suggested, the wartime strategy of the TUC, pursued under the pressure 
of corporatist tendencies, had resulted in the TUC becoming incorporated 
to a substantial extent into the state itself by the time of the end of the war 
(Colwill, 1986: 254). 112 In his forthright speech at the 1946 Congress, 
Citrine declared that during his term as TUC secretary, the trade unions 
had ‘passed from the era of propaganda to one of responsibility’. 
Certainly, responsibility was the keynote of the five years before and after 
his resignation. The leadership had become closely integrated with the 
government at every level (Pelling, 1987: 226).   
 On the other hand, it has been assessed that undoubtedly CWPS 
was a massive victory for the NUM on behalf of pneumoconiotic miners 
(McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 228). The NUM congratulated itself on the 
1974 no-fault Pneumoconiosis Scheme, with the South Wales General 
Secretary Dai Francis commenting that this was ‘probably one of the 
greatest achievements that this union has ever attained’ (McIvor and 
Johnston, 2007: 229).  
 Secondly, the schemes showed that there was tripartite 
consultation and political intervention of trade unions on parliament and 
government. With regard to IIA, the relationship between trade unions 
and Labour can more closely be understood in a body named National 
Joint Advisory Council. “In June of this year, the Minister of Labour 
informed the General Council that the government proposed that a regular 
channel should be established through which it might make available to 
the responsible organisations on both sides confidential information 
concerning government policy and the national economic position. 
Accordingly, the Minister proposed to recall the National Joint Advisory 
                                                 
112 As a result, during the war the unions gained, not only in prestige but also in 
membership. The total numbers rose from 6,053,000 in 1938 (including 4,669,000 





Council which was formed immediately prior to the outbreak of war and 
which in 1940 was more or less superseded by the Joint Consultative 
Committee to the Minister of Labour” (TUC, 1946: 180-181).    
 The trade unions met many times with politicians to argue their 
points about the legislative processes. This exercised their influence 
through Members of Parliament who had been supported by trade unions 
or were favourable to them. A typical example can be found in the 
statement of Mr John McDay (Wallsend). He said:  
 
“I suggest that the benefits themselves are not satisfactory. Many other 
speakers have indicated that they are not sufficient, and I want to 
conclude what I have said to-day in a general way to try to understand if 
I can. Am I a bad judge? Do I misunderstand the people I represent? Do 
I misunderstand the Labour Conference? Certainly I have never spoken 
there but I have an obligation to speak here and I am carrying out that 
obligation according to my conscience. I believe that men of the Labour 
movement attending this House should break themselves away from the 
strings that tie them down at the moment and examine the poison freely 
as a Labour government in the House of Commons with a strong 
majority, a Labour movement that naturally and reasonably expects to 
do something much better than a Conservative majority and to do 
something much better than a Coalition” (Hansard 414, 1945: 339). 
 
The most ideal example was the activities of the Miners’ Group of 
Members of Parliament who were generally more loyal to miners than to 
any political party. This was undoubtedly due to the strength of the links 
between the NUM and their sponsored Members of Parliament who 
remained dependent upon that union sponsorship for re-election (Colwill, 
1986: 280). During the enactment, the relationship between trade unions 
for miners and the Miners’ Group was found in several aspects. For 
example, they both met under the title, “Meeting of Workmen’s 
Compensation Sub-Committee [NUM] and Miners’ Members of 
Parliament” on 26 September 1945, and the Miners’ Group visited the 
relevant Minster in order to explain the position of miners: “Mr. Smith 





very strong feeling which existed among mine workers against certain 
features of the Industrial Injuries Bill” (PIN 21/68, 26 September 1945: 1). 
In addition, they tried to obtain supplementary benefits through the NUM. 
In the meeting of  the Workmen’s Compensation Sub-Committee and 
Miners’ Members of Parliament on 26 September 1945: “We consider 
that the basic rate is inadequate and our objection to it is not disposed of 
by the fact that in certain circumstances that rate may be supplemented by 
payments under the general scheme” (NUM, 1945: 651). 
 In the case of the introduction of the CWPS, the WGIRF itself 
was a typical corporatist body. There were tripartite participants 
concerned, including the government, and the result was drawn by 
discussion and compromise among them. Seemingly, there were of course 
no policy-making processes in parliament and the government because 
CWPS was basically an agreement between labour and management 
within an industry sector. However, the government’s offer to part 
finance the agreement should have been accepted by parliament because 
coalfields were government-owned workplaces. The government and 
politicians were major factors in introducing CWPS.   
 Thirdly, the IIA and the CWPS had great public support at the 
time. The IIA was a product of the post-war consensus while the CWPS 
was drawn from sympathy for the occupational diseases of society and 
the major burdens of the actors concerned. Therefore, the debate around 
the schemes was not over whether they would be introduced but how their 
compensation would be secured.  
 Fourthly, the schemes can be understood in the context of the 
creation of a new track for compensation. While the IIA was incorporated 
into the National Insurance system, the CWPS provided all the (ex-) 
miners with compensation without litigation by common law. In this 
context, the schemes can be seen as having shaped the paths of 





in partly in the traditions of institutions. While the IIA originated in the 
WCA, the CWPS was borne from the accumulated experience of disputes 






CHAPTER 5. COMPENSATION POLITICS AROUND 
CWP IN KOREA 
 
 




The history related to schemes for industrial injures compensation can be 
divided into three periods: before the Labour Standard Act in 1953, after 
the Labour Standard Act before the IACI in 1964, after the IACI. 
The first period covers the Japanese rule over Korea (1910-1945), 
the three year rule of the American Military Administration (1945-1948) 
before the establishment of the Government by the Southern part of 
Korea (1948). During the Japanese colonial period, Korean workers were 
treated differently to Japanese workers regarding wages and working 
conditions. For example, a Korean worker earned just 1.45 won as of 
1924, while the Japanese received 2.45 won and the Korean workers’ 
labour movement’s push for more wages and better working conditions 
was repressed. The dual attitude of Japanese workers in the two countries 
existed in industrial injury. Whereas in Japan they equipped institutions 
for labour-related schemes, there was no regulation for Korean workers, 
or even coal miners who were exposed to many hazards.  In 1938, the 
Coal Mining Ordinance, which contained a clause that a coal company 
should assist a worker with injury, an industrial disease, death or an 
incurable disease, was reformed. This was only a mutual aid system for 





During the three years after liberalisation, the American Military 
Administration tried to abolish bad laws introduced by Japanese 
imperialism and gradually introduced labour-related laws. First of all, the 
American Military Administration established the Labour Section under 
the Department of Trade and Industry (1945) and the Ministry of Labour 
(1946) and introduced schemes such as the Ordinance Number 97, titled 
‘Public Policy of Labour Problems and Establishment of Ministry of 
Labour ’ in 1946. However, by and large, while the American Military 
Administration preferred resolution by collective bargaining, there was no 
more advanced legislation. In particular, there was very little 
advancement for injured workers in small companies. 
 After Lee Seung-Man, the first president in Korea, was elected in 
1948, despite the introduction of the Constitutional Assembly and the 
Constitution113 there was very little development regarding the industrial 
injury system as well as labour-related laws before the introduction of the 
Labour Standard Act.  
 The noteworthy momentum in the development of an industrial 
injuries scheme was the introduction of the Labour Standard Act in 1953. 
The Labour Standard Act is very important in the history of industrial 
injury because compensation was regarded as legal duty (MOL, 2004: 12). 
However, there was a limitation in the fact that the compensation was 
based on the individual responsibility of employers. This meant that, if 
there was a lack of finance or will in a company, it may be difficult for an 
injured worker to be compensated (MOL, 1981: 4). In this context, no one 
can deny the fact that a worker in a small company or an unorganised 
organisation could not be compensated and a large disaster may result in 
the bankruptcy of a company (MOL, 1981: 24).  
                                                 
113 Then Constitution was very progressive to contain the protection of workers that lost 
working ability, labour’s three major rights, profit sharing right (MOL, 1981: 10). The 





Finally, there was the creation of an industrial injuries scheme as a 
national insurance, the IACIA, in 1963 and its implementation in 1964. 
The IACI is the compulsory insurance program where the state ensures 
the post-accidental livelihood of workers and their families. This means 
that the IACI overcomes a problem of employers’ individual 
responsibility based on the Labour Standard Act and enables injured 
workers to obtain income maintenance. In addition, it covers a job 
training programme as well as recuperation and recreation for injured 
workers (MOL, 1981: 4). 
The IACI is financed exclusively by contributions from employers 
while the Government is responsible for just the administrative costs of 
the system (Kim, M.S., 2002: 5). As a result, whereas around 95% of 
premium is from employers, the government is burdened with just 1 % of 
its finance from the general account (Kim, 1994: 36). On the other hand, 
at first, the IACI was limited to mining and manufacturing enterprises 
with 500 employees or more. Yet, the coverage has been expanded, and 
in 1998, a special provision was made to extend coverage to student 
trainees, students at vocational training centers, and employees stationed 
overseas. On July 1 1998, the insurance coverage was extended to 
financial and insurance companies that had four employees or more, and 
on July 1 2000, coverage was extended to virtually all firms or work 
places. Even businesses employing only one employee were included. In 
addition, based on the assumption that owners of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which hire fewer than 50 workers, participate in the actual 
production process as workers, the coverage was extended to their owners 
as well. Those who are self-employed, engaged in small-scale agriculture 
and fisheries, forestry, and hunting operations, and those who are 
involved in special occupations that may be difficult to define are 





As can be seen above, the IACI is for industrial injures, including 
industrial diseases. However, the activities of an interest group, which 
was composed of ex-miners with pneumoconiosis, and miners’ unions, 
FKCWTU, for more benefits and more protection just for miners and ex-
miners with pneumoconiosis led to the introduction of a special scheme, 
the APPPPW, in 1984. Likewise, the introduction deserved admiration for 
its participation of correspondents such as trade unions and ex-miners 
with CWP. 
In addition, it is assessed as a meaningful event for miners and 
CWP. The purpose was ‘to contribute to the protection of workers’ health 
and the promotion of their welfare by intensifying the prevention of 
pneumoconiosis and the control over the health of workers engaged in 
dust work by providing matters concerning the payment of consolation 
benefits to any worker suffering from pneumoconiosis and his bereaved 
family members’ (APPPPW, Article 1). The main contents of 
compensation are as follows:  
 
Pneumoconiosis funds can be drawn from the special account budget of 
the national budget or other funds (Article 23, 2). 
 
The funds can be used for scholarship for pneumoconiosis patients’ 
children and the stabilisation of their livelihood (Article 26). 
 
Work replacement benefit transfer allowance is raised to seventy days of 
the average payment (Article 38, 1). 
 
Survivor benefits and disability benefits are paid in 60/100 of average 
payment (Article 38, 2 &  3) (Kim, 1995: 4).  
 
As seen in the articles, what is important in this special law is that 









2. Legitimacy Politics and IACI 
 
 
A military group, which established the Third Republic later, took power 
by military force in 1961. The military junta claimed to stand for anti-
communism and developmentalism and exacted the obedience of these 
ideologies from people. On the other hand, it tried to introduce social 
security systems in order to make up for its weak point in legitimacy. In 
this context, the IACI was discussed by the Social Security Investigation 
Committee, an advisory agency within the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, and the national insurance was introduced on 8 October 1963 by 
the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (hereafter SCNR). The 
background, purpose and policy-making processes will be examined here.   
 
 
Background and Forced Social Consensus 
 
Military Coup and Anti-Communism 
 
Korea was under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. In this period 
social policy was very weak and this part will therefore examine the 
period from its liberalization Korea has experienced a turbulent period 
since its liberation from Japanese imperialism in 1945. After the UN 
trusteeship over Korea for three years, Korea was divided into the two 
countries of South Korea and North Korea which were supported by the 
US and USSR respectively in 1948 and experienced the Korean War for 
three years (1950-1953). This shows that ‘the Korean peninsula was at the 
center of the Cold War since the end of the Second World War’ (Koo, 
2001: 11). 
The First Republic (1948-1960) selected a president, Syngman 





and the previous ruling block such as the pro-Japanese group and the 
landed class. The Rhee government put the powerful political belief of 
national foundation on liberal democracy, which was actually identified 
as anti-communism, anti-USSR and anti-North Korea; in particular, ‘after 
the Korean War anticommunism became a hegemonic ideology’ (Kwon, 
1999: 35). In this stage, the Rhee Government played its active role as an 
anticommunist base. The Government suppressed the democracy 
movement as well as the labour movement114 under the clock of anti-
communism. Likewise, anticommunism and anti-North Korea were used 
as strategies and ideologies for Rhee’s rule.  
The April Revolution against Rhee’s dictatorship in 1960 led to 
the collapse of the First Republic and the Second Republic (1960-1961) 
was established by the Democratic Party. The new republic can be 
identified as a democratic government but it did not last long. This is 
because a military junta took power in the name of recovering social 
disorder and saving it from the threat of North Korea. The excuse given 
by General Park Chung-Hee, leader of the junta, was that their rule was 
temporary (Kwon, 1999: 3). Yet, the promise was like piecrust. After the 
two year of dominance (16 May 1961-1962), Park became a president of 
the Third Republic in the 1963 election for presidency.  
During the rule of the military junta, from May 1961 to December 
1962, the junta dissolved the National Assembly, which was replaced by 
the SCNR. ‘The SCNR played a significant role in centralising state 
power during a short time of the revolutionary period before the 
restoration of the presidential system in 1963’ (Woo, 2004: 35). In 
                                                 
114 ‘In this state-formation process, militant leftist unions (which had emerged 
right after liberation from Japanese colonial rule in August 1945) were 
completely destroyed by right-wing forces and the U.S. military government, 
leaving the new generation of Korean factory workers no organisational base on 





addition, the existing political parties, civic groups and trade unions were 
dissolved and reorganised in favour of the military junta.  
The general crisis of the Third Republic had begun in the late 
1960s because of an economic crisis from the first oil shock in the early 
1970s and increasing democratic movements. Park’s Government 
established the Yushin (‘revitalization’ in English) regime identified as 
the Fourth Republic (1972-1979) in October 1972 under the cloak of 
national harmony. The regime installed Park as a dictator for life who 
concentrated all state power only to himself (Kim, 1998: 323); ‘The 
Presidential Emergency Measures under the Yushin regime basically 
prohibited any political activities against the government’. In addition, the 
new constitution, called the Yushin Constitution, was introduced and the 
president dissolved the National Assembly and appointed one third of the 
legislators in this Constitution (Woo, 2004: 52). In other words, President 
Park became the only leader to dominate all the fields of administrative 
government, and legislative and judicial branches through the 
introduction of the Yushin Constitution (Kim, 2003: 203).  
The Third and the Fourth Republic, like Rhee’s Government, took 
the anticommunist line as a national policy. Park believed that the line 
could justify his military coup. Just after the military coup in 1961, the 
military junta proclaimed martial law and released ‘the Revolution 
Pledge’ with six articles:  
 
First, we will take anticommunism as the first national policy and 
reorganise the anticommunist system which has, so far, existed for 
form’s sake. Second, we will abide by obligations under the U.N. 
Charter, will faithfully fulfil international agreements and will cement 
relations with friendly nations based on liberalism. … Fifth, we will do 
everything in our power to develop our ability against communists for 







As can be seen in the pledge, the Third Republic put anticommunism as 
the first principle of national policies. Also, the Law Concerning Special 
Measures for Safeguarding National Security (December 1971) and ‘the 
Yushin Constitution’ (October 1972) enabled the president to stay in 
power forever in the name of anticommunism and peaceful unification:  
 
I urge our nation to closely band together in order to embody our long-
cherished desire of peaceful unity. In order to achieve this national 
mission, I proclaim a state of emergency for two months to lose the 
effect of some clauses of the constitutional law (The First Martial Law 
Proclamation, 17 October 1972). 
 
Likewise, ‘the  government took advantage of the threat from 
communist North Korea, claiming that this made authoritarian politics 
indispensable, at least for the time being’ (Kwon, 1999: 28). 
Consequently,  anticommunism was used in cracking down on the 
labour movement and democrats in addition to the repression of socialists. 
 
Developmental State and Modernisation of the Fatherland 
 
Throughout the 1950s, the Rhee Government largely depended on foreign 
relief aid programmes, which were initiated by international aid 
organisations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, and a massive 
US relief aid (Shin, 2003: 49). On the contrary, the Third and the Fourth 
Republic stood for ‘economic growth first’ and vowed to boost economic 
development. This meant that the Republics were ‘a developmental state 
and a hard state to dominate and replace a market as they intervene in 
allocation of resources’ rather than ‘a liberalist state to participate in the 
establishment of competition rules of market’ (Choi et al., 2001).  
In detail, Korea was based on oversea economic aid until the early 
1960s, and accordingly, the US economic aid absolutely contributed to 





state played a key role in industrialisation. The military junta put top 
priority on ‘the modernisation of the fatherland’ through economic 
growth for its legitimacy. The national goal was recognised as ‘a project 
to make the nation rich and powerful so as to protect itself from the 
hostile communist north and other foreign powers’ (Koo, 2001: 12): 
 
“I want to emphasize, and re-emphasize, that the key factor of the May 
16 Military Revolution was to affect an industrial revolution in Korea. 
Since the primary objective of the revolution was to achieve a national 
renaissance, the revolution envisaged political, social, and cultural 
reforms as well. My chief concern, however, was economic revolution. 
One must eat and breathe before concerning himself with politics, social 
affairs and culture” (recited in Shin, 2003: 52). 
 
The strong will of the junta was embodied by the First Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan implemented from 1962. The First Plan 
mainly focused on export-oriented industrialisation strategy and 
promotion based on labour-intensive light industries. Even after the 
transfer of power to the elected government in 1963, the government 
advocated national goals of ‘national security and economic 
development’. This was because the Government liked to put its political 
legitimacy on economic efficiency (Kim, 1994: 41). 
In the early 1970s, the strategy of industrialisation in the 
authoritarian Yushin regime was changed from light industries to heavy 
and chemical industrialisation. The change in economic strategy allowed 
the state to intervene in the economy more vigorously (Shin, 2003: 7). 
The economic growth-oriented strategy continued from Park’s 
Government through the Yushin regime to Chun’s government for the 
legitimacy of authoritarian governments.115  
                                                 
115 ‘During the period 1961-87, the governments of Korea pursued a strategy that can be 
summarised as legitimising through economic performance, despite different emphases 
at certain points in time. For example, President Park’s government pursued an 





As is written above, the military governments had taken advantage 
of economic performance and developmentalism as national policy and 
ideology. What is interesting is that there is a close relationship between 
anti-communism and developmentalism. In other words, the discourse of 
modernisation contributed to the consolidation of political power through 
complementary cooperation with anticommunism. The following 
statements in Park’s New Year message in 1962 and his inauguration 
speech in 1963 shows how discourses between economic growth and 
anticommunism combined together:  
 
It is absolutely necessary to bolster the perfect nation’s defence 
capability in order to depend freedom against the red menace and to 
stimulate economic rehabilitation in order to enjoy the freedom… 
Without independent spirit, effort to self-help spirit, self-regulating 
action and economical independence, it is proven that the democracy 
just in appearance leads to a way of disorder and ruin according to past 
experience (“New Year Message for 1962, 1 January 1962). 
 
Without economic growth, there is no emergence from poverty, without 
economic growth, there is no elimination from unemployment. Also 
without economic growth, there is no victory over communism in the 
long run which brings the emancipation of Northern brethren and 
unification that the force of freedom overflow (“Inauguration Speech for 
6th President”, 1 July 1967). 
 
As described above, as Park’s regime recognised modernisation as a 
measure to accomplish its purpose of anticommunism and anti-North 
Korea, its rationalised itself in terms of political legitimacy. Therefore, 
any action to obstruct economic construction, such as democratic 





                                                                                                                        
Consequently, economic policy took precedence over all other policy considerations, 





Legitimacy Politics and Social Security Investigation Committee 
 
As discussed, the social consensus, developmentalism and 
anticommunism, had been made under compulsion and the developmental 
and authoritarian government had been absorbed in economic growth. 
How can we then explain a move towards social security in the 1960s? In 
this part, the answer will be presented and the Social Security 
Investigation Committee (hereafter SSIC) will be described. 
 
Legitimacy Politics and Social Policy 
 
When social policy was introduced in Korea, the Government and capital 
were organised as an alliance for economic growth based on 
developmentalism and the growth-first ideology, whereas labour was 
suppressed. In addition, the discourses of developmentalism and 
anticommunism are never in concordance with social welfare. In addition, 
‘in 1960, when the per capita GNP in Korea was only US$80, the 
majority of Korean people were in absolute poverty, without any social 
protection. Social welfare had never been in the policy agendas of the 
government’ (Shin, 2003: 62).  
What is more interesting is that there is no doubt that the IACI and 
Health Care was introduced even without pressure group politics as well 
as class politics. How was the introduction of welfare institutions without 
class politics possible? This will be discussed in terms of legitimacy 
politics.  
The Third Republic mainly made a priority of national policy on 
national defense and security, and economic growth based on 
anticommuinism and developmentalism. On the other hand, ‘the military 
junta, after the 5.16 coup, took an equivocal attitude about the 





not have the professional competence to suggest a vision on social 
welfare. This was the same in the introduction of IACI’ (Woo, 2007: 166). 
Nevertheless, immediately after the coup in 1961, the Highest Congress 
for State Reconstruction made a public notice that the government would 
go towards social welfare. In particular, General Park urged a related 
body for social security to introduce insurance for industrial injured 
workers:  
 
We will make our best efforts to improve the quality of ordinary peoples’ 
living and establish the welfare society by the introduction of a social 
security system based on social assistance and social insurance 
programmes (Editing Board for History of the Korean Military 
Revolution, 1963: 391, recited in Shin, 2003: 62).  
 
The junta needed to show its legitimacy and at that time people had 
higher expectations for reform which stemmed from the 4.19 Student’s 
Revolution and the trial of the Second Republic. Therefore, the coup 
government felt a pressure to show its reformist character.  
For a more fundamental reason, the military government prepared 
for a presidential election because it promised the transition from military 
government to civil government in 1963. Therefore, the junta perceived 
that massive political support was critical to its survival (Woo, 2004: 37). 
A thing to note here is that economic growth was a crucial factor in 
legitimising the military junta. Nevertheless, why was it necessary that 
schemes with social policy should be introduced? This was because ‘the 
military junta increasingly lost its popularity due to the lack of visible 
economic performance, two years of poor harvest, insufficient social 
reforms, and Park’s reluctance to relinquish the military government. In 
the face of the presidential election in October 1963, in which Park 
himself planned to run as a candidate, the military junta needed to elevate 





As can be seen above, the junta intended to justify the coup in ‘the 
modernisation of the fatherland’, namely economic growth, but its effect 
would present over a long-term period. Thus, it needed to show some 
visual achievements at that time for the coming election. This attitude 
resulted in showing a desire for social security and social welfare. Kwon 
pointed out that:  
 
Legitimacy through economic performance was a long-term strategy 
and would take time to produce visible results. Meanwhile those in 
power needed a short-term strategy of legitimacy, especially because of 
their violation of constitutional rules and democratic principles (1999: 
41).  
 
As indicated above, because the social welfare system was introduced for 
the election, it was not a result of in-depth discussion and there was much 
limitation. For example, the social insurance just for professional groups 
such as professional soldiers, teachers and civil servants was first 
introduced. In the case of the IACI, its coverage was also limited, as can 
be seen in workers at firms with more than 500 employees in IACI.  
 
Establishment of Social Security Investigation Committee 
 
The military junta set up the SSIC as an advisory agency under the 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (hereafter MOHSA) in 1962. After 
the Cabinet Decree No. 469 of General Park in 1962 was sent, the 
MOHSA and the SSIC promoted the introduction of IACI, and after much 
deliberation 116  in the departments concerned, it was finally passed 
through the Standing Committee of the SCNR on 8 October 1963. This 
part will focus on the establishment of SSIC. 
                                                 
116 The process of investigation is as follows: Investigation in the SSIC  Acceptance 
of the Minister of MOHSA  Discussion in departments of the Government and 
Investigation of the Office of Legislation  Discussion in the Standing Committee of 





In the ‘Revolutionary Pledge’ there was no mention of social 
welfare programmes, although there was a pledge; ‘the solution to the 
immediate problem of people’s economic plight’. Yet, the SCNR vowed 
to aim at ‘the construction of welfare society’ in the ‘Direction of Basic 
Policy’ for enforcement in 1962. In accordance with this guide, the 
MOHSA made a draft titled the ‘Regulation on SSIC’ and submitted it to 
the Cabinet Council. This regulation named the Cabinet Decree was 
promulgated on 20 February 1962 (MOL, 2004, 16; Son, 1981: 28). 
According to this decree, the SSIC was created the next month. The body 
was an advisory agency within the MOHSA for the minister of health and 
social affairs. The SSIC117 first of all investigate and study the social 
security system to fit the reality of the country and carry out legislation 
and gradual study for the extended enforcement of a social security 
system through a pilot operation and the assessment of social security 
systems.   
The SSIC was divided into two structures: Plenary Committee and 
its four Standing Committees. The Plenary Committee consisted of less 
than 20 members. It was headed by the Vice-Minister of MOHSA while 
members could be appointed among persons of learning and experience 
on social security systems and civil servants. The term of office was one 
year (MOL, 2004: 16-17).  
On the other hand, there were four sections under the Plenary 
Committee: Comprehension, Health Care, Public Assistance and Labour. 
The researchers in each section were nominated among ‘persons of 
learning and experience on social security’ appointed by the Minister of 
                                                 
117 Before the SSIC took shape in 1962 it was a voluntary study group looking into the 
possibility of state medical insurance. At the beginning there were eight people in the 
group, including a doctor, intellectuals and civil servants. They were proud of their work, 
which might contribute to the future introduction of social welfare programmes. They 
produced several pamphlets, most of which outlined social welfare programmes and 
anticipated possible obstacles to their introduction. After the military coup by Cabinet 





the MOHSA. They were responsible for researches and studies on affairs 
of social security.  In the initial stage, there were two researchers in 
every section of whom one was a chief researcher and the other was an 
assistant researcher. Just Shim of total eight researchers was a civil 
servant while others were experts (MOL, 2004: 17-18). Likewise, most of 
members were experts.  
 
Table 5-1 Section and Member of Standing Committee  
Name of Section Chief Researcher Assistant Researcher 
Comprehension Man-Jae Cho Sang-Bok Nam 
Health Care Cheon-Song Choi Nam-Hee Kang 
Public Assistance Sang-Moo Hann Pill-Jae Park 
Labour Gang-Sup Shim Boo-Ki Min 
Sorces:  MOL, 1997: 16 
 
The sections regarded social security for workers as the most immediate 
priority and started to discuss it (Choi, 1991: 34- 35).  
Amid the discussion about the social security system in the SSIC, 
the chairman of the SCNR at a press conference in May 1962, General 
Park Chung-Hee, mentioned for the first time the introduction of social 
security programmes. He presented his interest particularly in the issue of 
‘equal access to health’ and he also paid attention to the importance of a 
social security system based upon social insurance and public relief. In 
addition, Park then presented his order memorandum titled the ‘Cabinet 
Decree No. 469’ on 28 July 1962, requesting the introduction of social 
welfare programmes (Kwon, 1999: 52-53; Woo, 2004: 37). The memo to 
the cabinet stated that its aim was ‘to increase the national income and 
protect the people from unemployment, sickness, and old age; to pay 





effective relief measures’ (Woo, 2004: 37). In addition, this decree 
ordered to select and establish social insurances to be easily conducted:  
 
The Government has carried out social assistance for the poor under the 
Livelihood Protection Law, but stable social security systems that 
people, employers and the Government can attend should be introduced 
in accordance with economic development. The Government will guide 
to establish comprehensive social security systems and to first establish 
some social insurances which are easy to enforce (SCNR, 1962).  
 
The decree showed the will of Park, the chairman of SCNR, which 
seemed to be a critical momentum in introducing the initial social security 
system. There is no doubt that this decree itself was a chairman’s token 
for the introduction of a social security system (Woo, 2007: 167). Thanks 
to this decree, the morale of experts in SSIC was greatly raised and the 
study of social security was full of spirit (Son, 1981: 36). 
Consequently, the IACI was first created as one of the social 
security programmes. Furthermore the introduction of Health Care was 
tried in order to realise an ideal of equal medical allotments. In other 
words, just before the transfer of power to the elected government, the 
IACIA was enacted on 5 December 1963 and the Health Care Law was 
legislated just eleven days later. Researches on social security 
subsequently continued and the results were presented as the Social 
Welfare Services Act in January 1970 and a draft for the National Pension 
Act in December 1973, which were both products of the SSIC (Choi, 
1991: 35). 
As written above, it is acknowledged that the SSIC played a vital 
role in producing the foundation of a social security system in Korea 












Agendas were set in the Labour Section of the SSIC (later changed to the 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Section118). The section 
which first participated in the introduction of a social security system 
should decide what a top priority in the performance of social insurance 
was. Therefore, there has been a variety of discussions about the order of 
precedence. As a result, the section decided the introduction of IACI and 
the Unemployment Insurance was the pressing domestic problem (MOL, 
1997: 17). This was because much interest in Unemployment Insurance 
had been at that time expressed by trade unions and there had also been a 
discussion about the establishment of legal compensation under social 
insurance rather than the Labour Standard Act.   
First of all, the problem of unemployment and its insurance had, 
as written above, been suggested for a long time since the nation’s 
liberation from Japanese colonial rule. Thus, the public as well as workers 
had known what the insurance was and public opinion also supported its 
introduction (MOL, 1997: 18). Yet, the section decided that insurance for 
an unemployed person was not possible at the time. This was because of 
the difficulty in creating the necessary funds and inappropriate timing. In 
the case of timing, Park wanted a clear plan to be prepared in time for his 
New Year press conference in January 1963 because there would soon be 
an election for presidency (Kwon, 1999: 53). 
                                                 
118 The reason why the name of the section was changed is because of change of 
function. The Labour Section considered at first the introduction of the Unemployment 
Insurance and the IACI. But, all the members of this section reached a conclusion that 
introduction of the Unemployment Insurance would be premature. Therefore, they 
discussed about introduction of the IACI. From then, the name, Labour Section of the 
SSIC, was naturally changed to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Section. 
In addition, the section strengthened itself through employing a new person as a assistant 





Therefore, the Labour Section of the SSIC decided to postpone the 
introduction of unemployment insurance but it expected that a defined 
plan for the insurance might be formed in the First Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan which was presented in July 1961(MOL, 1997: 19).  
Based on the above discussion, the SSIC made a decision to 
introduce the IACI. What then was the reason why the IACI of all 
insurances was first introduced in Korea?  
According to the Government’s explanation, historically the 
advanced countries had already examined social measures for injured 
workers one century ago, and in the early 1960s, nearly half of all the 
countries on Earth had introduced industrial injury schemes. Thus, the 
introduction of IACI was decided as the utmost priority of the 
Government (MOL, 2004: 19-20; 1981: 4). In addition, the Labour 
Section of the SSIC considered that injured workers faced more difficult 
financial situations than the unemployed because of the dual difficulties 
of injured workers in the loss of their ability to work as well as their need 
for health care (Kwon, 1999: 53: 80; MOL, 1981: 27). Nevertheless, there 
were many problems in the existing scheme for injured workers, Labour 
Standard Act. This was because the law did not cover injured workers in 
smaller companies. Thus, many injured workers were in a dead zone of 
protection outside the law. In addition, ‘The drawback of Labour 
Standard Act was that it did not guarantee that compensation would be 
paid, as employers only had to pay if their financial situation allowed’ 
(Kwon, 1999: 80).  
Yet, unlike the official explanation of the Ministry of Labour, the 
true reason why the IACI was first introduced seems to be due to the 
necessity of protection of labour power for industrialisation and less 
burden on employers.  
In detail, there seemed to be no problem in finance for the 





1953 Labour Standard Act, so the only thing that needed to be done was 
to turn this into compulsory insurance’ (Kwon, 1999: 53). Furthermore, it 
seemed not to put a big burden on businesses and the Government 
because it only covered workplaces with more than 500 employees119 
and it would be implemented with the employers’ contribution (Woo, 
2004: 39). 
It was assessed that the reason that the IACI was introduced was 
the intention of state which would like to keep and reproduce labour 
power for industrialization. This could be found in the discussions of the 
researchers of SSIC who were responsible for basic study on the IACI. 
The experts in those days considered which insurance of Unemployment 
or the IACI should be introduced first, and they selected the IACI as their 
first task. This is because there would be industrialisation according to the 
First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) and the 
Government should accordingly take measures for industrial injury and 
protection of the labour force. This attitude was also clearly found in the 
‘the Government’s Labour Policy Direction’. According to an official 
document written by the Labour Office, the scientific development and 
preservation of manpower were necessary in order to push for the First 
Five-Year Economic Development Plan. The document pointed out that 
to arrive at this goal, the IACI as well as vocational training and job 
security needed to be conducted (Kim, 1994: 42-43; Woo, 2007: 176). 
From this point of view, there is no doubt that the trial for the 
introduction of IACI was in accordance with developmentalism.  
Moreover, it seemed that the IACI was relatively easy to 
implement rather than other schemes. This is because the compensation 
for industrial injured workers was being conducted by the Labour 
Standard Act, which was introduced in 1953, and the collective 
                                                 
119 In fact, it showed that ‘as of 1965, industrial accident insurance covered 8.6 percent 





bargaining in individual firms. Lastly, there was not a problem in the 
IACI unlike the Unemployment Insurance in which there might be 
problems, such as reducing the will to work. Also, it was expected that 
the compensation from the IACI was a kind of poverty prevention, so it 
could reduce the burden of the Livelihood Protection Law. These reasons 
made the Government decide on the introduction of IACI (Min, 1963: 79).  
The bill for the IACI and its plan of operation sailed almost intact 
through the SSIC in July 1963. The SSIC put up a solitary struggle over 
two years for the introduction of IACI and the first stage of the work was 
completed (MOL, 2004: 23- 24). 
 
Vocation of Experts and Bureaucrats 
 
It is generally accepted that at the time, the 1960s social security 
system was introduced thanks to experts and bureaucrats. Son regards the 
welfare system introduced in the early 1960s as ‘a result of compromise 
and discussion between experts and bureaucrats’ (1981: 4). This means 
that they played a key role rather than pressure groups or trade unions in 
introducing social welfare. This can be understood in establishing the 
SSIC and introducing the IACI.  
First of all, this SSIC was set up based on a private meeting titled 
the ‘Health Care Research Society’ which had been run by experts, 
bureaucrats, doctors, etc. since October 1959 and was held on Thursdays 
every week. The members tried to affect bureaucrats and policy-makers 
on social policy and they later became the members of SSIC. They tried 
to persuade the members and especially the president of the SCNR to 
materialise social security system as soon as possible. The effort led to 
the Regulation on SSIC and the Cabinet Decree No. 469 of the president 





10). In this context, Son (1981) called them ‘initiators’ or ‘originators’ of 
social policy. 
With regard to the introduction of the IACI, there were five main 
men who were closely related to the introduction, such as Hee-Seop 
Jeong (Minister of MOHSA), Chong-Cheol Hong (Culture and Society 
Committee of SCNR), Kang-Sup Shim, Bu-Ki Nam, Yeun-Ho Nam 
(researchers of SSIC) (Son, 1981, 55): 
 
“If there was no minister Jeong and the committee member Hong who 
tried to introduce the insurance, it would have taken a long time in the 
establishment of the institution. Thus, we should highly assess their best 
efforts” (MOL, 198: 58).  
 
The important thing is that the experts successfully persuaded 
bureaucrats to understand the necessity of IACI. In other words, it shows 
that the minister Jeong and the committee member Hong finally accepted 
their explanation (Son, 1981: 28-30).  Through this process, the five men 
felt a sense of pride and obligation for introducing a social security 
system. They thought that social reform could be achieved on the back of 
a reformist atmosphere in a military revolution (Woo, 2007: 171).  
In the stage of proposing a scheme for industrial injury, the 
relevant body was the Labour Section of the SSIC and its staff had Kang-
Sup Shim as a technical expert and Yun-Ho Nam and Bu-Ki Min as his 
assistants (MOL, 2004: 17). Cheon-Song Choi, a member of Health Care, 
remembered them as outstanding players:  
 
“In the whole course, from drawing up the bill to passing the SCNR and 
promulgating the law, the researchers of SSIC directly intervened. 
Namely, they played a role like the job of a midwife and accordingly 
there was nothing to pass through their hands. In addition, they drew 
drafts for flow-up measures… Viewing through the whole process of 







As can be seen above, the three experts in the Labour Section of the SSIC 
contributed to the IACI introduction as they actively participated in 
making and passing the bill (MOL, 1982: 3). Likewise, the Government 
could not have carried the legislation off without their help (Choi, 1991: 
35). 
What is important to note is that if there had been no help from 
bureaucrats in this stage of policy-making, the establishment of the IACI 
would have been impossible. In this stage, there were main actors such as 
Hee-Sup Jung, minister of MOHSA, and Chong-Cheol Hong, a member 
of Culture and Society Committee at the SCNR.  
There was a prevalent atmosphere of skepticism in the economy-
related departments of the Government whilst introducing social 
insurance. In this situation, Yun-Ho Nam, assistant of researcher of SSCI, 
was charged with seeking bureaucrats’ consent in relatively low-ranking 
government officials rather than directors or chiefs, and he made 
outstanding contributions in accomplishing this mission (Son, 1981: 56-
57). On the other hand, the competent minister Chung actively tried to 
persuade ministers of each department, especially focusing on economy 
ministers (MOL, 2004: 28-29).  
On the other hand, Hong actively supported the introduction of 
social security, paying close attention to the IACI and he played an 
important role in the final stage of the SCNR: 
 
“Without Chong-Cheol Hong, it would have been difficult for processes 
to be favourably run and finally pass in the SCNR.... He stressed the 
importance of the introduction of the IACI to members of SCNR and 
ministers of government and took the lead in persuading them” (Woo, 
2007: 167). 
 
As shown above, experts not only make policy-makers recognise 
the importance and significance of the IACI and but also provided the 





expertise to the decision makers and to draft policy proposals once the 
decision makers had formulated their broad policy orientation. More 
importantly however, they also influenced the decision makers’ 
perceptions of social policy’ (Kwon, 1999: 31). On the other hand, 
relevant civil servants’ support helped to pass this law in the process of 
policy-making.  
In conclusion, the IACIA was a joint production of experts and 
bureaucrats. Yet, we should not overlook the fact that without the consent 
of Park, the highest person in the SCNR, the enactment would have been 
absolutely impossible. In other words, ‘although they were able to 
propose new policy ideas, they were unable to change the general 
orientation of policy because this stemmed from the political philosophy 
of the decision makers. If there was a difference between the orientation 
of the top decision makers, especially the president and that of the policy 
experts, the latter was marginalised from the decision-making process’ 
(Kwon, 1999: 31). It is noticeable that Park’s will was very important and 
played a crucial role in introducing the insurance. Yet, there is another 
noticeable point, that experts affected his will and decision. In fact, the 
Cabinet Decree was created thanks to the experts’ influence on the 
chairman: 
 
The Cabinet Decree was drawn up in the background that the 
researchers of SSIC persuade bureaucrats, especially the president of 
Culture and Society Committee in SCNR, Young-Mun Kim, and a 
committee member Chong-Cheol Hong, to understand the importance of 
social security through many meetings, and the bureaucrats who agreed 
with the researchers also talked the president of SCNR, Park, into 
receiving the will of researchers (Son, 1981: 37). 
 
As can seen in the above statement, the Cabinet Decree which played a 






Trade Unions and Employers: Onlooking and Passive Resistance 
 
Trade union or employers did not raise the question of social insurance 
for industrial injured workers until the government did but their basic 
views were in opposition to enactment. In particular, the introduction of 
IACI was opposed by state-owned companies, big private companies, 
even trade unions, contrary to expectation. From the point of view of the 
big companies, they had the ability to pay compensation and tended to 
think that in terms of labour control it was more rational for an employer 
to directly compensate injured workers. Likewise, employers thought that 
it was more profitable for labour management that employers made direct 
payment to injured workers in workplaces.   
Meanwhile, the FKTU worried about a decrease in compensation 
as a result of the introduction of the insurance. This was because they 
tended to believe that benefits were higher in collective bargaining rather 
than in the insurance. In other words, trade unions tended to think as 
follows: ‘injured workers through collective bargaining were now 
compensated for more than benefits and compensation based on the 
Labour Standard Act’. In this situation, they doubted whether the level 
based on the coming insurance for injured workers would be less than the 
existing level (MOL, 1981: 27; Kim, 1994: 52, 63).  
However, both bodies did not officially express their internal 
intention before the enactment of the law and they were just looking at 
the policy-making process to be conducted in the political governmental 
area. During the process, there were two public hearings held by the 
Labour Section of the SSIC. In these meetings, the Government tried to 
persuade trade unions and employers to receive the introduction of IACI 
(SCNR, 1963: 88-89; MOL, 2004: 26; Woo, 2007: 166). From the point 







“We can provide injured workers with enough payment and we have 
done well under the Labour Stand Law. So we cannot understand why 
the Government would like to build up another institution so that the 
work for compensation becomes more complex. If claims for 
compensation are done, our employers will have double burden. Thus, 
the existing way is right and helpful in labour management” (MOL, 
2004: 26). 
 
Meanwhile, trade unions made criticisms in these meetings: ’we are doing 
collective bargaining. In the negotiation, we aim for a compensation of 
level of 100/100 for benefit for suspended work. But the expected benefit 
in the insurance and the existing benefit in the Labour Standard Act are 
just 60/100’ (MOL, 2004: 26). The perspective of trade unions can be 
seen in the statement of Shim, expert of SSIC: 
 
“We indicated that in the case of benefit for suspended work it was valid 
for more than 60/100 through collective bargaining because the benefit 
level, 60/100, in the Labour Standard Act, was the lowest level. Despite 
our explanation, a trade unionist broke onto the platform and asked us 
to stop our briefing. During the process, some pages of our briefing 
chart were damaged” (MOL, 200: 26). 
 
Despite the disturbances, general labour and businesses seemed to be 
silent during the legislation for industrial injured workers. In fact, 
proposals and recommendations from all walks of life were submitted 
from around the middle of the 1970s according to documents from the 
Ministry of Labour and annual reports from trade unions and companies. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that there was not any active assertion in the 







Policy-Making Process in Government and Parliament 
 
The process of legislation for the IACI was not at all open. Differences on 
key issues were settled only within in the Government such as the SCNR 
and relevant departments. In other words, there were no trials to collect 
extensive public opinion from businesses and labour forces except for 
during two formal public hearings. After the SSIC affiliation with the 
MOHSA was established in 1962 and the Cabinet Decree from Park was 
delivered to the Cabinet same year, the MOHSA and the SSIC quickly 
promoted the introduction of IACI. A bill introduced by the SSIC went 
through a series of investigation processes (Making a draft in the SSIC 
 admission by the Minister of MOHSA  Investigation and 
consultation with the government’s departments  Investigation and 
discussion at SCNR) and finally became a law in the SCNR on 8 October 
1963 (Woo, 2007: 167). Policy-making process will be examined here, 
focusing on the discussions and compromises of the Government and the 
SCNR.  
 
Discussion in the Government 
 
First of all, the bill for industrial injury was on the table of the Cabinet 
council soon after the compromise among relevant departments of 
government. There was a controversial point at issue, whether it was a 
social insurance or a private insurance. The military junta did not firmly 
decide a type of IACI among the type of private insurances, preservation 
of compensation in the Labour Standard Act or the mode of social 
insurance (MOL, 2004: 23-24; Son, 1983: 101-108; Woo, 2007: 166). 
Through the policy-making process, the MOHSA decided to legislate in 





the MOHSA could persuade other departments, especially economic-
related ones.  
In detail, the two laws, the ‘Law on Social Security’ and the IACI, 
were submitted at the seventieth vice ministerial meeting on 9 November. 
The former was passed but the latter was put on hold. This was because 
some vice ministers in the Government thought that it should be 
examined again at a ministerial meeting as to whether the IACI deputed 
to an insurance section of the Government such as the Ministry of Postal 
Services or a private insurance company. Consequently, the original draft 
was accepted without revision in a ministerial meeting (MOL, 2004: 28).  
The researchers of SSIC played a key role in this process. For 
example, private enterprises actively lobbied to manage the insurance 
while the researchers and some relevant bureaucrats were persuading 
each department of the Government to receive the IACI under the 
responsibility of the Government. Even some bureaucrats who regarded 
the insurance as a bother tended to agree with this opinion. In this 
situation, relevant bureaucrats, Hee-Sub Kang and Hee-Sup Chung, asked 
experts which institution among the Government, state-run companies, or 
private companies should be responsible for the insurance. Yun-Ho Nam 
and Kang-Sup Shim explained to the bureaucrats’ satisfaction that the 
Government should rightly administer the affairs of the insurance because 
of social welfare. The civil servants became convinced of the legislation 
(Son, 1981: 56-57).   
When the bill was sent to the Cabinet Council, the economy-
related departments tended to oppose the bill strongly. The Economic 
Planning Board did not answer a word to the MOHSA because it held an 
opinion that the country’s per capita income120 was less than $100 and 
just the Labour Standard Act was enough (MOL, 2004: 25). In this 
                                                 
120 Now of 1962, per capita income was $87, the amount of export was $5.480 million, 





situation, the reason why the law could be realised was the absolute 
devolution of bureaucrats, as seen in the Shim’s memoirs: 
 
“Arguing pros and cons at the eight days’ vice ministerial meetings, 
Minster Chung ordered me to prepare for ‘a briefing chart’ and he said, 
“let’s explain the IACI to some ministers at 8 am every day before the 
Cabinet council on 17 November”. He added, “they do not seem to fully 
understand so I would like to explain the main points of social insurance. 
Let us make a full explanation”. Likewise, we planned to await a 
minister in his secretary’s office every morning before being at his office. 
We visited first the Minister of EPB, Yong-Seok Won. Minister Won was 
struck dumb when he saw us and told us “I fully know this issue. You 
don't have to do all this”. We visited the Minister of Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry the 
next morning but we didn’t give a briefing on social security because 
they understood our intention and quite a few agreed with the plan. 
Instead, since we were there, we tried to talk over a cup of tea about our 
goal. According to an after-talk, there was an unprecedented event in 
history that a minister himself/herself visited in the early morning in 
order to explain a matter. It’s really inspired me to the long-term 
civilian life” (Shim K.S., MOL, 2004: 28-29). 
 
As a result of the above efforts, the Law on Social Security was passed 
with revision at the 94th regular session of the Cabinet Council and at the 
same session the bill, IACI, was also approved in its original form. 
 
Discussion in the Highest State Committee on Reconstruction 
 
On 8 October 1963 at 10 am, the bills on IACI and Social Security came 
up for debate in the Standing Committee of SCNR. Contrary to 
expectation, the interpolation on these bills took two hours. In addition to 
an article-by-article discussion, the meeting was closed at 3:32 pm. The 
minutes reached 264 pages (in handwriting).  
Prior to the interpolation and article-by-article, Chong-Cheol 






“These two bills were drawn from the administrative policy in 1962 and 
1963, and the Cabinet Decree that His Excellency the Chairman directly 
ordered. According to these plans, the SSIC, an adjunct to the MOHSA, 
has studied for two years conducting field surveys, discussing with 
relevant departments, making verbal modification and modifying the text 
of these bills. Now, we would like submit these bills and we hope you 
will cooperate with the procedures” (SCNR, 1963: 6-7). 
 
Hong mentioned that these bills were from a clear instruction of Park, 
chairman of SCNR and reminded them that these bills were based on 
much discussion. He quickly urged them to pass them without more 
debate. Yet, an unexpectedly fierce controversy broke out over these bills. 
This debate was developed around some points in dispute, such as time 
being not yet ripe for social security, the immature ability of 
administration and consignment management (MOL, 2004: 48). Because 
the last two issues are closely related, the issues are categorised into one. 
So here they will be examined two categories. 
With regard to the first point in dispute, that the introduction of a 
social security system was difficult in a situation of economic crisis, Ju-Il 
Lee, the deputy chairman of Standing Committee of SCNR, mentioned as 
follows: 
 
“Although there will be any deal of damage in state-run companies, they 
are ok because of the Government’s loans and investments. On the 
contrary, because private enterprises lack working funds they will be 
completely ruined just with small damage. In this situation, Premium for 
injured workers is a big burden to these companies and might lead to 
them closing their doors” (SCNR, 1963: 32-34).  
 
This statement supports the claim that it was not the time to introduce the 
IACI in the difficult economic situation121. An official, Bong-Su Kang 
                                                 
121 The similar statements continued all through the meeting as follows: ‘Now, just 26 
per cent of companies more that 500 employees is working because of fuel shortage and 
others. In this situation, is it a wrong decision for social insurance?’ ‘Now the 
Government is in financial difficulties. Nevertheless, the plan provides the insurance 





who was in the Office of Planning & Coordination of MOHSA, rebutted: 
“the IACI is good for all business and workers. It’s our unfailing faith” 
(SCNR, 1963: 121):  
 
“An employer with an industrial injured worker is responsible for the 
accident in the existing institution. Thus, the employers may be ruined 
with compensation in one lump. The social insurance plans to provide 
for this situation. Namely, employers pay a small sum of money and 
companies with injured workers will benefit from the insurance without 
damage. Thus, the insurance can rather protect business bankruptcy” 
(SCNR, 1963: 32-34). 
 
The Second issue was who would manage the IACI. In the meeting, there 
were many critics of the plan that the MOHSA would operate the 
insurance. Others suggested that a private insurance company or the 
Ministry of Postal Services should be responsible for the management of 
the insurance (MOL, 2004: 31-32). Their logic was based on the fact that 
the Ministry of Postal Services used to manage the Military Pension. In 
addition, they asked why a new body should be established, although a 
private insurance company could be responsible for the insurance. A 
member of the Home Affairs Committee of SCNR pointed out that: 
 
“The Public Officials Pension is operated by the Government because 
it’s for civil servants. Yet, I cannot understand why the Government 
wants to manage insurance for workers. Unlike the Ministry of Postal 
Services, the MOHSA hasn’t treated any insurance. So if it’s surely 
managed by the Government, is it put in hands of the Ministry of Postal 
Services rather than the MOHSA?” (Park, Y.S.,  SCNR, 1963: 104-
105). 
 
Bong-Soo Kang answered this question: 
 
“Our MOHSA would like to be not necessarily responsible for the IACI. 
…Our minister also orders an examination of whether the insurance 
                                                                                                                        






could be entrusted to the Ministry of Postal Services. Yet, after taking 
everything into consideration, we reached a conclusion that the MOHSA 
cannot but manage the insurance” (SCNR, 1963: 102). 
 
The issue of who should be in charge of the IACI started in SSIC’s 
suggestion that the competent organisation was the MOHSA. In fact, 
there had been debates about this issue in the MOHSA and vice 
ministerial meetings before the debate in the SCNR. Finally, the 
discussion ended as the acceptance of initial plan, responsibility of 
MOHSA. 
Through the prescribed formalities, the bill was submitted in the 
Standing Committee of SCNR. In this meeting the interpolation for the 
bill on IACI just ended and the SCNR went to an article-by-article 
discussion, but members still had a fierce battle rather than their hearts 
softened. In this situation, as soon as Hong strongly mentioned, the 
chairman of SCNR adjourned the meeting for a compromise among 
members. It was exactly at 12:53pm when the meeting began again and it 
was declared closed at 3:32 pm (MOL, 2004: 34-35). 
As can be seen in the process, what should be noted above is that 
the IACI plunged into a highly critical crisis because of a low level 
economy and strong opposition. However, on each occasion Chong-Cheol 
Hong, member of SCNR, strongly and faithfully appealed to the others 
with the explanation of the importance of IACI and the law was finally 
passed with difficulty (MOL, 1981: 37).  
The amendment was finally adopted at the SCNR on 5 November 
1963 and came into effect on 1 July 1964. It covered firms with more 
than 500 employers. ‘The IACI was funded entirely out of contributions 
from employers, with the government paying for a portion of the 
administration costs. The benefits would cover medical expenses in full if 
the period of treatment exceeded three days. The programme would also 





covered workers’ who died as a result of industrial accidents’ (IACIA, 
1997: Article 40 in Shin, 2003: 64).  
Referring to the fixed content of IACI, because the political 
strategy of legitimacy placed the fundamental emphasis on economic 
performance, social policy was to a great extent constrained by the 
priority given to economic policy. This constraint was deeply embedded 
in the structure of IACI, affecting the method by which they were 
financed and the gradual expansion of coverage (Kwon, 1999: 42).  
 
 
3. Pressure Group Politics and APPPPW 1984 
 
 
Re-Appearance of Authoritarian State and Lack of Legitimacy 
 
President Park was assassinated on 12 October 1979. The death directly 
stemmed from a conflict among factions in the ruling block, but the crisis 
had already begun outside in the late 1970s. First of all, strikes were 
increasing in the late 1970s which were led by new trade unions called 
militant (or democratic) unionism. A female worker’s death on 11 August 
1979122 became a triggering event of an antigovernment demonstration. 
Also, a resistance on Park Chung-Hee’s dictatorship took place in civil 
society as could be seen in the demonstration in Pusan and Masan from 
16 to 26 October 1979. Furthermore, there were struggles for power 
between factions in the ruling block (Kim, 2003: 223-230). In terms of 
the economy, the second oil shock in 1979 and economic recession which 
came from the over investment into the heavy chemical industry 
                                                 
122 The workers in YH Trading Co., a small company, made a strike in opposition partly 
because there were delayed wages but the president of the trading company ran away to 





challenged ‘the myth of economic development’ which had kept the 
Yushin regime. This lead the Government into a crisis (Kim, 1998: 366). 
After Park’s death, there was a military coup on 12 December 
1979 by a new group of militarists, of which a major general, Doo-Hwan 
Chun, was the head. The group arrested the chief martial law 
administrator, general Cheong. This was a revolt against seniors through 
which Chun seized power. The 12.12 coup can be explained by the fact 
that the moderates in the militarists were eliminated by a new military 
group who wanted to extend the Yushin regime. 
However, until the 5.17 Martial Law in 1980 was expanded, a 
short period of political liberalisation started for about five months. There 
was a freedom, although politics was unstable; ‘The civil society was 
suddenly resurrected’ (Koo, 2001: 100). Student movements for a 
democratic government were increasing in May 1980. On the other hand, 
‘a wave of labour unrest erupted in spring 1980. The number of reported 
labour disputes increased sharply from 105 in 1979 to 407 in 1980. The 
absolute majority of these conflicts were concerned with economic issues 
such as delayed payments, wage increases plant closings, and layoffs’ 
(Koo, 2001: 100). Therefore, it was important that trade unions on a strike 
were organised well with a firm ideology. In fact, just a few trade unions 
were organised for strikes while the majority supported the new political 
group.   
On the pretext that the political situation was very confused, the 
new military authorities proclaimed martial law and expanded the 
application of the law on 17 May 1980. As the military group took 
completely power in May 1980, the short-term political liberalisation 
called the ‘1980 Political Spring’ abruptly ended. ‘The return to military 
rule under Doo-Hwan Chun was accompanied by a mass killing that took 
place in Gwangju city in 1980, the capital of South Jeolla Provice, in the 





thousands of citizens organised themselves for a demonstration against 
Chun’s coup. They were finally armed in front of the brutal military 
crackdown and the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Uprising resulted in the 
political tragedy which had the ‘biggest victims123 after the Korean War’ 
(Kim, 2003: 239). The defeat of democratic groups in Gwangju meant 
that the dark days began, and stayed until the 1987 Democratisation 
Movement. 
As can be seen in the above description, the authoritarian 
government continued after the assassination of Park Chung-Hee. In the 
same context, dominant ideologies such as anticommunism and 
developmentalism were kept. This was because the Chun Doo-Hwan 
Government (1980-1987) took political power with an illegal measure 
like Park, whose junior of the Military Academy was Chun. What is 
interesting is that President Chun added another ideology, ‘welfare 
society and social justice’, to economic growth and national security. This 
can be seen in his presidential inauguration speech on 1 November 1980: 
“This Government enables people to internalise democracy in terms of 
our situation, constructs welfare state, materialises justice society and 
enhances national consciousness through the promotion of cultural 
standard” (Kim, 2003: 245). Likewise, the Government proposed the 
‘Construction of a Welfare State’ but it was not until the late 1990s that 
the promise started to be more or less realised.  
 
 
Politics of Establishment of APPPPW  
 
Background and Key Players 
 
                                                 
123 The Government officially announced that there were 191 victims and 852 wounded 





There were several reasons for introducing the APPPPW, such as the 
miners’ strike in 1980, necessity and sympathy for better treatment of 
pneumoconiosis patients, the upcoming 1985 general election, the efforts 
of actors concerned with pneumoconiosis patients etc. However, the 1980 
miners’ strike was not directly related to pneumoconiosis as it was a 
conflict between miners around hegemony of miners’ trade union. 
Therefore, others will be examined in this part.  
First of all, the APPPPW was introduced due to a social consensus 
that patients with CWP should be cared for but the existing laws and 
institutions were very limited.  After the enactment of the Labour 
Standard Act in 1953, there was also the introduction of the Industrial 
Safety and Health Act in 1981 which was an independent law about 
industrial safety and health and the position of Ministry of Labour was 
upgraded from the Labour Office to the Ministry of Labour. This shows 
that the policy on industrial safety and health went into its stride. In this 
context, the interest of pneumoconiosis gradually increased with growing 
pneumoconiosis patients and interest in the industrial disease:  
 
Pneumoconiosis sufferers find it difficult to live because pneumoconiosis 
is complicated and cardiopulmonary function is worse after leaving 
their work around dust. As a drift of coal mines gradually deepens and 
working conditions are worse, the necessity for disease prevention is 
high. Therefore, the APPPPW was introduced in order to improve 
pneumoconiosis protection and control and care for the lives of 
pneumoconiosis patients (MOL, 1985: 118). 
 
Likewise, there had been a consensus among people for the seriousness of 
pneumoconiosis.124  This is because pneumoconiosis is a wasting disease 
and there was no cure. Nevertheless, the existing laws and schemes were 
not enough to handle the disease: 
 
                                                 
124 Pneumoconiosis outbreaks in mining industry were over 90% in 1984 and its 





“I think pneumoconiosis can be more or less treated in the current laws, 
the Mining Safety Act or the Industrial Safety and Health Act, but there 
is nothing especially for pneumoconiosis patients.  Therefore, I think 
that special laws for sufferers with specific industrial diseases should be 
introduced” (Assemblyman Lee, H.K., NA, 17/12/1981: 14).  
 
Furthermore, pneumoconiosis patients were in unfavorable circumstances 
because CWP appeared after long-term working and it was therefore 
difficult to impute responsibility to employers. This fact made it difficult 
for pneumoconiosis patients to win a suit for compensation.  
It should be also noted that political reasons were an important 
factor in introducing the APPPPW. The upcoming 1985 general election 
was recognised as a very important election to the ruling party, the 
Democratic Justice Party. This is because the upcoming general election 
was a barometer of the election for presidency as well as assessment of 
the Fifth Republic after the military coup in 1979 and the brutal military 
crackdown on the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Uprising in 1980. The 
Government and the ruling party wanted to introduce several schemes for 
social welfare as a measure of winning the election. In this context the 
APPPPW was promoted. An assemblyman, Chun-Young Son, mentioned 
the APPPPW introduction as follows:  
 
“We have tried to make a beautiful country since the Fifth Republic 
which targets ‘to realise society of justice and welfare’. Under the motor, 
we have made a constant effort with all of a mind. As a result, its 
economy has kept stability and growth and our country’s status in the 
world becomes elevated. But it is undeniable that there are still many 
people who need warm help and special care around us. We must be the 
first for our neighbourhood with all possible methods” (NA, 
13/12/1984: 19). 
 
The parliament under the leadership of ruling party therefore began with 
discussion of this petition and eventually passed it in 1984 soon before 
the general election. Likewise, the coming general election in 1985 led to 





There is no doubt that a crucial reason was that relevant actors had 
made efforts towards introduction of the law. There had been pressures 
from all sides for the introduction; trade unions, patients, the Government, 
experts, civic groups etc. All the interviewees for this thesis maintained 
that the law was enacted by their endeavours. In other words, each actor 
thought that he/she rather than others played a main role in the enactment.  
In the case of the APP, it is assessed that the APP played a main 
role in proposing the introduction of the APPPPW125. Jun-Sik Hyun, who 
was the first president in the area of Hwanggi and closely related to 
enactment of the APPPPW, looks back upon its processes as is follows:  
 
“We have very frequently visited the National Assembly and the 
Ministry of Labour in order to the introduction of APPPPW since the 
early 1980s. At last the law is introduced by efforts of all executives and 
members of the APP. We were moved to tears. The enactment actually 
proved that each sufferer has no power but pneumoconiosis patients to 
unite around the APP can wield too much power” (Journal of APP(No. 
1), 20 May 1995). 
 
On the other hand, the FKTU, the nation’s largest labour umbrella 
organisation, tended to leave the matter to the KFCWTU or the APP126. 
At that time, the FKTU did not have much interest in industrial injuries. It 
was not until the 2000s that the FKTU paid close attention to this issue 
but its activity remained in support of the APP and the KFCWTU: 
 
There is a limitation in the activities of the FKTU. The APP is not a 
member organisation of the FKTU. It is an interest group. We [the 
FKTU] tried to access the pneumoconiosis problem but there is the 
FKCWTU. The FKCWTU plays only a role as an intermediary of the 
APP. Therefore, the problem has been solved according to personality 
of individuals concerned. In other words, this issue is not systemically 
and structurally approached by trade unions. Rather, it has personally 
                                                 
125 The APP will be discussed in detail later. 
126 At present, there are two peak organisations for Korean workers: FKTU and KCTU. 
However, the KCTU which is armed with more progressive ideology did not exist at that 





been handled by some people such as Chun-Bong Hong of the APP, 
Tae-Sung Kim of the FKCWTU etc. (Centre for Industrial Safety in 
FKTU, 2002).  
 
As with the FKTU mentioned above, it is undeniable that the miners’ 
union, the FKCWTU, had contributed to represent and advance miners’ 
interests. There are three activities around CWP. The first is for 
compensation. This started around the middle 1970s. Previously, when a 
pneumoconiosis patient died the regulations of protection for miners were 
not sufficient. When a pneumoconiosis patient died, a company which the 
dead person used to work for refused to provide the deceased with funeral 
expenses because he/she was a retired employee. Therefore, a funeral 
service was usually conducted with the assistance of inhabitants and 
colleagues. When the Labour Office refused to provide a bereaved family 
with survivor benefits because the dead sufferer already received 
disability benefits, the trade union instituted a suit against the Labour 
Office on behalf of the family of the dead person (Kim, 1995: 1).  
The second activity of the FKCWTU is researching and making 
propositions to the Government. From 1976, the results of investigation 
related to pneumoconiosis were issued by the trade union and they were 
used for proposition and petition to relevant branches of the Government. 
As a result, the Pneumoconiosis Regulations (The Established Rule 185, 
the Office of Labour) was established and enforced in 1977 (Kim, 1995: 
1). 
The third activity is that of enactment. This activity has been 
written in annual reports of the FKCWTU since 1968. In 1968, 
documents for revision of Established Rule on Mining Safety Law and 
Pneumoconiosis Compensation were presented by the FKCWTU and the 
FKTU (FKCWTU, 1968). There has been an activity for enactment of 





document, ‘Why should the APPPPW be introduced?’, issued by the 
FKCWTU (1983. 10), suggested that: 
 
Pneumoconiosis as an incurable industrial disease. It’s a malignant 
disease which paralyzes cardiopulmonary function and finally deprives 
a man of life. … But the existing schemes in relation to pneumoconiosis 
are not enough to cope with these serious problems of pneumoconiosis 
and its sufferers, and a social problem may therefore arise in the near 
future. In front of this situation, the FKCWTU has tried to introduce a 
special law over several years in order to protect coal miners and their 
families and secure the society (FKCWTU, 1983: 1-2).  
 
As mentioned above, the FKCWTU published papers which explained the 
economic contribution of miners, the rising trend of pneumoconiosis, 
inpatients for medical treatment due to complications, suicides of 
sufferers faced with extreme financial difficulties, cases of broken 
families, abandonment of studies and of children etc. Furthermore, it sent 
these papers to the National Assembly, the Government and institutions 
concerned in order to create a consensus about APPPPW enactment. On 
the other hand, the FKCWTU presented a petition for a special law in 
December 1981 (Kim, 1995: 3). In this context, the FKCWTU has 
maintained that its own effort has led to the creation of the APPPPW: 
 
“The APP was just a social meeting without policy ability. They 
wandered from place to place without any measure. The Government 
didn’t have an intention to meet sufferers’ needs. In this situation, if we 
had not thrown ourselves into a matter with enthusiasm, the law 
couldn’t have been introduced. We gathered public opinion from all 
social standings for making a proposal and had pressed the Ministry of 
Labour and the National Assembly to introduce the APPPPW. Once 
again, the APP didn’t know how to proceed with the law making. 
Instead, we had had much know-how related to pneumoconiosis” 
(Interview with Kim, T.S.). 
 
It is also noted that politicians played a main role in introducing the 
APPPPW. They were members of the National Assembly who had their 





politics of legitimacy. A former Assemblyman, Kim 127  shows the 
politicians’ contribution in the introduction. He mentioned motivation and 
processes of the enactment, and the role of relevant actors:  
 
“When I became a member of the National Assembly based on Taebaek 
and Dogae
128
  in 1981, there were lots of problems in my district. The 
biggest problem in this area was the problem of pneumoconiosis 
patients. I couldn’t understand how the many problems had continued 
then. At the time, the incumbent president, Du-Whan Chun, visited the 
region by a helicopter. I introduced him into the Jangsung hospital (now, 
its name have changed to Taebaek Jungang Hospital). At the time, the 
hospital was a small one next to the police station of Jangsung and there 
were approximately 200 or 300 patients. Whenever the pneumoconiosis 
patients found the president, they cried to tell the president “help, please 
help”. In front of the crying the president seemed to be shocked. At this 
very moment, I pointed out a stream which ran just in front of the 
hospital. Its colour was black because of coal. And then, I said to the 
president that the people in this region drank the water. The president 
was depressed by my explanation. The president directly ordered the 
Prime Minister to make a plan for the district and as a result the 
legislation started” (Interview with Kim, J.N.).   
 
The anecdote shows that Assemblyman Kim who changed the mind of 
the President played a crucial role in introducing the APPPPW. But he 
also recognised the trade unions’ contribution. He said that trade unions 
had made many efforts for the introduction. However, he confirmed that 
if he had not been there, the special law would not have been introduced: 
 
“Actually, I know that trade unions’ executives as well as doctors had 
tried to legislate against pneumoconiosis. But, I realised their efforts 
into a law. So, if I had not had a will and had not moved the mind of the 
President, the law would have not been here” (Interview with Kim, J.N.). 
 
Also, expert groups are very proud of their influence on the creation of 
the law. The expert groups asserted that they made the main role in the 
enactment and the APP and the FKCWTU followed their directions: 
                                                 
127 He was a former member of the National Assembly and his electoral district was 
Taebaek. 






“What did trade unionists and pneumoconiosis patients know? They had 
no idea about pneumoconiosis and the way to reform. So they just 
followed me. I encouraged them to introduce a law. And I had met 
officials in order to inform on the social risks of pneumoconiosis and 
recommended the establishment of a special law” (Interview with Cho, 
K.S.) 
 
As can be seen in the statement, the professionals also claimed that they 
played the crucial role in the introduction of the APPPPW in terms of 
provision of medical knowledge, investigation on the actual condition, 
suggestion for legislation etc.  
In the case of employers, they did not basically seem to disagree 
with the legislation despite little reluctance: 
 
“I have heard that the employers fundamentally agree with its 
introduction. They think the introduction will greatly help the 
development of the coal industry. Thus, they are trying to raise funds” 
(Assemblyman Lee, H.K., NA, 17/12/1981). 
 
Likewise, it seems that almost all the actors agreed in principle with the 
introduction and each actor asserted that the enactment was thanks only to 
its own effort. Who was a key player then? 
Doctors maintained that they played a key role in the introduction. 
In fact, experts had served to give advice with special information and 
raise pneumoconiosis as a social problem. However, it is difficult to insist 
that their role was crucial in introducing the law. Dr. Yoon, who was 
publicly popular in this area, said: ‘From a rough draft of the APPPPW to 
its passage in the National Assembly, Buyoung-Yeon Kim, director in the 
FKCWTU, took all the trouble unimaginable. He visited me innumerable 
times in order to request medical points and I did the little that I could’ 
(Yoon, 2006: 10). Like his statement, it is clear that their role remained in 






“The team of Dr. Kyu-Sang Cho first accessed CWP in terms of medical 
treatment. But it did not contribute to policy-making. Namely it is very 
clear the team brought pneumoconiosis into being a social problem. But 
it does not mean that it participated in the policy-making process” 
(Interview with Cho, K.H.).  
 
Like doctors, the FKCWTU thought itself as a main actor in the 
enactment. In other words, the trade union recognised and investigated 
pneumoconiosis, and sent the results to the Government and the National 
Assembly. Also, it gathered the opinions of the APP and experts and 
urged the Government to introduce the APPPPW: 
 
“The APP was actually subjected to the FKCWTU. All the creatures 
came from the FKCWTU. It is not until now that the APP is powerful. 
The APP has not known industrial injuries in general and been 
interested just in the needs of hospitalised patients” (Interview with Kim, 
T.S.).  
 
The statement may on the whole be true, as written above, but was not 
fully believed. This is because Korea was under the Cheon Du-Whan 
government from 1981-1987 which was characterised as an authoritarian 
regime. At that time, industrial relations were subject to Government 
control and trade unions were patronised by the government. In addition, 
it was not until the late 1970s that the trade unions recognised the 
problem as serious, and just at that time it did not take an active hand in 
the dispute.    
In this context, the trade unions of the FKTU and the FKCWTU 
submitted proposals every year but these were recognised as perfunctory 
annual events and the trade unions did not affect the Government129. In 
this context, the relationship between trade unions and the Government 
around pneumoconiosis is an example of ‘a perfunctory response against 
a formal demand’ (Kim, 1986: 227-228). 
                                                 
129 The proposals of trade unions were submitted after the Ministry of Labour started 





On the other hand, the substantial momentum of the APPPPW 
seems to be an effort of the APP. It was a small body and was not a legal 
institution at that time, but the members strongly appealed to the 
Government and the public. As a result, the Government and the National 
Assembly did not turn away from its desperate need and ardent appeal. 
This meant that the APP was a very influential actor in introducing the 
law and policy concerned: 
 
“All the workers like miners were industrial soldiers. Why did the 
Government give 50 per cent more bonuses only to ex-miners with CWP. 
To be honest, I don’t know a logical ground. More consolation benefits 
had been given because the APP raised a hubbub. Because of making a 
terrible noise, they could receive, couldn’t them? A specific group is 
successful in a specific issue. Pneumoconiosis became a special agenda 
due to a special group, APP. This then resulted in the APPPPW. On the 
contrary, people with other diseases are not organised. There are the 
APP and the FKCWTU in the centre of the grouping” (Interview with 
Kown, Y.S.). 
 
Regarding the pneumoconiosis issue, the FKCWTU seems to be less 
influential than the APP. The association of sufferers has put the priority 
on issues around CWP, while the trade union has regarded the industrial 
disease as passive and secondary to other issues. This is because the APP 
consists of people with the industrial injury whereas from the point of 
view of the FKCWTU, the members of the APP who left the mines are 
not members of the FKCWTU anymore: 
 
“Ex-miners with pneumoconiosis are not members of the union. So it is 
difficult, we intervene in their issues. Only if the APP requests it can we 
positively work with the body” (Interview with Cho, K.H.). 
  
On the other hand, the demands of the APP materialised as the political 
area reacted. The main reason why the politicians received the demands 
of pneumoconiosis patients is in due to the elections. This can be seen in 






Administration and Parliament: Tacit Agreement without Discussion  
 
The start of the enactment was an appeal of APP. The APP presented a 
petition to the Government for a special scheme in December 1980. The 
Ministry of Labour responded to the demand and it began an investigation 
into pneumoconiosis patients. As a result, the Ministry of Labour  
understood that the number of patients was sharply increasing annually 
and the existing institutions were insufficient in protecting people from 
pneumoconiosis and caring for sufferers. Therefore, the Government 
thought that special measures should be taken.  
The APP with the FKCWTU’s help also submitted a petition to 
the National Assembly in August 1981. The petition was sent with the 
guarantee of Assemblyman Hun-Ki Lee (FKTU, 1982: 68; Journal of 
APP, 1995). Assemblyman Lee stated the meaning of the APPPPW as 
follows: 
 
“The number of miners with CWP amounts to seven thousands and is 
increasing. This is because working conditions are poor and facilities 
are not enough. This leads to a serious problem of livelihood. However, 
the existing laws, the Labour Standard Act, the IACI and the Health 
Regulations etc. are not enough to protect miners with CWP. So I would 
like to ask to introduce a special law” (Statement of Assemblyman Lee, 
H.K., NA, 17/12/1981: 14). 
 
However, the National Assembly postponed a decision on the proposal 
because the session did not remain enough (Statement of Assemblyman 
Hun-Ki Lee, NA, 17/12/1981: 14). The APP also submitted the petition to 
the parliament in March 1982. In this situation, the FKTU and the 
FKCWTU proposed their opinions regarding a special law to the 
Government and the National Assembly in August and September 1982. 
These reports maintained the importance and necessity of legislation 






Firstly, pneumoconiosis is a fatal and unavoidable disease and the 
number of sufferers reached over 7,000. Morbidity rate is almost 13%. 
  
Secondly, despite being industrial soldiers, the miners with 
pneumoconiosis are ousted from their workplaces and are furthermore 
given insufficient medical treatment and compensation. As a result, the 
sufferers and their family are living in difficult economic situations 
without measures for living. 
 
Thirdly, a special law is also necessary in terms of the industrial aspect. 
In other words, there will be a labour shortage because of industry 
expansion and development after the late 1980s and, in particular, the 
phenomenon will also appear in the mining industry. Therefore, the 
legislation is inevitable in terms of labour shortage as well as fuel 
measures and fuel provision in mining industry.    
 
Therefore, trade unions put forward the claim that ‘if a special law is not 
introduced, this will depress miners and their families and they will not 
contribute to economic development anymore. In addition, there will be 
an extreme backlash, a weakening control of the trade union on miners, 
social unrest and political distrust’ (FKTU, 1983: 88-89). Ahead of the 
postponement of legislation, the FKCWTU established the Special Law 
Initiative Committee (30 June 1983) and pushed forward this business as 
the major goal (FKCWTU, ‘Appeal for the APPPPW’, August 1983). 
On the other hand, the APP vowed that if a special law did not 
pass in this session of the National Assembly, it would try a collective 
action of refusal; the HPP first, then a refusal of medical treatment, then a 
demonstration (FKCWTU, 1983: 150-151; 1984: 221-222). The APP set 
up a permanent body for the legislation in March 1983 and held meetings 
on countermeasures between the APP and the FKCWTU. The APP also 
proposed its opinion to the National Assembly in April 1983 and visited 
the institutions concerned such as the ruling party, the Korea Coal 
Association, the Ministry of Labour, the MOHSA, the Health and Social 





During these efforts by the APP and trade unions, the Government 
presented a plan for legislation in October 1982. The Ministry of Labour 
had investigated problems around pneumoconiosis and set a target of 
legislation.  
On the other hand, almost all the members of the National 
Assembly seemed to agree with the legislation. Some assemblymen, 
including Assemblyman Lee and officials of the Government, visited 
underground workplaces at the Jangsung Colliery and the intensive care 
units of Jangsung Hospital in which the sufferers were. They reported 
their activities to the Health and Social Affairs Committee and the 
National Assembly held several public hearings (Kim, 1995: 4). Thus, the 
National Assembly seemed to decide the legislation around November 
1982 but its realisation was postponed because the ruling party wanted to 
legislate it as part of its general election pledges. As soon as the National 
Assembly postponed the legislation project, the Ministry of Labour 
continued to search for an alternative to the pneumoconiosis policy (Kim, 
1986: 226). 
A critical event in the legislation was a policy coordination 
meeting between the Government and the ruling party, the Democratic 
Justice Party, on 4 April 1984. After the meeting, the ruling party 
announced that it would submit a bill to the upcoming regular session of 
the National Assembly. With regard to the contents of the bill, the party 
did not have a consultation with the Ministry of Labour but made full use 
of the end product of the Ministry of Labour. Likewise, the proposal of 
the ruling party was issued in the context of the 1985 election (Kim, 
1986: 227). 
The bill submitted was discussed three times in the Health and 
Social Affairs Committee, which was the National Assembly Standing 
Committee concerned, in 1984 (28 November; 4 December; 13 





Prevention of Pneumoconiosis and Protection etc. of Pneumoconiosis 
Workers’ (Proposers: 61 Assemblymen. except Assemblyman Sim, M.B., 
Kim, J.N., Kim, J., Son, C.M.) (NA, 28/11/1984).  
Shin, S.K., director of the Labour Standard Department in the 
Ministry of Labour who attended the session as a reference, told of the 
necessity for the legislation to focus on the disadvantage of 
pneumoconiosis patients in the existing law: 
 
“Pneumoconiosis patients have not won in litigation. This is because 
most of the employers do not admit their mistake in industrial injury, do 
not recognise working careers of ex-miners with pneumoconiosis in 
their workplace and are busy in trying to pass the responsibility to ex-
miners by saying, “miners don’t wear a mask although we have 
educated them”.  In this situation, there are a few cases of civil suit. So 
a way, replacing civil suit is very necessary to protect pneumoconiosis 
patients” (NA, 28/11/1984).  
 
In this context, the bill submitted said its purpose was as follows: ‘to 
contribute to the protection of workers’ health and the promotion of their 
welfare by intensifying the prevention of pneumoconiosis and the control 
over the health of workers engaged in dusty work, and by providing 
matters concerning the payment of consolation benefits to any worker 
suffering from pneumoconiosis’. According to the bill, this would be 
carried out by the Ministry of Labour but that the funds should be raised 
by employers in the coal industry (NA, 28/11/1984: 9).  
At first the proposal was examined in the subcommittee of the 
Health and Social Affairs Committee of National Assembly, and next was 
discussed in the 15th meeting of the Health and Social Affairs Committee 
which the minister of the Ministry of Labour attended (NA, 4/12/ 1984: 
3). The bill submitted sailed through the meeting almost intact. Thus, the 
discussion ended in a short time. There was the 16th meeting in the 





without a great dissenting opinion in the 16th meeting on 13 December 
1984 (NA, 13/11/1984: 20).  
As can be seen above, from the submission of the proposal to 
passage of the law, there was no heated controversy and the original 
contents of bill were kept because there was no difference, except a slight 
difference of opinion regarding the bill’s scope of application. The 
consensus on the bill, likewise, was easily made because all the members 
of the National Assembly recognised pneumoconiosis patients as the most 
vulnerable social stratum and regarded this scheme as a political strategy 
in front of the soon coming election.  
 
 
Turbulence and Distrust around APPPPW 
 
Pneumoconiosis patients have been compensated by the APPPPW. 
However, the APP and others have tried to advance its benefits and there 
have also been conflicts among relevant bodies and associations around 
the adoption and revision of the APPPPW. At present, there is much 
distrust against pneumoconiosis institutions and between actors. This will 
be discussed in this part, focusing on the relationship between these actors. 
  
Two Patients and Three Organisations   
 
The main actor in compensation politics are the organisations 
representing pneumoconiosis patients. There are three organisations in 
accordance with their interests. In order to understand their organisational 
division, two kinds of pneumoconiosis patients and their different 
situations should be described.  
As mentioned above, pneumoconiosis patients who do not go into 





the difference between SPPs and HPPs. In other words, due to 
hospitalisation, SPPs and HPPs are in different situations and have 
different needs. This divergence comes from the fact that pneumoconiosis 
patients hospitalised with complications are entitled to benefits for 
suspended work, or work replacement benefit, as well as medical therapy 
called medical care benefit.  
In contrast, SPPs who are not in the hospital cannot receive the 
work replacement benefit and much less medical treatment. Furthermore, 
the social safety net is not well enough established yet for the aged and 
people with disabilities, and a majority of SPPs are not included in the 
qualified groups who benefit from government subsidies under the 
National Basic Livelihood Protection System. This is because the 
qualification condition of the system is complicated, so it is difficult for 
SPPs to receive it in reality. As a consequence, most of them cannot enjoy 
a decent life in economic terms and they are under the minimum standard 
of living.  
What makes the difference between a SPP and a HPP? As 
discussed above, the best benefits of pneumoconiosis patients are from 
the APPPPW and the condition qualified to it is whether they have 
complications or not. Likewise, the existence of complications is very 
important to pneumoconiosis patients for their living expenses and life. 
Therefore, it can readily be imagined that some pneumoconiosis patients 
sometimes try to get disease complications: 
 
“Pneumoconiosis patients are a humble figure. They try to catch a 
disease for medical treatment and living expenses. They can go into 
hospital and get money with complications. Really, really it’s a sad 
fate” (Interview with Jung, H.Y.). 
 
“Pneumoconiosis patients are afraid of curing their disease. So they 
even tend to be negative in medical treatment. Although a disease is 
overcome, they seem reluctant to believe in the fact” (Interview with 






In this context, HPPs do not tend to want disease to get cured while SPPs 
try to be diagnosed with a disease to get hospitalised. The problem is that 
the two groups of pneumoconiosis patients have the wrong belief: ‘SPPs’ 
belief is that they certainly have complications while HPPs believe that 
their complications as well as their pneumoconiosis is incurable’. What 
the belief means is that because all the pneumoconiosis patients have 
complications related to pneumoconiosis, this disease cannot be cured and 
they should be in hospital. In other words, because of this belief, HPPs 
cannot accept their discharge from hospital. Therefore, they try to stand 
together against the Government to order them out of hospital and the 
APP has played the role for the sake of its members.  
With regard to the patients’ organisations, there are three for 
pneumoconiosis patients: APP, Association of Korean Pneumoconiosis 
Patients, Association of Simple Pneumoconiosis Patients (b) (as can be 
seen in Table 5-2). The APP was first created in 1979 and recently the 
Association of Korean Pneumoconiosis Patients (hereafter AKPP) was 
created to respond to the need of SPPs. Subsequently, the Association of 
Simple Pneumoconiosis Patients (hereafter ASPP) (b) was also 
established against the AKPP.  
The APP is basically a voluntary association created by 
pneumoconiosis patients. It was set up in June 1979 by a few 
pneumoconiosis patients who were retired in order to overcome economic 
difficulties on a basis of reciprocity. Namely, it started as a friendly 
association (Kim, 1995: 1): ‘This association aims to promote friendship 
among members and advance social welfare for pneumoconiosis patients’ 
(APP, 1995, ‘Articles of Association’, Article 2). The body was perceived 
as a social organisation by the Ministry of Labour in 1986. The APP has 
been supported in finance and a building by the Government and the local 





subsidy of the Government (Journal of APP(1), 20 May 1995; Chun-
Bong Hong, 1988).  
 
Table 5-2 Associations of Pneumoconiosis Patients 
 APP AKPP ASPP(b) 





Just existence of 







3,300 of HPP,  
30,000 of SPP 
1,000 persons   










The APP has 23 branches based on relevant hospitals and 23 branches 
based on regions. The former is related to HPP whereas the latter is SPP. 
It issues a journal titled ‘The news of APP’ every month. APP has worked 
for PP through activities such as policy, consultation, education, public 
assistance etc.   
The APP is basically an organization for pneumoconiosis patients, 
but the APP tends to work for HPP (Won et al., 2008: 56). This is because 
HPP pay their membership fee to the APP whereas SPP do not. There is a 
kind of food chain between HPP and the APP. The APP plays a role in 
that HPPs can remain in hospital while the patients pay a membership fee. 
As a result, HPPs can continue their hospitalization owing to the tacit 
contract between them. Contrary to this, SPPs cannot pay the membership 
fee because they are poor and have a distrust of APP. In addition, it is 
difficult for the APP to collect dues from SPPs because they are not 
organised very well. As a result, the APP tends to become an organ of the 





The AKPP was created by pneumoconiosis patients who criticised 
the incumbent president Jung’s behaviour, such as the authoritarian 
administration of the APP, corruption, the representation of only 
hospitalised patients. Owing to these reasons, they established a new 
organisation named ‘The Association of Simple Pneumoconiosis Patients’ 
(ASPP(a)) in 2004. The name means that the association mainly stands 
for the activities of the pneumoconiosis patients at home without benefits, 
compared with the APP which is based on the hospitalised 
pneumoconiosis patients.     
Its creation caused the APP embarrassment despite its small 
members (City Hall of Taebak, 2006). There are many reasons; firstly, the 
entrance of ASPP(a) means that a competitive organisation appears. In 
addition, it means that the APP can be exposed to the menace of survival 
because the organisation is losing legitimacy these days. Secondly, the 
APP doubts there is someone behind the ASPP(a). In reality, the inventor 
of the ASPP(a) is Won, the president of the Association of Social Welfare 
in Taeback (hereafter ASWT). Won stated that:  
 
“The APP is too corrupt and is a kind of organisation only for HPP and 
its executives. I therefore discovered a way of dismantling the APP. It 
creates a true organisation for pneumoconiosis” (Interview with Won, 
E.H.).  
 
The ASPP (a), as can be seen in the name, is an institute not for HPPs but 
SPPs. The ASPP (a) is not yet a great influence. Its numbers are estimated 
at approximately 1000 and the member qualification is confined to SPPs. 
This means that the organisation is weak because SPPs have no ability to 
pay a membership fee. Nevertheless, the potentiality cannot be 
disregarded due to relative superiority in the area of morality and 
legitimacy. In addition, if the ASPP (a) becomes a legal body, it can also 





dramatically. In 2005, ASPP (a) changed its name to the AKPP. The new 
name can be understood as the new association would like to challenge 
the APP. This is because its target membership is the same as that of the 
APP. Hun-Young Jung, president of the APP, expresses grave concern:  
 
“That association aims at killing us. It is writhing and struggling to 
make pneumoconiosis patients its members. It would like to change its 
name from the ASPP to AKPP. This shows the organisation is absolutely 
against us” (Interview with Jung, H.Y.).  
 
How is the third organisation explained in 2005? It seems to be another 
mystery that the organisation calls itself by the same name as the second 
organization, ‘the ASPP (b). This is because the new association was 
directly founded by the APP. Eung-Whan Ju, president of the ASPP (a), 
criticises as follows:  
 
“There is only one in his [Hun-Young Jung] development. It’s a 
fraudulent practice. I don’t believe in him. I cannot believe although he 
says with this ballpoint pen, “it’s a ballpoint pen”. The Government 
shakes its head against the APP. The APP tries to set up an association 
which is the same name as ours, so he tries to terminate us. We are 
determined to fight to the last against the plot of the APP. That side 
builds up a slush fund through the intervention of post mortem 
examination and hospitalisation, and membership fees” (Interview with 
Ju, E.W.). 
 
The APP wanted to check ASPP (a) and its intention led to a creation of a 
competitor organisation. In reality, the ASPP (b) put its Headquarter 
within the building of APP. In the interview with the president of ASPP 
(b), he confessed the conspiracy relationship with APP:  
 
“I hope only to follow president Jung’s guideline because it’s true, 







The ASPP (b) recently exists as a bogus body. Therefore, there is hardly 
any activity. In contrast, the AKPP and the APP competitively work in all 
fields. While the APP is still based on HPPs, the AKPP preoccupies 
social agenda and plays an active part in the area of social welfare for 
SPPs.  
 
Relationship among Groups around Issues in Dispute 
 
In addition to the organisations of pneumoconiosis patients, there are 
many organisations around pneumoconiosis patients, the ASWT, the 
Government, trade unions (FKTU, KCTU, FKCWTU), doctors, 
researchers, politicians etc.  
The ASWT as a civic group is a nongovernmental organisation 
run by a church.130  The ASWT has concentrated on only the poor SPPs. 
After the ASWT knows their difficulty in life and mind, it has tried to 
advance their life condition by its welfare activity. For example, it has 
established the Centre for Industrial Disease Management in Mining since 
1991 with aids from the EZE of Germany and run many programmes 
such as a survey of SPPs, free physical examinations, education against 
alcohol and smoking, regular lectures on health, research and a 
publication on pneumoconiosis etc. In addition, the ASWT has carried out 
residential care programmes for SPPs since 1995.  
The ASWT has tried to contact the Government and the APP in 
order to promote welfare for pneumoconiosis patients. In this process, the 
ASWT has experienced a struggle with the APP and the Government. 
This is because the basis and interests are different; the ASWT is based 
                                                 
130 It was rooted in the Association for Christian Social Welfare of Miners’ Town, 
established in 1984. The ASWT defines itself as a Christian welfare organisation for 
coal workers, their families and pneumoconiosis patients, the elderly and the poor in 





on SPPs whereas the APP is closely related to HPPs. With regard to this, 
Eung-Ho Won, president of the ASWT, said: 
 
“The APP is just for HPPs. This body is actually not interested in SPPs. 
Furthermore, it is the biggest obstacle in creating comprehensive 
institutions for SPPs. Thus it’s unavoidable to fight with the APP for the 
rationalisation of the pneumoconiosis system” (Interview with Won, 
E.H.). 
 
In this case, the Government, ‘the IACI Section’ in the Ministry of 
Labour and the Korea Labour Welfare Cooperation, are in charge of the 
problem in relation to pneumoconiosis. They try to conduct research on 
the actual condition of pneumoconiosis patients and gather the opinions 
of researchers and organisations concerned. They have enacted and 
revised the pertinent law and have shaped a policy about pneumoconiosis 
patients on the basis of these investigations.   
The APP tried to have a close relationship with the government. 
However, the Government had some critical perspectives on the APP. For 
example, the Government has regarded the APP as a pressure group with 
excessive demands and a trouble maker regarding medical treatment:   
 
“It’s a big problem that the patients all are just lying in a hospital bed. 
Namely, they refuse to become outpatients. I think if a patient stays in 
hospital over three months it’s abnormal. Because complications related 
to pneumoconiosis can be curable in this period. If I say like this, a war 
will break out. In fact, even the FKCWTU is raising a question ‘why 
should family of patients be in hospital?’ The main reason why they 
intended to be in hospital is that, they believe, they will soon be 
discharged if the type of medical treatment from hospitalised patients to 
outpatients is changed. … The APP is mostly responsible for this 
distorted structure. … On the other hand, there is collusion between 
doctors, hospitals and patients. The structure brings over treatment. The 
APP is on the centre of this collusion structure. Theses above structures 
must be collapsed. This means the APP becomes a more rational body” 






Nevertheless, the Government has had a good or close relationship with 
the APP despite this negative point of view. In other words, the coalition 
of the Government and the APP has been strong despite some struggles. 
This is because officials who are in charge of the IACI in the Ministry of 
Labour do not want that the problem during their tenure of the 
department. 131   In the view of the official, this relationship is 
comfortable because a good relationship with APP makes the 
pneumoconiosis issue quiet. In addition, the APP is a better partner than 
other actors to the officials. For example, trade unions are more difficult 
partners than the APP. In the case of the ASWT, the organisation has a 
weak in influence and is not related to HPPs who have strong power.  
Up to now, the APP and the Government seem to be in the close 
cooperation. However, the bribe event related to the APP and the 
establishment of AKPP makes these firm relations doubtful and the APP 
is realising that it is in danger.  
On the other hand, politicians had not been interested in this issue 
because pneumoconiosis was an industrial disease which existed in the 
past and the sufferers do not seem to give any help to politicians. 
However, since the pressure groups were created and trade unions were 
concerned about the disease, politicians tend to have watched with deep 
concern as far as it influences elections. In particular, politicians in some 
electoral districts where many sufferers live, for example Taebaek, Sabuk, 
Jungsun etc., have been concerned about pneumoconiosis and its sufferers. 
However, it is noted that the concern is restricted to some districts of coal 
towns in the past where ex-miners and pneumoconiosis patients live. 
Thus, politicians just express interest in specific periods of election and 
the interest is just temporary and arbitrary.  
In addition to these organisations, trade unions have also been 
related to pneumoconiosis patients and their organisations because they 
                                                 





were its members in the past and there are still miners in some mines 
today.  
There are two umbrella trade unions, FKTU and KCTU in Korea, 
and one miners’ organisation, FKCWTU. The KCTU is more militant and 
left-oriented while the FKTU is right-wing. But the KCTU has been 
influenced by pneumoconiosis patients because the trade union was 
organised in 1995 when most mines disappeared and the FKCWTU 
belongs not to KCTU but FKTU. Therefore, most pneumoconiosis 
patients were not members of the KCTU: 
 
“The pneumoconiosis issue is being touched only by the FKTU. There 
are no members of miners’ unions in the KCTU. Basically it is 
structurally difficult because the KCTU draws attention to 
pneumoconiosis. This corresponds to the Democratic Labour Party 
which is based on the support of the KCTU” (Interview with Cho, K.H.). 
 
“There is little leeway to intervene in the problem. The APP and the 
FKCWTU doesn’t want us handling this problem. On the other hand, 
the FKCWTU and miners were not a member of our unions. In fact, 
there is not much motivation for us to intervene” (Interview with Kim, 
E.G.).  
 
The FKCWTU as an industrial union in the mining industry has been 
interested in pneumoconiosis patients more than the FKTU. However, 
both are less active than the APP. This is because pneumoconiosis 
patients are not members of trade unions. More fundamental reasons why 
these unions are passive in activities for pneumoconiosis patients are that 
the APP is as obstinate as a mule and does not want the unions’ 
intervention: 
 
“The sufferers’ association has an allergy to the rationalisation of 
medical treatment system. The APP wants the existing system to 
continue. So it’s very careful that we intervene. When the APP calls us 
some help just about a specific issue we can cooperate with the body” 






“The APP becomes a too bulky organization. It’s hard to communicate 
with the members of the APP. It upsets us and criticises all, regardless 
of our president or an assemblyman. The members go through fire and 
water for their sake. In this situation, who would like to touch the body 
and its persons? They are very older people and have deaf ears” 
(Interview with Cho, K.H.).  
 
As has been discussed, the main actors in Korean politics are the APP and 
the Government. The APP on behalf of pneumoconiosis patients mainly 
focusing on the interest of HPPs became a key compromiser in political 
bargaining with the government, whereas trade unions and political 
parties keep their distance from welfare politics in the area of 
pneumoconiosis. As a result, the politics becomes too narrow only for a 
patient group and Ministry of Labour.  
 
Compensation Politics for Reform in Income and Hospital Treatment 
 
In this part, the recent compensation politics will be examined, focusing 
on the reform and rationalisation of income and hospital treatment. The 
general reform of the pneumoconiosis system has been tried in the area of 
several points at issue 132  such as the expansion of the scope of 
complications, the creation of the disability degree of 13, and the 
provision of living costs.  
With regard to complications, relevant groups want to add other 
diseases to the list of complications in addition to the existing eight 
diseases: 
 
It is widely accepted in the medical profession that the contraction of 
pneumoconiosis can easily lead to lung cancer, stomach cancer, and 
liver cancer. In addition, pneumoconiosis is often accompanied by 
                                                 
132 The main points which are submitted by the FKCWTU in dispute are as follows 
(Kim, 2001: 55-70; FKCWTU, 2001.2: 3-9): expansion of extent of complication, 
creation of 13 degree in disability grade, livelihood protection of pneumoconiosis 
patients, expansion of medical treatment, expansion of scholarship of sufferers’ children, 





hypertension, apoplexy, arteriosclerosis, liver cirrhosis, diabetes, 
cancer of the oesophagus. Therefore, this disease should be included in 
complications (FKCWTU, 2001. 2: 3).  
 
Of the diseases which should be added to the list of complications, 
pneumonia was noted as the most important disease. In other words, 
pneumoconiosis patients and the groups concerned asserted that 
pneumonia should be included as a subject of medical treatment: 
 
Pneumonia is a terrible disease which puts pneumoconiosis patients to 
death. In particular, it is very horrible and fearful disease to the SPPs 
who don’t have opportunity of medical treatment. The SPPs who have 
low immunity, unlike the public, easily contract pneumonia with a slight 
cold... Pneumonia should be included in complications (ASPP (a), 2004: 
4). 
 
On the other hand, the existing institution divides the disability rating into 
six grades: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. Pneumoconiosis patients and relevant 
organisations maintain that the disability rating must be added to the 13 
grade. This means the coverage will be accepted as pneumoconiosis is 
expanded. Lastly, the provision of living expenses means that a 
supplementary living allowance is provided for SPPs or patients who end 
medical treatment.   
The above suggestions are all related to income maintenance, 
especially focusing on SPPs. In other words, it is natural that the support 
of living expenses and the expansion of disability grade are for SPPs and 
that the expansion of complications to pneumonia leads to the medical 
treatment and income maintenance of sufferers, especially SPPs.  
As a response to these demands, the Ministry of Labour 
announced a plan for pneumoconiosis: ‘The Comprehensive 
Countermeasures of Pneumoconiosis’ (2001.9).  This plan seems to 






Expansion of the complications in relation to pneumoconiosis: from the 
existing eight kinds of complications to ten kinds of complications 
including pneumonia and mycobacterium. The research is under study. 
 
Expansion of the disability grade of 13: the research is under study. 
 
Examination of the provision of living expenses to SPPs and patients 
living in hospital at the minimum cost of living level of the National 
Basic Livelihood Protection System: 286,000 per person, 482,000 for 
two people, 667,000 for three, 842,000 for four (MOL, 2001.9: 5-10).  
 
The Government expects that this scheme will work in three dimensions 
of effectiveness: ‘Firstly, as a contribution to social integration because of 
the alleviation of a feeling of uneasiness and frustration; Secondly, by 
decreasing the expenditure in medical treatment by the rationalisation of 
hospital treatment; and lastly, by establishing mutual trust between The 
Welco, hospitals, sufferers’ (MOL, 2001.9: 15).  
All the claimants welcome this with open arms. The FKTU 
suggested organising an action committee to consist of trade unions, the 
APP, the Government, and experts in order to promote this plan (Kim, 
2001: 46-47). This suggestion seemed to be useful but there was no body 
to be established for this discussion. This was because the Government 
didn’t have much will. The Government just mentioned that the plan was 
under study and was being examined.   
Finally, the Government’s third item which seemed to be very 
important to the income maintenance of SPPs was not welcomed, whilst 
the first one was completely received. With regards to the second item, 
only atypical mycobacterial infection was added as one of the appointed 
complications. In other words, pneumonia which was the main cause of 
death for sufferers was not accepted. In the case of atypical mycobacterial 
infection, there have been two pneumoconiosis patients who had 
contracted this complication. Therefore, the expansion of complications 






Regarding the three items which may mark an epoch in income 
maintenance for pneumoconiosis patients, the will of government seemed 
to be very weak. Incumbent director, Young-Sun Kown, who replaced 
Wan-Young Lee who was a director at that time, says:  
 
“Accidents at Wongin Rayon Co. and pneumoconiosis of industrial 
diseases in Korea have been treated with special interest. Why have we 
specially paid attention to and cared for these diseases and these 
sufferers compared with others? I think these things are not so much 
special things as agenda based on collective action … It is quite out of 
the question that Wan-Young Lee [former director of the Ministry of 
Labour] tries to provide pneumoconiosis patients with 400,000 won per 
month. Where can it be from? … This means that the Government gives 
all of the ex-miners money. It’s very silly” (Interview with Lee, Y.S.). 
 
Up to now, the demand for income maintenance from the APP and trade 
unions has continued. As can been seen in this discussion, ‘The 
Comprehensive Countermeasures of Pneumoconiosis’ of the Government 
does not contribute much to guaranteeing income maintenance.  
On the other hand, there had been a controversial issue 
surrounding the rationalisation of hospital treatment. Most of the 
pneumoconiosis patients hospitalised are long-stay patients. There are 
5.1 % (144 persons) under 1 year, 29.6 % (837 persons) from 2 to 5 years, 
49.9 % (1,409 persons) over 5 years. The rate of long-stay patients with 
pneumoconiosis is higher than those with other diseases.  
There are several reasons for the high number of long-stay 
patients with pneumoconiosis. One of them is that the sufferers strongly 
want to stay in hospital. This is because there are many benefits for 
sufferers such as shutdown benefits (70% of the average wage), medical 
benefits, survivor benefits etc. (MOL, 2001.9: 3; FKTUCIS, 2002: 8-9). 
On the other hand, pneumoconiosis patients tend to be reluctant to 
become outpatients, although they can receive shutdown benefits and 





that becoming an outpatient is a step towards ending their medical 
treatment. In particular, they believe that it is very difficult to receive 
survivor benefits in they leave the hospital (MOL, 2001.9: 4).  
The other reason, which is more fundamental and important in 
explaining the long-stay patients, is the fact that the APP has systemically 
prevented them leaving hospital. The APP can receive membership fees 
and preserve its organisation based on HPPs. On the other hand, HPPs 
want to be protected by the APP in return for paying the fees. In other 
words, there is a kind of conspiracy relationship between the APP and 
HPPs. The APP prevents the end of hospital treatment for HPPs, and in 
return for protection, HPPs support the APP with their loyalty and 
membership fees. In this context, the APP and HPPs have refused to 
examine hospitals and long-stay patients.  
In addition, the hospitals with the long-term patients are also 
responsible for the behavior of the patients. The long-term patients make 
the hospitals many profits. Therefore, they are trying to attract 
pneumoconiosis patients. For this, the hospitals, one the one hand, tend to 
fawn over the APP and on the other hand convert wards into 
accommodation-like rooms according to the demand of patients 
(FKTUCIS, 2002: 9): 
 
"There is a conspiracy structure between hospitals and patients. It 
results in over treatment. The APP intervenes in this structure and 
strengthens this structure. The hospitals tend to meet the requirement of 
the APP and even provide funds. The structure should be resolved” 
(Interview with Kown, Y.S.) 
 
This situation tends to make it difficult for SPPs to go into hospital. This 
is because the fund for pneumoconiosis is limited and the Government 
does not accept hospitalised patients to some extent without a strict 





disagreement between HPPs and SPPs, and between the APP and others. 
This can be understood in the statement of the AKPP’s president:  
 
“Complications can usually be cured in three months.  But a patient 
went into hospital twenty years ago and now receives four million per 
month in shutdown benefits. Because of this person, the really humble 
person with pneumoconiosis cannot go into hospital.  By the way, there 
are no statistics about this reality. Is it the Government? It’s time to 
examine closely HPP. Based on this survey, the Government forces fake 
patients to leave hospital and the genuine to go into hospital” (Interview 
with Ju, E.W.). 
   
Most organizations, except the APP, that is the Ministry of Labour, the 
AKPP, and expert groups, demand the rationalisation of hospital 
treatment. For example, the FKTU argues: 
 
50 per cent of the patients are long-term patients over five years and 
recently there is no discharge from hospital. It’s really abnormal 
although we consider special treatment of pneumoconiosis (FKTUCIS, 
2002: 9). 
 
Based on this consciousness, the FKTU maintains that the Government 
should search for an alternative for ‘hospitalised patients to outpatients’ 
(FKTUCIS, 2002: 12). 
The Ministry of Labour tries to change the belief that ‘medical 
treatment out of hospital is a step towards ending medical treatment’ and 
aims to get rid of the usual practice in hospitals that ‘the hospital is 
reluctant to order patients out of hospital for its profit’. In addition, the 
Government examines that ‘survivor benefits in the case of SPPs can be 
accepted, except the cases of accidental death such as a traffic accident, 
and the Government considers providing pneumoconiosis patients leaving 
hospital with their cost of living (MOL, 2001.9: 8-9).  
In the same context, specialists have criticised the APP. From 
their point of view, long-term hospitalisation is irrational and therefore 





reform. However, these efforts of rationalisation are frustrated due to the 
great reaction from the APP: 
 
“The APP and HPPs tend to recognise the rationalisation of hospital 
treatment as a kind of notice of death. So they are always nervous and 
have prepared for resistance against any trial for rationalisation. They 
have collected funds for demonstration. They always tell me “Dr. … we 
believe in you. You are our friend. Could you protect their conspiracy?” 
(Interview with Jeon, K.J.). 
 
The logical basis on which the APP is based is that complications related 
to pneumoconiosis are incurable, unlike with other patients (Hun-Young 
Jung, Interview PP1). Therefore they take it for granted that they stay 
forever in hospital. In this context, they assert that hospital facilities and 
programmes should be established for long-term patients: 
 
“It is generally accepted that pneumoconiosis is an incurable disease. If 
hospitalised, they must stay in hospital until they stop breathing... An 
existing ward for us is very small and stuffy. There are six or seven beds 
with fridge, TV, clothes chest etc. It’s a present situation there is no 
space for a nurse even to sit down. Our room in this hospital is a kind of 
prison rather than a ward for medical treatment... It’s time to change it 
to a facility for medical treatment” (Jung, 2003: 5-6).   
 
The APP strongly asserts the maintenance of the status quo. In this 
position, it criticises all the trials to change present conditions under the 
name of rationalisation: 
 
“The APP dislikes any survey on the actual conditions of 
pneumoconiosis patients themselves. It said “why does it examine 
pneumoconiosis patients who live happily in hospital?” In fact, it thinks, 
“the survey is not favourable to us”. So it has refused any examination 
under the name of rationalization” (Interview with Cho, K.H.).  
 
The following events show how strong the resistance of the APP is. These 
cases are trials related to research on the actual conditions of HPPs. The 





Medical Science Catholic University in Korea. She received a project 
from the Welco titled ‘A Project for Management System Rationalisation 
of Pneumoconiosis Patients in Hospital’ in November 2002. According to 
this project, she tried to investigate the factual conditions of 
pneumoconiosis patients and their hospitals. However, the survey could 
not be conducted because the APP prohibited her from carrying out this 
survey. It understood that the survey was for forced discharge from 
hospital. Jung, president of the APP said: 
 
“If pneumoconiosis patients in hospital are taken out of hospital they 
will die in six months. Nonetheless, if they are forced out of hospital, we 
desperately fight against this conspiracy” (Nodongilbo, 19/11/2002).  
 
In fact, professor Lim seemed to stimulate the APP. According to the 
Nodongilbo, she announced her direction to reform in ‘the Specialists’ 
Meeting’ of 24 December 2002: ‘the restructuring of long-term patients 
over 5 years, the reform of hospitalisation-oriented medical treatment 
system, the strengthening of medical institution’. These are the items that 
the APP hates. In front of a strong protest against the APP, Prof. Lim set 
about uncovering the truth: “The paper absolutely gives wrong 
information.  My project is not for the reform of medical treatment 
system but to understand the management situations of hospitals” (Lim, 
Y., 25 November 2002). However, the APP and its members did not 
believe her statement. The next day, the APP declared inflexible 
determination for fighting (Nodongilbo, 25 November 2002). The protest 
was for two nights and three days in her hospital run by the Catholic 
University for which Prof. Lim works. Finally, she openly apologised to 
the APP and the patients and the protest ended. 
The second case was in 2005. Dr. Baek who majors in medical 
science is a well-known professor in the industrial health area. He had 





people within APP. However, his misfortune started in the interest of 
rationalising pneumoconiosis medical treatment. He had a critical opinion 
of irrational care in hospitals and sympathy for the pitiable conditions of 
SPPs. He finally received the project to rationalise the hospital system for 
pneumoconiosis patients from the Ministry of Labour in 2005. There is no 
doubt that the APP strongly resisted the project.  
Ahead of this protest from the APP, the Ministry of Labour 
recommended he stop the presentation of the research result but he tried 
to put forward it. The members of the APP tried to prohibit the 
presentation by throwing eggs in a symposium to Dr. Baek and the 
project was cancelled. Due to this affair, Dr. Baek has been separated 
from APP and he is still angered by APP’s behaviour.  
On the contrary, the AKPP supports Baek’s research and it says 
that the results of his work should be published and used for real reform:  
 
Dr. Baek’s research was stopped on the way because of a demonstration 
by a specific association. This study should continue and be embodied 
into real policy (ASPP (a), 2004: 5-6). 
 
As can be seen, all rationalisation failed. This is because the APP, firstly, 
has continued to be a stubborn resistance, and secondly, the Government 
didn’t have much will power against the APP. Therefore, the reform has 
not conducted systemically.   
 
Compensation Politics of Corruption and Distrust 
 
As can be seen above, hospitalisation absolutely makes pneumoconiosis 
patients different in terms of income and medical service. Thus, the 
decision as to whether pneumoconiosis is a prescribed complication is 
very important to the sufferers. The importance leads to a dispute around 





the decision process, pneumoconiosis institutions and policies have been 
doubted and criticised.  
For a long time, pneumoconiosis patients have had doubts about 
the medical decision criteria and suspected that the decisions depends on 
bribes and relations with pertinent people or an institute, such as a doctor, 
officials, the APP. In this context, SPPs believe that hospitalisation 
depends not on whether or not patients have complications but whether or 
not they have money for a bribe or know relevant people such as doctor, 
executives of the APP, politicians etc. Pneumoconiosis patients have 
repeated this assertion with a firm belief. The AKPP which was 
established against the APP said:  
 
“The APP has built up to use a slush fund. I quarrelled with the director 
of Insurance Reform Team in the Ministry of Labour. “Are you clean?”, 
“Did you get the fund from Dr. Jung and the APP?”, “Are the 
institutions innocent in this area?” They all may be bribed by the APP” 
(Interview with Ju, E.W.).  
  
In this situation, the event named ‘A Scandal of Medical Treatment 
Judgment of Pneumoconiosis Patients’ took place on 23 August 2004. 
The outline was that Dr. Jung who was the chairman of ‘A Judging 
Committee of Pneumoconiosis’ received money (about 48 million won) 
on condition that he granted an illegal request from Jung, S.Y. etc. who 
acted as a broker. The detailed story is as follows:  
 
“The suspects in this event, Jung, S.Y. gained access to patients and told 
them that if you spend money, you can go into hospital. The money 
would be used as a bribe to Dr. Jung in order to receive judgment of 
complications. In reality, Dr. Jung who received a request of Jung, S.Y. 
with the bribe judged that many persons to be introduced by Jung, S.Y. 
had a complication relating to pneumoconiosis. However, the problem 
was caused when Jung, S.Y. did not return the received money to a 
person who gave money in order to receive the judgment of 
complications but was not be judged as a patient with a complication by 
Dr. Jung. Despite receiving  money from Dr. Jung, Jung, S.Y. did not 





who needed more money finally threatened Dr. Jung with disclosure of 
taking the bribe, and Dr. Jung who became unbearable went to the 
police by himself in order to confess his crime” (Interview with Shim, 
Y.B.).  
 
The above story was ascertained by a police investigation. Besides the 
event, there were other events related to Dr. Jung. As a result, three 
people, except Jung, S.Y., were sent to jail; two ex-vice-presidents of 
APP and Dr. Jeong. Dr Jeong and the APP have been at the centre of the 
news.  
In these events, the fact that the leading members of APP were 
connected to the bribe crime came as a shock. What the former vice-
presidents of APP being placed under arrest shows is that the APP has 
been connected to the bribe event. In addition, it has been suspected that 
the president of APP may have been involved with bribes for a long time. 
In reality, anonymous letters divulging his embezzlements have not 
ceased and the police have investigated him several times. 
 
“The organisation’s centre is the president and the president is 
therefore the heart of the bribe crime. Nevertheless, only two vice-
presidents were imprisoned” (Interview with Won, E.H.).  
 
As shown above, regardless of whether the present of APP is implicated 
in the bribery case, it is an obvious fact that most actors concerned have 
been related to corruption.  
 
 
4. Pattern of Compensation Politics 
 
 
Based on the above description, there are some differences between the 





doubt that the IACI contained a very limited level of compensation and 
coverage. In other words, it did not cover small workplaces where more 
serious accidents occurred. The level of compensation was also relatively 
low compared to the severity of the accident. On the contrary, the 
APPPPW compensates at a better level. It means that ex-miners with 
pneumoconiosis receive higher levels of benefits than injured workers 
with other industrial diseases. This is due to the introduction of the 
relevant scheme, APPPPW. How is this possible? This is because of 
compensation politics. Therefore, there will be examination and 
assessment of compensation politics in the introduction of IACI and 
APPPPW.    
First of all, we need to examine the differences in compensation 
politics between the two schemes. Regarding policy participation, 
businesses and trade unions were no involved in the policy-making 
process for the IACI. In fact, experts in the Government mainly planned 
to legislate for injured workers. Even trade unions as well as employers 
were negative towards establishing the system. In contrast, the APP and 
trade unions to an extent participated in the enactment of APPPPW. In 
particular, the APP stimulated all the actors to be interested in the 
legislation.  
In addition, there is a difference in the policy-making process in 
terms of party politics. Both were introduced by the leading role of ruling 
party, not the opposition party. Yet, the APPPPW was enacted in normal 
parliamentary politics whereas the IACI was a product of the SCNR run 
by the military junta. In this context, the main discussion for the IACI and 
the APPPPW was conducted in the Government and the National 
Assembly respectively.  
To sum up, while compensation politics in the introduction of 
IACI is characterised as legitimacy politics under the leadership of the 





the introduction of the APPPPW was characterised as interest 
coordination between a ‘strong activity of the APP for compensation and 
politicians’ political strategy for the coming election’. The APP played 
the role of the locomotive before the National Assembly while 
assemblymen made a decision in the National Assembly. Also, this 
showed that trade unions were a secondary actor in the introduction of 
APPPPW.  
There are several similarities in introducing the IACI and the 
APPPPW. First of all, it is difficult to view them from a class politics 
point of view in terms of low participation and the influence of trade 
unions in the policy-making process.  
Capitalists and unionists all refused to introduce insurance. 
Capitalists thought that they might lose their power on workers’ control 
because of the introduction of social security while trade unionists feared 
that it would result in low compensation. Park’s played a key role in 
introducing the IACI while unions intervened but were not a main subject 
in the introduction of APPPPW. In fact, the main role was achieved by 
the APP.   
Secondly, the main motivation of the legislation was legitimacy 
for the Government. The Fifth Republic was established on the 12.12 
coup and the 1980 Gwangju massacre, while the Third Republic replaced 
the Second Republic which was overthrown by a military coup in 1961. 
In order to hide their weakness in legitimacy, the Government introduced 
some laws related to social welfare. 
Thirdly, these laws were introduced in accordance with a pre-
election strategy. There was a presidential election and a general election 
just before the introduction of the IACI and the APPPPW respectively. 
The ruling party liked to hold all the cards for the upcoming contest. 
Focusing on implementation of institutions around the APPPPW, 





more and more.  Focusing on the rationalisation of hospital treatment 
and the decision of complications related to pneumoconiosis, it can be 
assessed that the gist of compensation politics in Korea is ‘pressure group 
politics without trade unions’. This is because the trade unions were very 
weak and subjected to the authoritarian government and, on the contrary, 
pressure groups had a very strong affect on the Government and trade 
unions.  
Compensation politics for the implementation and reform of the 
pneumoconiosis-related scheme was mainly conducted by the APP as a 
pressure group. However, there are some problems with the political 
context. To begin with, this terrain was not advantageous to all the 
pneumoconiosis sufferers. This is because the content tended to be 
introduced in the interests of the main members of APP. The APP, which 
is usually composed of hospitalised pneumoconiosis sufferers, cannot be 
a proper actor for the universal scheme and a partner with the government 
in the aspect of a balance of power. The worst problem lies in the political 
relations which can deteriorate the problem. It is assessed that the APP 
does not always work for pneumoconiosis sufferers in general but only 
those patients in hospital. In the style of compromise, the APP prefers not 
a type of public social dialogue but a confidential and secret compromise 
with the government.  
Therefore, the political actors, including their own representatives 
of APP, are being doubted by pneumoconiosis sufferers. Furthermore, the 
operation of the scheme has also come under question; for example, there 
has been a consultative institute133 on law but in reality, the committee 
has not operated until now. As a result, compensation politics results in 
politics of distrust. 
                                                 
133 The body has been established according to the APPPPW: ‘In order to respond to the 
consultation of the Minister of Labour concerning the establishment of a plan on 
prevention, etc. of pneumoconiosis, the Pneumoconiosis Deliberation Committee shall 






CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
 





Similarities between Britain and Korea concerning CWP are found in 
three aspects: the ex-miners with CWP, the relevant institutions and 
welfare politics. With regard to the past and present of ex-miners with 
CWP in Britain and Korea, they all worked in bad working conditions, 
and this led to various industrial diseases, including CWP. The British 
miners toiled in an extremely hazardous workplace in the nineteenth and 
the twentieth centuries in one of the most dangerous and unhealthy of all 
occupations (Mclvor and Jonestone, 2007: 27), and there is no doubt that 
Korean miners worked in similar circumstances. The differences between 
the two countries relate to the period of work. While the British miners 
worked in harsh working conditions during the nineteenth century and in 
more advanced workplaces in the twentieth century thanks to the 
nationalization of the mining industry and the strong solidarity of trade 
unions; Korean miners were still working in hardship even in the 1950s-
1970s, in similar conditions to the British miners in the 19th and the early 
20th centuries.   
 The experience of CWP also seems to be similar in the two 
countries. Both had this occupational disease occur in these workplaces 
and most sufferers are generally elderly and disabled. If there is a 





poverty than British ones because of the differences in the social welfare 
systems.  
 There is, furthermore, a similarity between the institutions 
involved. The sufferers in both countries are treated by welfare states 
classified as liberal welfare regimes. While Britain has established a 
welfare state based on the principles of minimum standards of living and 
universality, Korea has also introduced institutions in the areas of national 
insurance, social assistance and social services. However, there is also a 
difference in the period in which these institutions were introduced. 
Britain’s welfare system was established in the 1940s and Korea’s in the 
1990s.    
 Institutions for industrial injuries are also similar between Britain 
and Korea although, of course, they have different histories and different 
categories; the schemes are also similar in content and benefits. The 
characteristic difference is that while the CWPS in Britain is an institution 
formed by business-labour compromise, the APPPPW is secured by the 
Korean Government. Another different thing is that while medical 
treatment in Britain comes from the NHS, the treatment for injured 
workers in Korea is provided by the IACI.  
 In the case of welfare politics, there are many differences but 
there are also similarities. Above all, the ex-miners with CWP in Britain 
and Korea have the same purpose: to try to receive more benefits and they 
have made their efforts with the help of trade unions. Although there is a 
big difference in the influence and role of trade unions in Britain and 
interest groups in Korea, they are both miners’ organizations which 











The aim of a comparative social policy study is to discover differences, 
analyse them and finally expand understandings of social science through 
their implications. From this point of view, more differences have been 
found than similarities between Britain and Korea and it is, accordingly, 
accepted that the comparison between the two countries is useful for the 
comparative study. These differences will be described in terms of the 
determinants of welfare politics or the ‘deficiency of politics’: the role of 
trade unions, their political ability in relationship with a political party, 
and institutional legacies in two aspects of welfare system and corporatist 
system. Of these determinants, the role of trade unions, their political 
influence over a political party and policy making process and the 
corporatist system are closely connected while the welfare system is 
classified as another factor. Therefore the former can be examined as a 
category of welfare politics while the latter is discussed as social welfare 
system or welfare model, as can be seen in table 6-1.    
 
Table 6- 1 Difference between Britain and Korea 
 Britain Korea 
Main Period 1940s and 1970s 1960s and 1980s 








Welfare Model The Institutional The Residual 
 
Before examining these factors, it needs to be noticed that the welfare 
politics and welfare institutions have been designed based on different 
ideologies and social consensus in the two countries (see Table 6-1). At 





system based on the post-war consensus from the mid-1940s and the 
social contract, especially in the first half of the 1970s. In these periods 
respectively, the IIA and the CWPS were introduced. By contrast, social 
corporatism and a seemingly complete welfare system did not appear in 
Korea until the late 1990s. Before 1987, Korean society and state rushed 
into developmentalism with the slogan of ‘growth first, welfare later’ and 
had been ruled by the dominant consciousness of ‘anti-North Korea’ and 
‘anti-communism’. In this situation, Korean trade unions were just an 
executive committee designed to faithfully follow the goals and intentions 
of the authoritarian state. In this period, the IACI and the APPPPW were 
introduced without voluntary and active consensus in enacting the laws in 
Korea.  
Bearing this fact in mind, it is easy to see how the welfare system 
and welfare politics are understood in these countries. Firstly, regarding 
welfare institutions, Korean sufferers with CWP seem to be in greater 
economic difficulties than their British counterparts. The British welfare 
institutions against poverty secure an income which is at least enough to 
maintain minimum standards of living based on three components, social 
assistance, national insurance and demogrant. In addition, health and 
social services provide free medical treatment to the public through the 
National Health Service and personal services. Korea has also established 
a social welfare system with three axes, social insurance, social services 
and public assistance. However, it is tragic for the Korean elderly that a 
national pension, the main component of income maintenance, was 
introduced only very recently. Therefore, over-65s cannot at present 
receive these benefits. Furthermore, they can ensure their income with 
social assistance, but it is very difficult because the entitlement, based on 
the unit of family, is severely limited. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the Korean national health service is based on contributions and offers 





and does not offer all types of medical treatment.    
 Likewise, the quality and benefits from social security are 
definitely different. Korean social security is defined as being ‘residual’ in 
income maintenance and medical care and does not always give even 
these benefits to ex-miners because the welfare system has only been 
introduced recently. Unlike Korea, Britain offers free medical care from 
the National Health Service and provides a social safety net with a 
comprehensive care system for families with children, unemployed 
people, those on low incomes, elderly people, sick and disabled people, 
bereaved people, and others. 
 With regard to the IIA and the CWPS in Britain, and the IACI 
and the APPPPW in Korea which are designed to are for ex-miners with 
CWP, there are differences in the structure of the law. While Korea’s 
schemes exist as an independent social insurance, Britain incorporates 
them into the social security system.  An interesting aspect is that while 
the IACI provides medical treatment benefits and work-off allowances 
only to a small group of injured workers, these benefits are secured in the 
Social Security Act in Britain.  This means that there are nearly no 
benefits for income maintenance and medical treatment outside the IACI 
in Korea. Likewise, as far as industrial injuries schemes are concerned, 
the coverage of compensation in Korea may be more comprehensive than 
that of Britain because there are medical treatment and work-off 
allowances in these countries, which are of course secured by National 
Health Service and Social Security in Britain. For this reason, a Korean 
person injured at work would like to receive benefits, staying in the IACI 
for a long time.   
Do the differences in the welfare systems affect welfare politics? 
Injured workers in Korea yearn to receive the benefits of IACI because 
the benefits are almost full income and pay for medical treatment. In 





desire or an object of criticism according to whether or not they are 
recipients. By contrast, Britain covers these benefits in the social welfare 
system as well as providing compensation for industrial diseases. In other 
words, British workers with an industrial injury can be provided with free 
medical treatment and social benefits outside the IIA. Therefore, injured 
workers in Britain do not feel the temptation to stay in IIA for a long time 
compared with Korean workers. As a result, the welfare politics for 
compensation tends to be formed around the industrial injuries schemes in 
Korea and around the social security system in Britain. In addition, 
because the industrial injuries system in Korea provides limited 
beneficiaries with compensation for CWP134, the welfare politics tends to 
be established differently between ex-miners with and without benefits. In 
other words, the politics can be characterized as not politics for the 
general ex-miners but only for some ex-miners.  
As discussed above, welfare institutions affect the trend and 
characteristic of welfare politics around CWP. In this institutional 
situation, welfare politics makes a distorted implementation of institutions 
in Korea as described below. To understand this, the situation of welfare 
politics in Britain will first be examined; then Korean welfare politics will 
be examined.  
 Compensation politics in Britain around CWP can be identified 
as follows. Firstly, the politics of the introduction of the schemes was 
characterized as class politics based on social corporatism. In other words, 
the compensation politics was labour politics based on the tripartite 
participation between trade unions, employers and the Government. 
Secondly, the compensation politics identified as democratic or social 
                                                 
134 It is a problem that recipients are very limited. There are big problems in terms of 
limitation of IACA and social insurances in level of benefits. In the case of 
pneumoconiotics, only about 3,000 pneumoconiotics of approximately 30,000 who get 
miners’ lung (Welco, 2001) are in hospital due to the strict examination criteria. 






corporatism is based on the strong influence of trade unions on policy-
making process in state politics. For example, the introduction of the 
CWPS was also introduced by labour politics based on a social contract 
and social corporatism between the Government, capital and labour. As 
can be seen in Figure 5, the struggle around compensation of 
pneumoconiosis has been solved by social concertation between NUM 
and NCB, which are representatives of labour and ex-miners with CWP 
and of the government and British coal corporations respectively.   
 








G: Government  
Labour: Labour Party 
 
The processes of the CWPS’ establishment showed typical characteristics 
of social corporatism which were compromises by participants and 
classes, and the participants recognized this and were satisfied with the 
results of compensation politics. Likewise, compensation politics for 
introduction of the schemes in Britain are identified as a relatively fair 
exchange by the relevant participants. Regarding the IIA, there were 
exchanges between participants. For example, trade unions agreed with a 
proposal containing workers’ financial contributions to the IIA. This 
agreement means that trade unions accepted a financial burden. In return 
for this contribution, it was expected that trade unions could participate in 
administrative affairs and injured workers could all be institutionally 
compensated. In the case of the CWPS, the NCB and the Government 
TUC 
Labour 





urged the trade unions to take responsibility in return for the introduction 
of the CWPS while the Government made a promise for subsidies in this 
contract (NCB, NUM, NACODS and BACM, 1974: 440-441). Likewise, 
the compensation politics in the CWPS is identified as the politics of 
exchange due to the fact that on the one hand there were compensation 
benefits and finance for compensation and on the other hand there was a 
restraint of litigation to common law.  
 The compensation politics characterized as politics of exchange 
can be called a social contract. Firstly, this is because the exchange had 
been formed by participation and agreement of actors of labour politics, 
the Government, the TUC, the NCB, and the unions concerned. Secondly, 
the actors even including the opposition party, the Conservatives, were 
very satisfied with the results of the exchange, namely the Social Security 
Act, IIA, the ‘Plan for Coal’ and CWPS 1974. The politics of exchange 
based on social dialogue showed the power and influence of trade unions 
over the Government and the political area. In the context, the NUM was 
very positive about the establishment of the CWPS: “The scheme brought 
many benefits to miners and widows. The best of these was compensation 
to make up for lost earnings” (Thomas Coulter, Interview). 
On the other hand, the legislation in Korea can be understood in 
the context of deficiency of welfare politics. Firstly, instead of trade 
unions experts and pressure groups actively participated in the legislation 
of the IACI and the APPPPW respectively. As mentioned above, the trade 
unions were organized in line with the Government’s intentions and 
agreed with its ideology of anticommunism and developmentalism. In this 
situation of authoritarian politics, pressure group politics and class 
politics may have been impossible. This is exactly applicable to the IACI. 
Yet, fortunately, pressure group politics was involved in the policy-





The main actors in introducing the APPPPW were the APP and 
the Government as shown in the figure 6. The APP, acting on behalf of 
pneumoconiosis patients, became a key compromiser in the political 
bargaining with the government whereas trade unions and political parties 
kept a distance.  
 










KC: Korean Coal Companies 
 
There were no parties involved in introducing the IACI and the APPPPW 
and there was thus no relationship between a progressive party and the 
trade unions. This is because that there is no room for progressive parties 
in a political terrain based on anticommunism and developmentalism. In 
particular, “this political environment also deprived labour of political 
party support. No party in South Korea, even at the end of the 1990s, 
sought to identify itself with labour or to render organizational support to 
the working-class movement for fear of being branded as sympathetic to 
communism” (Koo, 2001: 12). Thus, almost everything depended on the 
will of the President who was assisted by bureaucrats and experts.  
To summarize the legislation, the IACI and the APPPPW can be 
characterized as a deficiency of welfare politics or ‘bureaucratic-
authoritarian politics’ in terms of the very weak role played by trade 
unions, the absence of progressive parties, the absolutely strong 










government’s legitimacy although pressure group politics did exist 
around the introduction of the APPPPW. Consequently, the Korean 
welfare politics had produced ‘a premature baby’ because of poor politics 
in the creation of social security institution as can be seen in the example 
of the IACI and the APPPPW.  
The weakness of welfare politics seems to lead to political distrust 
from the ex-miners. The political actors, including their own 
representative, the APP, the trade unions and the Government, were all 
doubted by ex-miners with CWP and this led to institutional distrust and 
institutional distortion in operation. In addition, their political weakness 
prohibits reflecting on the interests of workers and sufferers. “When the 
IACI was first introduced, the programme covered only workers working 
in mining and manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees” (Shin, 
2003: 64). In the case of the APPPPW, the deficiency of politics can 
make the problem even worse. It was perceived that the APP did not 
always work for the sufferers in general but just for a special stratification 
of them, HPP. The APP preferred a confidential and secret compromise 
with the government to reflect on its special interests. This finally resulted 
in separation between ex-miners with CWP and their representative 
organizations.  
Another negative effect which is caused by the political weakness 
is that subjects for compromise and discussion are very limited. In other 
words, the Government and relevant actors want to handle subjects 
confined to subjects such as level of compensation and the expansion of 
coverage rather than a reform of structures such as participation of actors 
and institutional frame. For example, the APP has been interested in 
“demands of HPP rather than the IACI in general” (Young-Sun Kown, 
Interview B1).  
 Based on the above discussion of welfare politics, there are two 





group politics and labour politics. Korean politics is characterized as 
interest group politics. Despite now having relatively stronger trade 
unions, there is a lack of intervention in policy-making and political 
participation. In particular, the organizational base, enterprise-based trade 
unionism, does not enable them to represent all workers.   
 By contrast, the politics in Britain can be recognized as labour 
politics or class politics. The trade unions created the Labour Party and 
participated in policy-making. This means that they have represented 
general interest. In this context, ex-miners with CWP did not have to form 
their own organization:  “This was one reason why there was no 
significant separate pressure group activity on respiratory disease in UK 
coal mining” (McIvor and Johnston, 2007: 233). 
 The most important difference between Britain and Korea is the 
political relationships among the main actors. Korean compensation 
politics for pneumoconiotics are conducted by the patients themselves, 
who organized APP and the Ministry of Labour; whereas compensation 
politics in Britain are subject to welfare politics handled by a tripartite 
committee of trade unions, businesses and the government. In particular, 
compensation politics have been supported by a social consensus such as 
the post-war consensus and social contract. 
To summarize, there are differences in the areas of welfare 
politics and welfare system between Britain and Korea as shown in the 
Figure 7. Welfare politics in Britain is identified as class politics, labour 
politics and exchange politics based on balanced power relations among 
classes and the corporatist political system. Welfare politics in Korea, 
however, is characterized as pressure group politics for specific parts or 
legitimacy politics for the national goal based on state corporatism. In 
addition, welfare politics has established different welfare institutions. 
Korea has established a residual welfare system while Britain has an 





politics in different ways: the interests of ex-miners with CWP are 
secured through established schemes by trade unions in Britain while in 
Korea the schemes are unfairly operated by interest groups for a sub-
group of the sufferers. As a result, in Korea, welfare politics based on 
these politics and institutions leads beneficiaries to distrust the 
Government, relevant institutions, and even their own organization. 
Similarly, the distrust which exists in Korean ex-miners with CWP can be 
understood and explained in terms of welfare politics and a welfare 
system which has been formed by welfare politics.    
  

























































2. Findings and Implications  
 
There are five findings in this thesis. Firstly, the distrustful attitudes of 





welfare politics which are closely related. Secondly, a principle of new 
institutionalism, the correlation between institution and politics, is evident 
in the compensation politics in Britain and Korea. Thirdly, in an 
explanation of the Korean welfare state, the power resources model which 
is rooted in political economy and corporatism is more persuasive than a 
cultural approach, Confucianism. Fourthly, there are many differences in 
this policy area between Britain and Korea despite similarities in their 
welfare state regimes. Fifthly, politics rather than institutions are the 
dominant explanatory variable. These findings will each be discussed in 
turn.  
With regard to the first finding, Korean ex-miners with CWP have 
to make a strong personal effort in order to receive benefits from the 
APPPPW while British ex-miners with CWP can rely on the general 
social security system and the efforts of their trade unions. Korean 
sufferers tend to have an overall distrust of the government, experts, 
institutions and even their own colleagues and organizations, making 
them isolated from society, whereas British sufferers trust their 
organization, the NUM, and, accordingly, have not set up their own 
organization for compensation outside the NUM. The explanation of this 
contrast lies in institutions and politics.  
 Firstly, there has been a deficient welfare system in Korea. As 
explained earlier, the Korean welfare system does not ensure income 
standards required for living and adequate medical treatment of the 
elderly. Thus, ex-miners with CWP prefer to be hospitalized for medical 
treatment and receive off-work allowances. However, the provision is 
very small and limited and outside of the IACI and the APPPPW sufferers 
are disappointed. The poverty and discouragement they face results in 
social distrust.   
 Secondly, there is poor management of institutions. The 





Government, the APP and professionals. There is little intervention from 
trade unions while some ex-miners with CWP are represented by the APP. 
In this situation, the management of institutions based on compromises 
between the Government and the APP seems almost as collusion against 
general sufferers without benefits.  
 Regarding the second finding about new institutionalism, the 
explanation is split into two aspects. The first one is related to the 
formation of institutions and the second to the management of institutions.  
 In the case of formation of institutions, attention must be paid to 
the institutional legacies; this will be discussed in two aspects. To begin 
with, the phenomena are explained by the weakness of social welfare. 
Korea has experienced a dramatic development in economic areas based 
on the ideology of putting an emphasis on economic growth. As a result, 
there is lack of welfare in Korea. This is because the developmental state 
and a few technological bureaucrats, who had regarded welfare as a 
luxury, introduced a welfare system primarily as a means to provide 
legitimatization to the authoritarian regime.  
 On the other hand is the politics of the residual welfare system, 
which has been created without trade unions, competes for limited 
resources and the main actors tend to be limited to small interest groups. 
A fundamental problem is that groups who support a welfare state do not 
entrench themselves.  The British experience was that the welfare 
system won the support of people and groups who were linked with 
institutions. Thus, they become avid supporters and this protects them 
from retrenchment in the case of a crisis in welfare. It can be proved from 
the Korean experience that the authoritarian politics created residual 
welfare institutions and hence political deficiencies in welfare politics.   
 In the case of the management of Korean institutions, on the one 
hand the politics of compensation is mainly run by the APP which is 





under the APPPPW leads to a separation between HPP and SPP. Likewise, 
a vicious circle of institutions and activities (or politics) creates political 
effects of distrust and distortion.  
 According to historical institutionalism, politics establishes 
institutions and the institutions affect politics; this is the pattern of 
welfare politics around pneumoconiosis compensation.  
 As far as the third finding is concerned, this thesis asserts that in 
an explanation of Korean welfare state, the power resources model is 
more persuasive than a cultural approach derived from Confucianism. 
The previous main perspective of East Asian Welfare Model is that, to 
simply, the model is characterized as a residual welfare system with 
responsibility of family, and its attributes stem from Confucianism.  
 There are several doubts about this argument. Firstly, the 
perspective can suggest mistakenly that people who are in the tradition of 
Confucianism agree with the residual welfare model, whereas we can 
draw no such conclusion because of the history of repression by 
authoritarian regimes. Secondly, there is a doubt whether the public are 
subject to Confucianism. After the rapid growth of Christianity in Korea 
in the 1970s, a majority of the religious population divide into 
Christianity and Buddhism. Only a few people tend to identify themselves 
as a Confucianist. In particular, there has been a dramatic change in the 
typical composition of the family from extended to nuclear family since 
the industrialization of 1960s. Thirdly, this explanation does not reflect on 
a change of political terrain since demonstrations in the 1980s in Korea. 
A new trade union movement called the ‘Democratic Trade Union 
Movement’ appeared as a main actor in labour politics and the group is 
identified as left-wing and militant. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
additionally, a variety of civic groups have acted in various areas and 
impacted on political arenas. Fourthly, it is necessary to re-examine the 





of economic growth in East Asia. Regarding familialism, Confucianism 
tends to regard family and state in the same light and does not contend 
that the state should hand over its responsibility to the family. Finally, the 
perspective based on Confucianism can lead to fatalism or path-
dependency. In other words, because the culture of Confucianism instilled 
into people cannot be changed easily, the East Asian Welfare Model can 
be legitimated as path-dependent and the transformation from 
authoritarianism to democracy made very difficult.  
 This thesis strongly asserts that the residual welfare system in 
East Asian state is based on deficiency of welfare politics rather than 
Confucianism. It shows that citizens have not accepted the values of 
Confucianism although the authoritarian state might seek to rest its 
welfare policy on Confucianism. In addition, their adoption of the 
residual welfare model is due to the state’s coercion and intentions 
reflecting the weakness of trade unions and the absence of a progressive 
political party. Therefore there was a lack of class politics as there were 
no political bases, such as trade unions, to act as a political partner in the 
corporatist system of compromise and leadership of these political groups 
to the public. In conclusion, poverty of class politics results in distrust of 
the East Asian Welfare Model which can be identified as residual social 
welfare.   
 Although the East Asian Welfare Model can explain insufficient 
welfare benefits, this still does not fully explain the distrust of 
pneumoconiosis patients to the pertinent institutions. When 
pneumoconiosis patients criticize the government and the institutions, the 
criticism tends to go toward the operation of the institution and the 
performance of the policy rather than institutions or policies themselves. 
Therefore the crucial problems of the institutions and policies lie not in 
the content of the institutions and policies themselves but the failure to 





the East Asian Welfare Model should be considered in terms of the 
weakness of politics in relation to consensus and compromise in addition 
to the weakness of welfare provisions.   
 With regard to the fourth finding, this thesis shows that there are 
big differences between the welfare systems and welfares politics of 
Britain and Korea although the two are often included in the same 
category of welfare state regime, the Anglo-Saxon Model. The main 
factor in these differences is the legacy of politics and institutions. In 
politics, the role and position of trade unions in welfare politics should be 
considered as a crucial factor.  Related to this, Castles pointed out that 
there is a peculiar clustering of the Anglo-Saxon nations around the 
liberal model but it is important to distinguish between those societies, 
like Australia and Britain, where the labour movement has played a 
significant role in social policy formation and those, like the United States, 
where its role was peripheral (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 75). In the case of 
the legacies of institutions, we should draw attention to the level of 
benefits available within the established essential institutions.   
 Within this general context, welfare systems were based on 
different institutional legacies and politics in their formation, 
transformation and implementation, it is also noted that the welfare 
systems in the two countries, including the institutions for 
pneumoconiosis patients, are also based on different political systems and 
institutional legacies. For example, Britain has a fully-equipped, 
consistent system of ideologies such as social democracy or liberalism, as 
well as policy concertation characterized as social corporatism and a 
balance of power, whereas Korea had been ruled by an authoritarian 
regime typified as state corporatism or a developmental state.  
 The fifth and final finding that politics is prior to institutions is 





following three ways the question of what causes the sense of distrust 
among the elderly with pneumoconiosis.  
 Firstly, are ex-miners with CWP criticising and distrusting the 
institutions due to their own greediness?  This assertion confuses a cause 
and a result. The institutions are responsible for the attitude of the elderly 
with pneumoconiosis, rather than the reverse. Their longings for benefits 
are related to their rights and it is natural that the poor institutions in 
aspects of benefits and politics result in excessive activities and demands.  
In conclusion, sufferers’ attitudes are not a cause but a result of bad 
institutions.  
Secondly, is it the institutions concerned? The answer is definitely 
yes. Unequal distribution and unclear operational processes lead the 
elderly with pneumoconiosis to a justifiable distrust of institutions and 
society. The authority and legitimacy of laws and the government are in 
danger in Korea due to the deficiencies of the institutions operating in 
these areas.   
What then about the third possible cause, welfare politics? The 
answer again is definitely yes. Politics generally plays two roles: creator 
and manager of institutions. First of all, politics enacts institutions 
necessitated by the power relations and needs of an era. In this process 
welfare politics expresses value distribution in social welfare in 
institutions. The internal power relations, intentions of actors and the 
struggle and compromise between them are inscribed in the institutions. 
The origin and identification of an institution can therefore be discovered 
in politics. In addition, institutions are also managed by politics. In other 
words, an institution in provisional existence becomes a social and alive 
subject when politics eventually animates it. Similarly, it is certain that 
welfare politics is responsible for criticisms and complaints of 






 The pneumoconiosis problem has been caused by politics and 
institutions, as shown in the analysis above. This is because politics as an 
inventor gives birth to institutions and furthermore it tries to preserve or 
change them in a reformist or a revolutionist sense although this is 
sometimes influenced by the order of institutions. Although the 
importance of both varies in accordance with a great variety of situations, 
relations and eras, the argument of this thesis is that the primacy of 
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Appendix A  
 
Interviews in Britain 
 
Name Position and Career Date/ Location Source 
Eric Varley Ex-Labour MP 
Secretary of State for 
Energy in 1974 
AUD/58 
Alex Eadie Junior Minister for 
Energy in 1974 
AUD/129 
D. J. Ezra  AUD/54 
L. Daly  AUD/40 in Miner’ 
Library 
M. McGahey  AUD/137 in Miner’ 
Library 
Arthur Scargill Ex-President of NUM AUD 143 in Miner’ 
Library 
Tony Benn Secretary of State for 
Industry in 1974 




J. Gormley Ex-President of NUM  Autography 




Meeting in Scottish 
Miner’s Home in 
Fife 
Wayne Thomas 8 May 08 
president of South 
Wales NUM 
 
Meeting in the 
office of South 
Wales NUM 




Meeting in Scottish 
Mining Museum 
N. Wilson 4 May 07 
President of Scotland 
NUM 
 
Meetings in office 
of Scotland NUM 
Dave Douglass 2 July 08 
Branch Secretary at 
Hatfield Main, 
currently Organiser in 
Transport and General 
Workers’ Union. 
 








Appendix B  
 
Interviews in Korea 
 
Institute Name (Sex) Position Date/ Location 
Kown, Y.S. 
(M) 
Head of IACA 
Department in the 
Ministry of Labour 
27. 04. 06. 
Kyonggi Province: Office of the 
MOL 
Park, M. S. 
(F) 
Assistant junior official 
27. 04. 06. 
Kyonggi Province: Office of the 





Ex-Minister in the 
Ministry of Labour 
27. 04. 06. 





20. 04. 06. 
Taebaek Office 
Kim, J. N. 
(M) 
Ex-member of the 
National Assembly 
02. 05. 06.  
Seoul: a coffee shop 
Politician 
Kim, Y. S. 
(M) 
Member of the Local 
Assembly in Taebaek 
City 
19. 04. 06. 
Taebaek: his office for election 
Jung, H. Y. 
(M) 
President of APP 
21. 04. 06.  
Taebaek: office of APP 
Hong, C. B. 
(M) 
The Director of APP and 
journalist of Daily 
Newspaper 
20. 04. 06. 
Taebaek: office of APP 
Kim, M.K. 
(M) 
President of ASPP(2) 
19. 04. 06. 
Taebaek: a restaurant ; Press room in 
Taebaek City Hall 
Pneumoconiosis-
related association 
Ju, E. W. 
(M) 
President of ASSPP(1) 
20. 04. 06. 
Taebaek: office of ASPP (1) 
Local Association 
Won, E. H. 
(M) 
President of Taebaek 
Self-Sufficiency Centre 
20. 04. 06 
Taebaek: office of  Taebaek Self-
Sufficiency Centre 
Kim. T. S. 
(M) 
The vice-chairman of 
FKMWTU 
25. 04. 06 
Seoul: office of FKMWTU Trade Union(1) 
FKMWTU Park. C. C. 
(M) 
Section chief of Safety 
Department 
25. 04. 06 
Seoul: office of FKMWTU 
Trade Union(2) 
FKTU 
Cho, K. H. 
(M) 
Director in Occupational 
Health & Safety Institute 
02. 05. 06. 
Seoul: office of FKTU 
Trade Union(3) 
KCTU 
Kim, E. G. 
(M) 
Deputy Director in 
Industrial Safety and 
Health Unit 
27. 04. 06 
Seoul: office of KCTU 





18. 04. 06 
Seoul: a coffee shop in Catholic 
Hospital 
Cho, K. S. 
(M) 
President of Korean 
Industrial Health 
Association 
18. 04. 06 
Seoul:  office of of Korean 




The director of the 
internal department  in 
Taeback Choongang 
General Hospital 
19. 04. 06 
Taeback: medical office of Taeback 




Social Worker in Taeback 
Choongang General 
Hospital 
3. 05. 06 





Appendix C  
 
Data for Development and Deline of Mining Industry in Scotland 
 
Coal Production in Britain (thousand tonnes) 
 Britain World Britain as % of World 
1913 292,043 1,214,685 24.0 
1920 233,216 1,167,710 20.0 
1925 248,408 1,188,527 21.8 
1930 247,870 1,221,978 20.3 
1934 224,383 1,096,178 20.6 
Source: TUCGC, 1936: 16.   
 
Deep-Mined Coal Production in Britain: Number of coal mines, output, 










1913 3,024   287,430 1,075 267 
1920 2,571   229,532 1,191 193 
1930 2,091   243,882 910 268 
1937 1,807   240,409 773 311 
1939    235,000 766  
1945    187,000 709  
1947 1,542 184,894 2,309 187,203 707 265 
1950 901 202,420 1,719 204,139 693 295 
1955 850 207,921 2,339 210,260 704 299 
1960 698 183,862 2,190 186,052 607 306 
1965 504 178,914 1,253 180,167 469 384 
* From 1948, the figures relate to NCB mines in production at the end of the year and 
exclude licensed mines. There were 233 licensed mines in production during 1967.  






British Coal Mining: Supply and Demand Since Nationalisation  
Million tonnes 
 1947 1957 1977 1983 1984 
Supply      
Deep-
mined 
190 213 168 107 35 
Opencast 10 14 7 14 14 
Imports 1 3 - 2 9 
 201 230 175 123 58 
Demand      




5 8 2 2 2 
 193 224 169 126 79 
Source: Robinson and Marshall, 1985: 18. 
 
Primary Fuel Input in Britain: Millions of Tonnes Coal Equivalent and % 
1948 1958 1970 
 
mtce % mtce % mtce % 
Coal 193.9 90.8 202.4 80.5 154.4 47.1 
Petroleum 18.7 8.8 47.2 18.7 145.6 44.4 
Hydro 
electricity 
0.9 0.4 1.5 0.6 2.6 0.8 
Nuclear 
electricity 
- - 0.1 0.1 9.4 2.8 
Natural gas - - 0.1 0.1 16.0 4.9 
Total 213.5 100.0 251.3 100.0 328.0 100 
Source: DTI, 1971.  
 
Production of Primary Fuels in Britain, 1980-2005 (energy supplied basis) 
Million tonnes of equivalent 





Hydroelectricity Total  
1980 79 87 35 10 0 211 
1985 57 139 40 17 0 253 
1990 56 100 46 16 0 219 
1995 33 143 71 21 1 270 
2000 20 138 108 20 1 289 
2005 13 93 88 18 1 215 














Anthracite Bituminous Total Anthracite Bituminous Total Total 
1977 1,209 105,914 107,123 1320 12,231 13,551 120,674 
1979 1,693 106,082 107,775 1,337 11,525 12,862 120,637 
1981 1,566 108,907 110,473 1,343 13,485 14,828 125,301 
1983 1,249 100,493 101,742 767 13,939 14,706 116,448 
1985 838 74,451 75,289 1,304 14,265 15,569 90,858 
1987 917 85,040 85,957 1,174 14,612 15,786 101,743 
1989 453 79,175 79,628 1,607 17,050 18,657 98,285 
1991 189 73,168 73,357 1,607 17,050 18,657 91,993 
1993 115 50,342 50,457 1,289 15,717 17,006 67,463 
1995 - - 35,150 - - 16,369 51,519 
2000 - - 17,187 - - 13,412 30,599 
2005 - - 9,563 - - 10,445 20,008 





Appendix D  
 
Data for Development and Deline of Mining Industry in Korea 
 
Coal Production of Private and Nationalised Coal Mines 











1962 7,444 100.0 3,535 47.5 3,909 52.5 
1964 9,622 100.0 4,635 48.2 4,987 51.8 
1966 11,613 100.0 4,104 35.3 7,509 64.7 
1968 10,242 100.0 4,256 41.6 5,986 58.4 
1970 12,394 100.0 4,454 35.9 7,940 64.1 
1972 14,403 100.0 3,809 26.4 10,594 73.6 
1974 15,263 100.0 4,410 28.9 10,853 71.1 
1976 16,427 100.0 4,617 28.1 11,810 71.9 
1978 18,054 100.0 4,672 25.9 13,882 74.1 
1980 18,624 100.0 4,786 25.7 13,838 74.3 
1982 20,116 100.0 5,006 24.3 15,222 75.7 
1984 21,370 100.0 4,953 23.2 16,417 76.8 
1986 24,253 100.0 5,218 21.5 19,035 78.5 
1988 24,295 100.0 5,221 21.5 19,073 78.5 
Source: Korea Energy Institute, 1988; Seo, 1993: 43-44. 
 
Coal production, Number of Pits, Number of Workers (1965-1991) 
 Productivity 
Number of Coal 
Mines 
Number of Wage 
Earners 
Year (thousand tonnes) (mines) (persons) 
1965 10248 128 35000 
1967 12436 155 40000 
1969 10273 129 32000 
1971 12785 160 39478 
1973 13571 160 34573 
1975 17593 239 45642 
1977 17268 145 48779 
1979 18208 201 53098 
1981 19865 219 60302 
1983 19861 346 59923 
1985 22543 361 67136 
1987 24274 363 68491 
1989 20785 332 47934 
1991 15057 170 32561 









Pit Closure in Korea (1989-1993) 




No. of Miners 
Nation 303 13,618 31,535 
Gangwon 156 8,700 18,996 
Taeback 42 3,564 8,585 
Dogae 8 229 836 
Youngdong 42 1,071 1,972 




34 1,866 3,488 
Source: CIPB, 1994; Kang, 2000: 34.  




Britain America Korea 
Reserves (million) 8,479 230,300 185,000 695,828 1,635 
No. of Mines 28 42 196 570 347 
No. of Miners 14,425 65,203 102,900 108,718 64,031 
Annual Production 
(thousands) 
16,012 80,200 108,100 318,000 24,295 
Rate of 
Mechanisation (%) 
76 99 94 99 49 
Deaths (per 
million) 
0.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 7.2 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix H  
 
Approval and Disapproval of Medical Treatment by Occupational Disease  
(Unit: Person) 
2000 1999 1998 1997 
 
A D A D A D A D 
Pneumoconiosis 416 266 402 142 475 62 661 381 
Difficulty in Hearing 
due to Work Noise 
144 20 224 60 221 29 264 99 
Metallic toxication 11 2 22 2 27 11 22 15 
Organic Solvent 7 3 52 69 56 63 82 62 
Chemicals 16 5 21 9 23 8 26 1 
VDT Syndrome 157 19 139 35 65 20 139 6 
Disease of Heart and 
Brain 
794 232 932 484 836 326 710 456 
Lumbago 81 13 75 26 57 22 79 79 
Others 78 68 70 93 72 47 43 78 
Total 1,704 628 1,937 920 1,832 588 2,026 1,177 
Note: A: Approval; D: Disapproval 
Source: Welco, 2001: 10.  
 
 
 
 
